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The OSCE Kosovo Verification mission (KVM) was established in October 1998, in order to 
verify the compliance with the UN Security Council Resolutions relevant to the Kosovo conflict. 
The breakdown of the peace process in March 1999, lead to the withdrawal of the mission and 
painted it as a failure. It is surprising, how many authors speak about a failure of the KVM, while 
giving no reasonable argumentation. This study will try to show, that this negative assessment is 
largely a product of misinterpretation of the KVM´s mandate and misunderstanding of the very 
purpose of verification (observation) missions. It was not the task of the KVM to prevent the 
ceasefire violations, neither to provide a peaceful solution to the conflict. It was to verify 
(observe) the compliance with the UN Security Council Resolutions. Verification (observation) 
missions do not seek any concrete achievements (mission goals; as e.g. peacekeeping or peace 
enforcement missions), their “goal” is their performance. They are to report the compliance with 
the agreements (in case of KVM also to provide a guidance), but however, the development of 
the situation is not supposed to be in their hands. Therefore, it is inappropriate to speak about 
successes of failures these missions, but rather about effectiveness of their performance.. 
Escalation of violence was a primary strategic goal of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 
order to undermine the ongoing peace process and achieve international military intervention, 
which they saw as the only way to independence. The unarmed KVM could do little or nothing 
to stop or prevent it. Wrong timing, insufficient staffing and deteriorating security conditions 
together with complete absence of enforcement measures were to large extent preventing the 
verifiers to perform its duties. Though, the mission had achieved considerable achievements 
mainly in keeping the ceasefire through brokering numerous small-scale disputes and thus 
acquiring necessary time for the peace process. 
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Topic Specification:    
 
Conflict prevention, early warning and early action have become crucial elements of any 
proactive foreign policy. It is generally acknowledged that the cost of effective conflict 
prevention is much lower than the human and financial costs of a conflict. Over the last decade, 
the number of regional and especially ethnically motivated domestic conflicts in the world is still 
increasing. Europe itself has not been spared. The phenomenon of extreme nationalism, ethnic 
cleansing, genocide and expulsion of whole populations have fully appeared after the dissolution 
of Yugoslavia at the beginning of 1990s. While the eyes of the world were aimed at the 
bloodsheds in Croatia and Bosnia, another crisis was smouldering at the very neighbouring 
Kosovo.   
The growing importance of the European Union and reconsidered NATO, is slowly 
starting to replace the sovereign foreign policie sof the traditional European powers, which 
proved to be tragicaly ineffective. However, both European and Transatlantic structures, from 
their very character can never fully replaced the role of OSCE and UN (mainly with regard to the 
Russian Federation) as a widely respected platforms for a political dialogue and instruments for a 
common action, which work on the basis of neutrality and sovereign equality. The OSCE 
member states covers the geographical area from Vancouver to Vladivostok and through its 
activities addresses a wide range of security-related issues including arms control, conflict 
prevention, early warning, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation, human rights, election 
monitoring and economic and environmental security.  
When the crisis in Yugoslavia broke out in 1991, the European Community was given a chance 
to deal with this indeed European problem. However, after failing to solve previous conflicts in 
the area1, the European Union resp. NATO, backed by the United States, again assumed the 
leading position in the international efforts for solution of the long smouldering conflict in 
Kosovo.  
After more than six months of escalating armed conflict between the self-constituted 
Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) and the Yugoslav armed forces, and five months before the 
start of the NATO bombing campaign, the UN Security Council in Resolution 1199, called both 
parties for an immediate cease-fire and for an international presence to monitor the withdrawal 
of the Yugoslav “security units used for civilian repression” and allegations of human rights 
                                                          
1
 considering the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia (Dec. 1991 - Jan. 1992) when Germany dealt regardless on the 
common position of the EC, and after the premature recognition of Bosnia (Feb. 1992; neither Croatia), which 
subsequently lead to the biggest wave of atrocities in Europe since the World War II., 
violations committed by both parties of the conflict. It was agreed, that the observation will be 
carried out by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).  
On 16 October 1998, as a result of difficult negotiations, an agreement between the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the OSCE was signed in Belgrade. The agreement, 
accepted under a high international pressure, obliged Yugoslavia to stop all security operations, 
reduce its forces in the area to pre-hostilities levels, and ensure the protection of human rights 
for all inhabitants of Kosovo. The provisions of the agreement stipulated that it was to be 
“verified” by an OSCE-ODIHR2 mission in strength of 2000 unarmed international civilian 
personnel, known as the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). The mission´s mandate 
was to monitor compliance with the SC Resolution 1199 and the adherence of the cease-fire. 
With the collapse of the so called Rambouillet peace process, the OSCE-KVM has been 
withdrawn from Kosovo on 20 March 1999, due to a deteriorating security situation in the area. 
Four days later, the NATO air strikes were launched (24 March 1999). 
Never before the OSCE set up such a large and complex mission, there was little or no 
prior OSCE experience, no personnel, no equipment, no concepts, and little knowledge of the 
ground. Some authors are speaking about its failure, some are even accusing it from gathering 
intelligence for NATO.  
 
 
The Aim of the Study:  
 
It is surprising, how many authors speak about a failure of the KVM, while giving no 
reasonable argumentation. This study will try to show, that this negative assessment is largely a 
product of misinterpretation of the KVM´s mandate and misunderstanding of the very purpose 
of verification (observation) missions. It was not the task of the KVM to prevent the ceasefire 
violations, neither to provide a peaceful solution to the conflict. It was to verify (observe) the 
compliance with the UN Security Council Resolutions. 
Verification (observation) missions do not seek any concrete achievements (strategic 
mission goals; as e.g. peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions), their “goal” is their 
performance. They are to report the compliance with the agreements (in case of KVM also to 
provide a guidance with them), but however, the development of the situation is not supposed to 
be in their hands. Therefore, it is inappropriate to speak about successes of failures these 
missions, but rather about effectiveness of their performance. 
                                                          
2 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights – the human-rights observation component of the OSCE 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate, whether the KVM was, within the given 
conditions, effectively fulfilling its assigned tasks. In order to find the answer, this study will 
analyse the mandate, operational environment and performance of the KVM, during the period 
from its deployment (October 1998 – 22nd March 1999). The study will attempt to demonstrate, 
that KVM was far more effective than it has been given credit for. It will also try to underline 
lessons for future verification operations in a highly volatile environment. 
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Introduction 
 
The OSCE Kosovo Verification mission (KVM) was established in October 1998, in 
order to verify the compliance with the UN Security Council Resolutions relevant to the Kosovo 
conflict. The breakdown of the peace process in March 1999, lead to the withdrawal of the 
mission and painted it as a failure. 
It is surprising, how many authors speak about a failure of the KVM, while giving no 
reasonable argumentation. This study will try to show, that this negative assessment is largely a 
product of misinterpretation of the KVM´s mandate and misunderstanding of the very purpose 
of verification (observation) missions. It was not the task of the KVM to prevent the ceasefire 
violations, neither to provide a peaceful solution to the conflict. It was to verify (observe) the 
compliance with the UN Security Council Resolutions. 
Verification (observation) missions do not seek any concrete achievements (strategic 
mission goals; as e.g. peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions), their “goal” is their 
performance. They are to report the compliance with the agreements (in case of KVM also to 
provide a guidance with them), but however, the development of the situation is not supposed to 
be in their hands. Therefore, it is inappropriate to speak about successes of failures these 
missions, but rather about effectiveness of their performance. 
Escalation of violence was a primary strategic goal of the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA) in order to undermine the ongoing peace process and achieve international military 
intervention, which they saw as the only way to independence. The unarmed KVM could do 
little or nothing to stop or prevent it. Wrong timing, insufficient staffing and deteriorating 
security conditions together with complete absence of enforcement measures were to large 
extent preventing the verifiers to perform its duties. Though, the mission had achieved 
considerable achievements mainly in keeping the ceasefire through brokering numerous small-
scale disputes and thus acquiring necessary time for the peace process.  
The purpose of this study is to evaluate, whether the KVM was, within the given 
conditions, effectively fulfilling its assigned tasks. In order to find the answer, this study will 
analyse the mandate, operational environment and performance of the KVM, during the period 
from its deployment (October 1998 – 22nd March 1999). The study will attempt to demonstrate, 
that KVM was far more effective than it has been given credit for. It will also try to underline 
lessons for future verification operations in a highly volatile environment. 
The study analyses the topic exclusively in actual contemporary situation and do not 
consider the events which followed after 22nd March 1999 (date of withdrawal of the mission 
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from Kosovo). It also does not analyze the KVM´s factual findings, unless they were related to 
the performance of the mission. All the local names are used in their contemporary official 
forms, i.e. Serbian in Kosovo.  
For elaboration of this work, I have used a comparative method, whereas comparing the 
original mandate of the KVM, and its performance in the field, taking into account the 
limitations set by the contemporary security situation in Kosovo.  
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Overview 
 
For a better orientation in the text as well as for an easy feedback, the study is organised into 
seven chapters (marked as 1-7), which are further divided into a number of sub-chapters (marked 
as e.g. 3.1-3.4), which deal with concrete topics. 
1 Chapter one briefly introduces the recent global security development and briefly 
describes the conflict prevention concept with a special focus on early warning systems 
and the role of the OSCE in the European security architecture.  
 
2 Chapter two offers a comprehensive overview of the Kosovo crisis, starting with the 
historical introduction, covering all the key events till the withdrawal of the KVM shortly 
before the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in March 1999. Understanding  
the historical consequences is, according to my opinion, crucial for understanding the 
essential motives and political incentives of the conflict.  
 
3 Chapter three provides description of structure, strength and strategic objectives of both 
of the belligerents and provides a short overview of the key aspects of the international 
involvement in the crisis until the deployment of the KVM. This Chapter, together with 
the Chapter five, should introduce the reader with the contemporary security situation in 
Kosovo, and the threats under which the KVM had to operate. 
 
4 Chapter four provides detailed overview of the KVM, including its mandate, structure, 
performance and operational environment. This chapter is inserted between the chapters 
three and five to enable the reader to better understand the limitations and possibilities 
of the KVM in performing its tasks within the given conditions. 
 
5 Chapter five provides a basic overview of the development of the conflict during the 
period of the KVM deployment, covering simultaneously all the key events of the peace 
process and in the field. 
 
6 Chapter six analyses the information from Chapters three, four and five, and derives 
concrete findings.  
 
7 Chapter seven draws conclusions from the findings of Chapter six.  
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Discourse on Literature 
 
During the elaboration of this study, I have put a great effort on impartiality and 
balanced approach. The same approach I used in choice of the literature and resources. 
Although there are many materials dealing with the Kosovo crisis, there are only few dealing 
exclusively with the KVM (with the exception of the articles of BellamyGriffin, 
Maissoneuvre and the OSCE publication “KOSOVO/KOSOVA As Seen, As Told”). 
However, none of them is focused on the same aspects as this paper. Therefore, I could not 
be much inspired by other author´s constructions and approaches, but instead I had to work 
with primary sources, construct my own approach and derive original conclusions.  
 
In regards to the origin, the sources can be divided into two basic groups:  
 Primary sources: OSCE, UN and other intergovernmental and governmental 
documentation, decisions, press releases, international treaties, etc. This group is 
mostly comprised of materials from the OSCE KVM Archive (OSCE Prague Office), 
the large and comprehensive analysis of the findings of the KVM Human Rights 
Division “KOSOVO/KOSOVA As Seen, As Told” and materials available at 
various governmental and intergovernmental online archives (e.g. www.osce.org, 
www.un.org, www.nato.int, www.parliament.co.uk, etc.).  
 
 Secondary sources: publications, studies and articles of various NGOs, independent 
think tanks and individual researchers. However, as there is no study dealing with the 
same topic as this paper, I could use these sources mainly during elaboration of the 
first three chapters. Especially, I would like to point out the studies from the OSCE 
Yearbook, published by the Centre for OSCE Research (CORE). They represent a 
source of high quality analysis, providing an objective view of both recent and current 
OSCE activities. 
 
For the elaboration of the Chapter One (Introduction), I have been mainly working 
with studies, dealing with the phenomena of conflict in the post-cold war international 
security (e.g. BailesWiharta: Armed Conflicts and International Security; Hopmann: Building Security 
in Post–Cold War Eurasia), conflict prevention concept and early warning systems (e.g. 
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MasonRichard:  Conflict Analysis Tools; Jentleson, Bruce W.: Coercive Prevention, Normative, Political, 
and Policy Dilemmas; Dress.: Desingning a Peacebuilding Infrastructure) and the role of the OSCE in 
the security architecture of Europe (Øverland: A Gap in OSCE Conflict Prevention; Burghardt: 
Early Warning and Conflict Prevention as Tasks of the European Union and EU-OSCE Co-operation; 
Hopmann: Building Security in Post–Cold War Eurasia: The OSCE and U.S. Foreign Policy).  
 During the work on the Chapter Two (Kosovo Crisis at a Glance), I have been 
working with literature, describing the broader political and historical consequences of the 
Kosovo crisis (e.g. Becker: The Kosovo Conflict: Political and Socio-Economic Aspects; Troebst: The 
Kosovo Conflict 1998; Reuter: Kosovo 1998; Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War).  
During writing of the Chapter Three (The Belligerents), I had to use literature dealing 
with the politico-military aspects of the Kosovo conflict, i.e. political background, strategic 
goals, organisation and strength of the parties and the involvement of the international 
community (e.g. HeinemannPaes: Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo 
Liberation army; Kosovo/Kosova as Seen, as Told; and also Troebst: The Kosovo Conflict 1998).  
During elaboration of the Chapter Five (The Six Months in Review), I was using 
studies focused on the development of the peace process (e.g. Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and 
the Kosovo War) and and the simultaneous situation in the field (e.g. Mitchell, Sandra: Human 
Rights in Kosovo; Gazzini: NATO Coercive Military Activities in the Yugoslav Crisis). In the majority 
of cases, the materials were acquired online, from corresponding webpages and various on-
line libraries.  
 
Particularly, I would like to point out several studies, which had been key sources for 
my work:  
 The studies of BailesWiharta and Hopmann provides a key overview of the post-
Cold War security development, providing useful tables and statistics, necessary for 
introduction to the global, resp. European security situation in late 1990s.  
 The studies of Dress, Jentleson and MasonRichard provides the theoretical 
background to the modern conflict prevention. They draw up a basic overview of the 
Conflict Prevention and Early Warning concepts. 
 The studies of Øverland, Burghardt and Hopmann analyses the role of the OSCE in 
the development of the Post-Cold War security architecture in Europe. They offer an 
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understandable analysis of the specifics of the OSCE position among the other 
international organisations in the area of Europe and Central Asia.  
 In the studies of Crawford and Gazzini I have found a great deal of analysis dealing 
with the failure of the international (NATO) policy towards the Kosovo peace 
process. However, from the most part, I could not draw from them, as their topics 
are from the most part beyond the scope of this study. However, I have been 
inspired in his basic thesis that the failure lies in a different levels of international 
politics, than was out of the reach of the KVM. Both of the authors puts the criticism 
mainly on the inability of NATO to deter both of the parties to the conflict equally 
and thus establish suitable conditions for the KVM. These publications provided an 
introduction into the contemporary international politics.  
 The study of HeinemannPaes provides a detailed analysis of the Kosovo Liberation 
Army, covering all the key information as history, political background, structure 
strength, financing, of the Kosovo Albanian rebels, which is, according to my 
opinion, necessary for complete understanding of the comprehensive nature of the 
Kosovo conflict and the environment, where the KVM was supposed to work in. 
Other useful information on this topic I have found in the study of Troebst. 
However, as it is focused mainly on the development of the field operations, it 
provides only brief description of the warring sides. 
 As stated above, for elaboration of the key parts of the work (Chapters Four, Six and 
Seven), I have been referred to primary sources. These were all sources of a high 
credibility, providing reliable factual information such as numbers, dates and figures. 
However, as they are written exclusively by authors personally involved through being 
employed in the correspondent international organisations (OSCE, NATO, etc.), they 
lack adequate level of critical approach. I had mainly used:  
 The KVM archive in the OSCE Prague Office – through the OSCE Researcher-in-
Residence Programme, I had obtained an access to nearly all the key KVM 
documentation, including the daily, weekly and bi-weekly reports, planning 
documents, organisational tables, statistics, etc. These documents were crucial in 
order to construct a factual overview about the actual shape of the mission, and 
about the possibilities and limitations coming out of it. The correspondence also 
helped me to understand the contemporary visions and perceptions of the 
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responsible officials, which was indeed interesting to compare with the later 
development. 
 The OSCE publication KOSOVO/KOSOVA As Seen As Told is an extensive 
overview of the KVM Human Rights Division (HRD) findings. It was a very good 
supplementary source, which enables better imagination of the contemporary security 
environment in Kosovo. However, it provides only a very limited information on the 
mission itself as it is focused only on the findings and does not provide any remarks 
considering to the structure or performance of mission itself.  
 In order to verify some of the key information from the secondary sources, and to 
gain the essential legal background, I have used corresponding international treaties, 
resolutions, decisions, press releases, etc. available in various online archives 
(www.osce.org, www.un.org, www.nato.int). 
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1 CONFLICT PREVENTION IN POST-COLD WAR WORLD 
 
1.1 The Dilemma of Conflict Prevention: State Sovereignty – Right or Responsibility?  
          One of the main dilemmas of conflict prevention is the question of right for an external 
intervention. The difficulty lies in the distinction between understanding of state sovereignty as a 
right and state sovereignty as a responsibility.1 History shows, that the conception of state 
sovereignty changed over the last century, starting with the President Wilson´s 14 points (1918), 
opening the questions of national self-determination a collective security. However, even if a 
noble idea, it was executed exclusively by the victorious Allied powers without regards to some 
of the defeated nations, what bequeathed the destructive heritage of irredentism (Germany, 
Hungary, Bulgaria). Even the only real result of Wilson´s thesis – the establishment of the 
League of Nations did not grant it any effective instruments how to prevent another armed 
conflicts and aggressions, what finally lead to the World War II.  
The establishment of the United Nations already learned from those lessons and 
embodied the organisation with many efficient instruments of conflict prevention. The question 
of state sovereignty can be found under the Article 2 of the UN Charter, where is written: 
“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” 2 Understanding of 
the state sovereignty as a right had been prevailing over/during the Cold War period (1945-
1990). However, as history has proven so far, the state can not be always considered as 
competent to solve its internal conflicts, especially if the government is controlled by one of the 
quarrelling parties (Yugoslavia, Rwanda).  
Staying neutral is not an option. As Bruce W. Jentleson writes in his study about the 
coercive prevention „While they [the international actors] may profess neutrality, by limiting their 
involvement to humanitarian rescue or simply staying out, there is no “non position” in the 
sense of no impact one way or the other.“3 If one side of the conflict realises that it currently 
possess the advantage of military power, so long as the other side cannot count on international 
involvement or direct support, there can be no surprise that war becomes an option of choice. 
This was highly visible on the case of the war in Bosnia. While the Bosnian Serbs possessed 
sufficient military power (in means of equipment), the arms embargo was applied on all sides of 
                                                          
1 Jentleson: Coercive Prevention, pp. 19 
2 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I, Art. 2;  
3 Jentleson: Coercive Prevention, pp. 14 
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the conflict including the poorly equipped government forces. That indeed caused a substantial 
prolonging of the war. 
The sovereignty-as-responsibility understanding is based on the conception of the human 
individual, not the state as the right and duty bearing unit in international society.4 It implies, that 
the state is established for its people, not the opposite. As the ex-UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan said: „The UN Charter ...  was issued in the name of “the peoples”, not the governments 
of the United Nations ... The Charter protects the sovereignty of peoples. It was never meant as 
a license for governments to trample on human rights and human dignity. Sovereignty implies 
responsibility, not just power”.5 This is embedded in the Article 3 of the Charter, which affirms 
that „everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person.” Article 55 commits the 
UN to „promote ... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” and Article 56 pledges all members „to take joint and separate action” in this regard.6 
Further commitments are also embodied in the Genocide Convention, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, and other international covenants that make no distinction on whether the 
offender is a foreign invader or one’s own government. 7 
As a fundamental involvement into the state´s sovereignty, any decision of the Security 
Council for an early action must be appropriately legitimised by factual evidence. One of the 
crucial instruments providing the basic field-based information for such legitimisation, are the 
early warning systems (EWS), particularly the international observation missions (see further). 
From their very nature, observation missions do not represent any military force and as so they 
generally require the consent of the hosting state. Certainly, more efficient would be a broad 
introduction of the so called „challenge inspections“ as it is a new practice in arms control and 
non-proliferation, where the „international authority can come in without national permission 
and apply extant treaty provisions and concomitant norms that are to govern state behaviour on 
these issues.“8  
Another important question is about the legitimacy for intervening. As the world’s only 
universal multilateral political body, the UN possesses the unique delegation to provide 
legitimization (authorize) for preventive, peacemaking and peacekeeping interventions. No other 
international organisation can claim a comparable role in establishing global norms or 
authorizing actions in their name. However, even the UN is often unable to act effectively 
                                                          
4 Cit. Jentleson: Coercive Prevention, pp. 19 
5 Cit. Jentleson: Coercive Prevention, pp. 20 
6 In the case of Kosovo (1998), the OSCE pointed out, thatthe  problem was not exclusively an internal affair of Yugoslavia, 
because it involved human rights and the security of the whole region. See Reuter, Jens: Kosovo 1998, pp. 189 
7 Cit. Jentleson: Coercive Prevention, pp. 20  
8 Cit. Jentleson: Coercive Prevention, pp. 21 
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enough to serve its norms. Therefore, several regional multilateral organisations (RMOs) have 
been established in order to play supportive (but not substitutive) role in regional conflict 
prevention and resolution, both military (OAU) or diplomatic nature (OSCE).  
 
 
1.2 Intra-State Conflicts in Modern World 
During the 20th century, war crimes such as genocide increased in an alarming manner, starting 
with the Boer war in South Africa and the expulsion of Armenians in the Ottoman empire, 
ending in the “recent” events in Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda or Bosnia. This was indeed mainly 
boosted by the technological development and rapid increase of the world population. However, 
a similar development  
 
Tab. 1 Regional distribution, number and types of major armed conflicts 1990-2003 
 
Source: Bailes, Wiharta: Armed Conflicts and International Security, pp.6 
 
can be expected to continue in the twenty-first century. The United Nations, NATO, European 
Union, OSCE and other multilateral international actors are constructed to brake this trend. 
Certainly, the best way to save the victims is to find the most effective method how suffocate the 
conflicts before mass atrocities begin. One of the instruments for doing this is deployment of 
observers as “the eyes and ears of the international community”.  
Since the end of the Cold War, the total number of “major armed conflicts” 9 in the 
world has generally declined. Also the number of „traditional“ conflicts between states has 
                                                          
9 The formal definition of an „major armed conflict“ accpording to the Stockholm International Püeace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) and the Conflict data Project of the Uppsala University (UCDP) is: „a contested incompatibility that concerns 
government and/or territory over which the use of armed force between the military forces of 2 parties, of which at least 1 party 
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decreased. However, this has been replaced by a reciprocial increase of intra-state (internal, civil) 
conflicts (See tab. 1).10 In Eurasia, the security landscape changed in a dramatic way. Conflict 
were mostly flared by the breakup along ethnic lines, with regional, linguistic or religious 
elements serving as the primary markers of identity. 11 
 The stirring history of some of the regions (Balkans, Caucasus), marked by large forced 
movements of populations, laid an terrible heritage, unknown by the “Western” society, where 
the ethnic links to territory are often multiple and produce secessionist and irredentist tensions, 
largely resulting in long and deadly conflicts.  
However, it is rather unusual for an intra-state conflict to remain a purely “civil“, keeping within 
one state´s boundaries.  Especially in the case of Africa, cross-border ethnic links and massive 
refugee movements easily overflow to the neighbouring countries and create temptations for 
their interventions. The crisis in ex-Yugoslavia showed, that conflict that begins as an intra state 
may also turn out into inter-state one, via creation of two or more new states. An overall 
tendency shows, that the major number of conflicts shifts to the developing countries and 
regions of the world, in particular to the Southern hemisphere (see Tab. 2).12 The number of 
conflicts in Europe reached its peak in 1993, as war in Yugoslavia and in several parts of former 
Soviet territory flared up. The number of conflicts in the Middle East remained static over the 
last decades, while Latin America have shown a slight decrease.13 Thus the world´s conflict 
hotspots became Africa and Asia (especially South and South-East Asia). This explains the 
general shift of concern of the European and Northern-American countries from open armed 
conflict as a threat to their security, towards struggle against the international terrorism and the 
so called „soft security“ issues such as social and economic dysfunction as its primary causes.  
Another remarkable feature is, that the proportion of the conflicts motivated by control 
of government and those motivated by territory (these might involve either inter-state border 
disputes, or secessionist claims of particular regions) was during the period of 1990-2003 
approximately balanced.14 It is possible to state, that conflicts over control of government 
consistently dominate in Africa, while conflicts over territory are more typical for Asia.15 The 
death toll is always the most complicated point. The data availability and accuracy are usually  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
is the government of a state, has resulted in at least 1000 battle-related deaths in any single year“. Bailes, Wiharta: Armed 
Conflicts and International Security, pp. 5 
10 From 1946 to 1989 there were 15 major inter-state conflicts, but in 1990, only one from total 31 conflicts. Bailes, Wiharta: 
Armed Conflicts and International Security, pp. 8 
11 Hopmann: Building Security in Post–Cold War Eurasia, pp. 5 
12 Bailes, Wiharta: Armed Conflicts and International Security, pp. 8 
13 Bailes, Wiharta: Armed Conflicts and International Security, pp. 8 
14 Bailes, Wiharta: Armed Conflicts and International Security, pp. 9 
15 Bailes, Wiharta: Armed Conflicts and International Security, pp. 9 
Vladimír Randáček                                                                 The OSCE Kosovo Verification mission 1998-1999 
15 
 
Tab. 2 Regional distribution and total number of major armed conflicts 1990-2003 
 
Source: Bailes, Wiharta: Armed Conflicts and International Security, pp. 7 
 
very poor. Killings in combat generally compose the smallest part of the casualties total, while 
the deaths by secondary causes (disease, famine, displacement consequences, etc.) prevail. The 
overall trend of successful democratisation process in the Central and Eastern Europe linked 
with the enlargement of NATO and the EU, distinctively contributed to the general stability of 
the region (See Tab. 3). Practically, there was no war in Europe since 1945 till the Yugoslav 
crisis. The Cold War block confrontation in Europe, with their nuclear arsenals ready for total 
mutual destruction, effectively blocked the willingness for any military confrontation on both 
sides. The tension than flew into a number of “proxy wars” between the protégés in other parts 
of the world. However, the foundations of many of such conflicts (especially in Africa) were 
mostly laid centuries ago by drawing the colonial borders without respect to the actual ethnic 
lines of division. The end of the Cold War in Europe was succeeded by an alternative system of 
positive partnership networks, agreements, and negotiating processes, designed to have a 
stabilisation effect such as NATO’s Partnership for Peace, the efforts of the OSCE, or the 
NATO’s and the EU’s enlargement processes.  
One of the basic explanations could be the lessons learned from the impact of the World 
War II, which led to the establishment of international bodies as the United Nations, Council of 
Europe, European Union and later the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 
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However, in the other parts of world, the developing democracies may often be vulnerable to 
instabilities that could easily trigger internal or external conflicts.  
 
Tab. 3 Number of Multilateral peace missions 
 
Source: Bailes, Wiharta: Armed Conflicts and International Security, pp. 29 
 
Internal conflicts can have many different causes ranging from ethnic, religious or 
ideological concerns (and their combinations) to territorial interests (usually over control of 
important natural resources). A particularly stubborn sort of conflicts is that linked with 
extremist ideologies producing an a priori intransigent attitude, unwilling to recede from absolute 
demands. That nowadays applies mainly to the Islamic fundamentalism (Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Pakistan, Algeria). Another problematic type of conflict is that motivated by combination of 
ethnicity and territory. Those are also of intransigent and long-lasting nature, especially if the 
secessionist groups define their demands in absolute terms that allow no compromises than 
secession and complete independence, thus challenging the survival of the very unity of the given 
state (Kosovo, Chechnya, Indonesia /Aceh/, Sri Lanka). In variety of such cases, even granting 
of any level of autonomy is not enough to solve the problem as the stubborn attitudes of the 
local leaders continue to cause problems e.g. with other residual ethnic groups, particularly those 
of the “parent” state nationality (Kosovo, Sri Lanka). But also the ideologically motivated 
conflicts such as those in Colombia, Nepal, or the Philippines are among the most cruel and 
costly. In general, the prerequisite for a peaceful solution of such kind of disputes lies in the 
ability of the parties to step aside from their absolute positions and agree on a constructive 
compromise.  
The broad majority of modern intra-state conflicts are caused by multiple reasons. Often, 
the rebels try to produce chaotic conditions and use partisan type of warfare (Iraq, Afghanistan, 
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Pakistan) including criminal and terrorist practices as genocide, ethnic cleansing (Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Rwanda), kidnapping, torture, public assassinations, suicide bombing (Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka) or use of child soldiers (Cambodia, Africa). Very often, the 
rebelling fraction´s ability to fight is financed from criminal activities like drug production 
(Afghanistan, Colombia), trafficking (Kosovo) or illegal trade such as with diamonds (Africa). 
One of the options how to brake stop these practises is to decrease the intensity of the conflict 
trough squeezing these activities and getting the control over the international trade with arms 
i.e. with Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), which are the typical “poor man’s weapons” 
fuelling the intensity of many local conflicts. However, the case of Rwanda machete-killing 
genocide shows, that it is not always enough. An ideal place for such deadly type of conflicts are 
the so called “weak” or “failed” states (Afghanistan, Iraq), which, e.g. due to a regime change, 
lost its official monopoly of the use of force and it is no longer able to stop the violence.  
However, there is still not any single pattern of international conflict management. As 
history shows, intra-state conflicts are more difficult to settle through peaceful means than the 
conflicts between states. Numerous studies find negotiations in intra-state wars successful in only 
29 % cases compared to 55 % of successes in negotiating the inter-state conflicts.16 During the 
1945-1993 period, only 14 of 91 cases were successfully resolved through negotiations. 
Moreover, there is no equal correspondence between the human-dimension of the conflicts and 
international response to them (see Tables 3-4). To be fair, it is necessary to mention that neither 
the UN nor anyone else has the resources to intervene everywhere and even if the resources 
would be present, it would certainly not be always possible to reach the necessary universal 
consent. In some cases it even seems that the pattern of intervention is dictated more or less by 
the strategic interests and policies of the certain world powers. Some of the longest-running 
deadly conflicts have not yet seen any external military intervention at all (Myanmar, Sudan up to 
2004).  
 
 
1.3 Conflict Prevention and the Early Warning Systems Concept 
Conflict prevention can be defined as „actions and institutions that are used to keep political 
disputes between and within states from becoming violent, and to hinder existing violent 
conflicts from escalating“ 17 It can be applied both to:18  
 
                                                          
16 Jentleson: Coercive Prevention, pp. 15 
17 Cit. Øverland: A Gap in OSCE Conflict Prevention? Pp. 3 
18 Øverland: A Gap in OSCE Conflict Prevention? Pp. 3 
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 Initial outbreak of violence 
 Its escalation 
 The relapse of sleeping conflicts into it 
 
Some authors use the metaphor comparing conflict prevention logic with preventive 
medicine logic as „don’t wait until the cancer has spread or the arteries are fully clogged.“ 19 
Some are critical to it saying that it is just an appealing medical metaphor that is far from the 
reality of a political conflict. They continue to question „the ability of social science to precisely 
forecast the outbreak of violent domestic conflicts.“ 20 Yes, it is indeed hard to assess the level of 
success of any conflict prevention action, as conflict prevention from its very nature misses the 
factual feedback necessary for a retroactive evaluation or justification of an external intervention 
or laid in other words „How does one prove that one prevented something that didn’t happen?“ 
21 The difficulty is, that the performance has to be judged largely by what has not happened, as 
the very success of conflict prevention means the absence of violent conflict i.e. factor, that 
normally draws the public attention necessary to generate the political will required to undertake 
an action. As Terrence Hopman wrote: “Conflict prevention successes are frequently overlooked 
in large part because, from the point of view of the media and most political figures, when 
conflicts are prevented it appears that nothing happened.”22 
Within the field of conflict prevention, several important „contraceptive“ terms have been 
developed to distinguish the particular methods and approaches: 
 
 preventive action 
 preventive engagement 
 preventive deployment 
 conflict prevention 
 crisis prevention 
 preventive diplomacy23 
 
„Preventive diplomacy“ is certainly the most important of them. It has been lifted by the UN 
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, who tried to use it for insulating conflicts from the 
contemporary bipolar rivalry. The concept has been unearthed again in 1992 by the UN 
                                                          
19 Cit. Øverland: A Gap in OSCE Conflict Prevention? Pp. 4 
20 Cit. Øverland: A Gap in OSCE Conflict Prevention? Pp. 4 
21 Cit. Øverland: A Gap in OSCE Conflict Prevention? Pp. 4 
22 Hopmann: Building Security in Post–Cold War Eurasia, pp. 40 
23 Øverland: A Gap in OSCE Conflict Prevention? Pp. 3 
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Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Gali in his „Agenda for Peace“, where he defined four basic 
components of it:24 
 
 fact-finding 
 confidence-building 
 early warning 
 preventive deployment 
 
However, there are uncertainties about using the term „preventive diplomacy“ as the word 
„diplomacy“ can be easily understood more narrowly than necessarily. Sometimes it is 
substituted by using the term „preventive action“ or simply with the broader term „conflict 
prevention“, as the later one can be often to large extent in practise understood synonymously. 25  
The general definition of early warning and its tool – the early warning systems (EWS) is “any 
organised initiative for the systematic collection of information from areas of crisis in order to: 
 
 anticipate the start and/or escalation of violent conflict; 
 develop strategic responses to crisis;  
 propose clear and feasible options for the international community and its bodies, 
humanitarian agencies, governments and other parties involved, to support their decision 
making and effective response strategies.” 26 
 
This can include various practices ranging from basic data collection and analysis to prompt risk 
assessment from the crisis area.  
 The EWS has been evolving since the 1950s, particularly in two basic ways – while the 
Cold War military/strategic intelligence evolved towards pre-emption, the civilian systems 
evolved mainly towards forecasting humanitarian and natural disasters such as famines, droughts 
and epidemic (e.g. United Nations Humanitarian Early Warning System).27 Currently, the early 
warning focuses mainly on identifying the most salient conflict indicators, providing balanced 
situational analysis, assessing mid-term and long-term crisis scenarios and suggesting suitable 
opportunities for peacemaking.28 During the last two decades, the EWS have been mainly used 
to analyse complex humanitarian emergencies such as genocide, forced displacements, other 
                                                          
24 Ghali: An Agenda for Peace, pp. 11-19 
25 Øverland: A Gap in OSCE Conflict Prevention? Pp. 3 
26 Cit. Dress, Tobi P., J.D.: Desingning a Peacebuilding Infrastructure, pp. 28 
27 Dress, Tobi P., J.D.: Desingning a Peacebuilding Infrastructure, pp. 29 
28 Cit. Dress, Tobi P., J.D.: Desingning a Peacebuilding Infrastructure, pp. 29 
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human rights violations, etc. Meanwhile, the EWS have been broadly divided into four 
methodological categories. 29  
 
 Qualitative early warning systems – field-based analysis by experts monitoring the 
situation and conducting research directly in the crisis zone. These field works are 
fact-finding observation (verification) missions. Field expertise is crucial for success 
of any early warning and conflict prevention. Only experts in field (observers) can 
comprehend the specific context, local popular views and emotions of a given 
conflict. 
 Quantitative early warning systems – are using systematic data collection and 
processing of empirical information according to a given set of criteria. It is mainly 
analytical work applied in causal and systems-dynamics models where conflict-
causing factors are isolated and attempts are made to reveal links between them and 
the outbreak of violent conflict. These models, based on a pre-defined set of 
indicators, are aimed to identify the conditions under which violence threatens to 
occur. They analyse the relations between the indicators and their importance to 
assess the possibility of flaring the conflict. 
 Some agencies use both of these methods simultaneously and combine constant 
monitoring (qualitative), event data analysis (quantitative), factfinding missions in the 
field and external expertise from a network of governments and NGOs. 30  
 At last, but not least, there are various networks which play only supporting role in 
the conflict warning systems. As different humanitarian agencies acquire the will and 
means to improve their communications with others for purposes of early warning, 
networks have proliferated although they do not create any strictly formal system. 
They also help to access resources, which might not otherwise be available and thus 
have the advantage of being cost-effective, since repeated field studies do not have to 
be done. Besides from publishing and seminar-organisation they also provide access 
for leading experts to exchange the analytical information, etc.  
 
Though the ability to predict and specify a conflict stays limited as conflicts are human-
made scenarios containing the element of irregularity and unpredictability,31 the EWS have 
become an essential component of conflict prevention that provides key information, scenario- 
                                                          
29 Dress, Tobi P., J.D.: Desingning a Peacebuilding Infrastructure, pp. 29 
30 See Dress, Tobi P., J.D.: Desingning a Peacebuilding Infrastructure, pp. 29 
31 Dress, Tobi P., J.D.: Desingning a Peacebuilding Infrastructure, pp. 30-31 
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and risk analysis, necessary prior a deployment of any international peacekeeping force. There 
are several typical alert indicators that signs conflict, which, observed and correctly identified in 
the early phases, can provide sufficient time to undertake adequate preventive or pre-emptive 
actions. These indicators are broadly defined as: 32  
 
 Mounting Demographic Pressures 
 Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline 
 Criminalization or De-legitimization of the State 
 Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines33 
 Rise of Factionalized Elites 
 Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance 
 
Almost every study on conflict prevention concludes, that the most common reason of 
failure is the lack of political will. At this point, we should look at the deep reasons of this 
phenomenon. Governments often fear losing the popular support due to possible casualties or 
costs of larger military involvement. Investing into an effective warning systems and giving the 
chance for an early action can effectively save these costs as preventing a conflict from escalating 
to violence is much more limited objective than ending violence once it has begun. The earlier is 
the possibility of conflict recognized, the more and easier options for an early action are opened. 
However, the options narrow and do not stay open over the time.  
It is the costs of waiting or inactivity, more than the costs of acting early, that are so high, 
it is conflict prevention, not inaction, that is the more rational and realistic strategy. As the 
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Max van der Stoel has expressed: “It is 
evident from the experience of Bosnia, Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia and elsewhere, 
that once a conflict has erupted, it is extremely difficult to bring it to an end. In the meantime, 
precious lives have been lost, new waves of hatred have been created and enormous damage has 
been inflicted. It is my firm belief that money spent on conflict prevention is money well spent, 
not only because it is cheaper, but especially because it saves so many lives.”34  
                                                          
32 Chido, Diane E.: Images of Twentieth Century Genocide: Decoding Images and Heeding Warnings, pp. 101 
33 In Rwanda, for example, the Hutu government started importing massive numbers of machetes, far above the number needed 
for agriculture, a full year before the violence began in earnest. On 29 March 1994 (one week before the killing began) military 
leaders “suggested that the burgomasters should instruct people in the use of traditional weapons, including swords, spears, bows 
and arrows, and machetes” See Human Rights Watch: “Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda.” (March 1999), 
accessed on 8 April 2006 at: http://www.hrw.org/ reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-02.htm#P29_10436 and “The Rwandan 
Genocide: How It Was Prepared.” A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, April 2006, Number 1., accessed 8 April 2006 at: 
http://hrw.org/ backgrounder/africa/rwanda0406/ 
34 Hopmann: Building Security in Post–Cold War Eurasia, pp. 20 
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The number of violent ethnic conflicts will certainly not decrease until the majority of 
local disputes will not be ignored till they become crises or extensive humanitarian emergencies. 
Very often these conflicts begin as localized disputes or result of tensions that could be resolved 
at local or national, or sub-regional levels if there were taken early preventive actions such as 
mediation or grievance settlement. In many cases, local disputes are addressed only after they 
become armed conflicts, what requires crisis intervention operations consuming massive supplies 
of resources. The aggressors are not only the ravaging bands in the field, but often highly 
organised fighting machines with an effective tactical and strategic planning. Their leaders are 
brutal, but they are not mad men. They make calculations and as such they have to be seen as 
rational. They do follow a logical calculus and the price they can pay depend on the interests of 
the ruling elite and often also on consent of their society. They indeed take into account what 
action the international community is likely to take (as it was with the KLA in the case of 
Kosovo). There have been numerous cases over the modern history when states have foregone 
apparent opportunities to reach their aims because they assessed the costs to be too high. The 
case of the 1993 UN preventive military deployment in FYROM (first as a part of UNPF, later 
UNPREDEP) is an important example of a successful early preventive action. The deployment 
of troops to the field at the very early stage of the conflict cycle compensated the limited size of 
the peacekeeping force and although the mission strength was modest, its presence was enough 
deterring factor.  
However, there is still a huge gap between early warning and early response. Effective 
conflict prevention still continue to be sporadic and mostly too weak, too late, often depending 
on the vagaries of geopolitics. The dependence of any large-scale military actions upon a 
presence of the U.S. military is the most frequent cause of the international community´s current 
inability to act.35 Moreover, there are also examples that even if warned in time and having 
certain military presence in the field, the international community, resp. the UN did not use these 
means in order to stop the occurring violence. This was the case of Rwanda. When UNAMIR 
commander General Romeo Dallaire passed a warning based on detailed information from a 
Hutu informant to the UN Headquarters and asked for authorization to take preventive action,36 
                                                          
35 The Nordic countries and Canada took on the bulk of the burden for this operation, but the U.S. troops, despite being small in 
number and confined to low-risk duties, were disproportionately important as “a signal to all those who want to destabilize the 
region,” as stressed by President Kiro Gligorov of Macedonia. For more see Jentleson: Coercive Prevention, pp. 16 
36 Concretely searching for and confiscating arms caches revealed by the informant who even provided precise locations for 
many of them. A study by the Carnegie Commission dates the last opportunity for an emergency intervention short of massive 
military force was the last week of April, by which time mass violence had spread to the countryside. One of the main reasons 
why the Hutu “crisis committee” decided to expand violence to the countryside was “the failure of the international community 
to respond forcefully to the initial killings in Kigali and other regions.” Jentleson: Coercive Prevention, Normative, Political, and 
Policy Dilemmas, pp. 17 
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he was turned down. Dallaire repeated his requests the next month but the reply was same. He 
was turned down even during the April 1994 crisis when asked for strengthening the UNAMIR 
force.37 
Although the international community had achieved several successes during the first 
decade of the post-Cold War era, it was, however, more significantly stigmatised by missed 
opportunities. Many of interventions authorized by the UN Security Council over the 1990s 
(Iraqi Kurds, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, East Timor, Kosovo), have been rather reactive than 
preventive, stopping or reducing already flaring conflicts where practices of mass violence 
already occured. Many international observation and peacekeeping missions, which could actually 
be, from the professional point of view (i.e. within the tasks set) considered as successful, are due 
to a negative media misinterpreted as failures. Among others, this was the case of the 
UNPROFOR mission to Bosnia (1992-1995), UNOSOM II mission to Somalia (1992-1993) and 
the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (1998-1999).  
 
 
1.4 The Role of OSCE in the European Security 
The very origins of OSCE lay already in the 50s when the Soviets proposed summoning 
a conference, which would finally resolve the “German question” and confirm the post-war 
status quo in Europe (1954). This attempt was left unheeded as the Western countries did not 
agree with some of the proposed implications.38 In the mid 1960s, the USSR, now under the 
auspices of the Warsaw Pact, again proposed summoning a conference on security and co-
operation, which would not only confirm the status quo in Europe, but also introduce for larger 
economic co-operation between the two blocks. The idea met with a positive reaction of the 
neutral and non-aligned states, but NATO conditioned its participation with several conditions 
including the participation of the U.S. and Canada, reconfirmation of the status of Berlin, 
number of conventional weapons in Europe and at last, but not least, human rights.39 After the 
positivist West German Chancellor Brandt´s  “Ostpolitik” the West-East tension considerably 
relaxed and the Soviet union agreed on the conditions and promised its participation. Finally, 
Finland offered to host the preparatory talks which lasted from 22nd November 1972 till 8th 
June 197, concluding with the “the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations”(also 
known as the “Blue Book”), which drew up arrangements for a three-stage conference. All the 
                                                          
37 Jentleson: Coercive Prevention, pp. 17 
38 OSCE: History of the OSCE, pp. 1 
39 OSCE: History of the OSCE, pp. 1 
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states had to participate as “sovereign and independent States and in conditions of full equality”, 
with all the decisions to be taken by consensus. The issues were organized under four headings:  
 Security in Europe 
 Co-operation in the Fields of Economics, Science, Technology and Environment 
 Humanitarian and other Fields 
 Follow- Up to the Conference 
 
The fact that Western states succeeded to supplement of the human rights issues to the 
conference agenda later proved to be a fatal success and the CSCE provided a large contribution 
to the fall of the Eastern Block. In December 1975, when the “Final Act” was signed, a series of 
conferences were held dealing with European security issues.  
The collapse of the former Eastern block was simultaneously followed by the collapse of 
both Warsaw Pact and Comecon and members of the NATO and EU originated only in the 
West. The only surviving organisation dealing with security issues and covering the Eastern area 
was the CSCE. It adapted to the new security challenges and transformed from a bridge between 
the Eastern and Western Europe into a platform where all the states “from Vancouver to 
Vladivostok” including the US, Canada and the former Soviet republics can equally participate to 
build peace and stability in the region.  
In 1994, at the summit in Budapest, the organisation was transformed into a fully 
institutionalized regional security organisation (RSO) under the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, 
with a permanent secretariat and associate bodies. The new organisation was named as the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The CSCE was from the beginning a 
political, not a legal organisation.40 This fact enabled it to be more flexible than if operated under 
formal treaties. There was an initiative of some of the member states during the Budapest 
summit, to grant the OSCE a special status under international law in conjunction with 
proclaiming as a RSO under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, the attempt was 
turned down by majority of the member states, mainly by the US, arguing that it would be on 
account of its flexibility.41 Another important contribution of the Budapest summit was the 
adopting of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, which sets a regional 
normative framework for all aspects of military activity, including civil-military relations, the 
conduct of warfare, and the behavior of military personnel in combat. 
                                                          
40 Hopmann: Building Security in Post–Cold War Eurasia, pp. 14 
41 Hopmann: Building Security in Post–Cold War Eurasia, pp. 14 
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Over the following years, the OSCE gradually became the third main contributor to the 
European security after EU and NATO, and, except the UN, also the most universal one.42 
OSCE also preserved its unique linkage between the politico-military issues and the human 
rights dimension, establishing the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR) and High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). Over the past decade, the 
OSCE activities has covered different security issues extending from politico-military matters, 
over human and minority rights to economic and environmental issues. Concretely in the field of 
conflict-prevention its main focus is to identify and respond to brewing conflicts in order to 
prevent the outbreak of violence. In the field of conflict resolution OSCE has provides third-
party functions (good services) as assisting in the negotiation of ceasefires between warring 
parties. Further, it monitors peace, ceasefires and compliance with bilateral or multilateral 
arrangements.  
Surprisingly, to achieve such large scope of activities, the organization operates with 
considerably smaller budget than other organizations of its type and with entire permanent staff 
of only cca 250 people (including interpreters and 180 persons employed at the secretariat).43 For 
illustration, the entire budget of the OSCE for 1998 was about 2.2 billion Austrian schillings 
(U.S. $180 million), more than 82 % of which was allocated solely to the largest OSCE missions 
and projects in Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia.44  
Many of the critics of OSCE are pointing out its past “failures” in conflict prevention 
and resolution. Most cite are the cases of Croatia and Bosnia (1991-1992), Kosovo (1998-1999) 
or to resolve the frozen conflicts in Nagorji-Karabakh, Transdniestria and Georgia (Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia).45 OSCE has undoubtedly much greater potential to contribute to the Eurasian 
security than it is generally recognized. It has several very important comparative advantages 
comparing with other institutions like its universality and human dimension accent. Its criticized 
weaknesses originate mainly from the inadequate resources and lack of political support. 
However, it has proven that once it is given with any amount of resources, it is capable to use 
them with maximal results.   
 
 
 
                                                          
42 Majority of experts and leaders especially from Russia argue that only the OSCE can play the role of a pan-European security 
institution in the next decades. See Hopmann: Building Security in Post–Cold War Eurasia, pp. 3 
43 Hopmann: Building Security in Post–Cold War Eurasia, pp. VI 
44 Hopmann: Building Security in Post–Cold War Eurasia, pp. 14 
45 Hopmann: Building Security in Post–Cold War Eurasia, pp 46 
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2 THE KOSOVO CRISIS AT A GLANCE 
2.1 Historical Background 
odern Albanians derive their origins from the Indo-European Illyrian tribes, 46 which settled 
the area during the first Indo-European migration into Europe, ergo much earlier, than the 
Slavic Serbs who immigrated there in the 6th century. The particular area of today´s Kosovo 
was inhabited by the Illyrian tribe of Dardanians. In 160 BC, the area was conquered by the 
Roman Empire and annexed as the province of Illyricum (59 BC). In 87 AD, the region became 
part of the province Moesia Superior, later (post 284) further reorganized by Diocletian into 
smaller provinces, from which Dardania included eastern parts of modern Kosovo, while the 
western part belonged to the province of Prevalitana. During 6th century AD, the area was 
annexed by the Byzantine Empire. During the 6th and 7th century AD, the area was under 
constant Slavic expansions. During the 9th century AD, the region fell under the rule of 
Bulgarian Empire, and in 1018 it was re-absorbed into Byzantium. In 1180, the young Serbian 
state took control over it. 
 Serbia was not an integrated state entity at the time. It was divided into a number of 
smaller kingdoms with dominating centres in Raška (modern central Serbia) and Duklja 
(Montenegro). By 1216, the king Stefan Nemanja and his successor Stefan Prvovencani, united 
the Serbian states creating an entity covering most of the area of today´s Serbia and Montenegro. 
The rule of the Nemanjić dynasty (14th century), was the age of establishment of many orthodox 
churches and monasteries built throughout Serbian territory and especially in Kosovo. 
Monasteries such as in Metohija, were usually given by large estates and possessed a great 
authority within the Serbian state. At that time Prizren and Priština became alternatively the seats 
of the Nemanjic rulers. Kosovo was traditionally of a great economic importance for the region, 
with Pristina as one of the major trading centres in the region lying on a junction of the trade 
routes to the Adriatic ports. There was a number other ethnicities living along with Serbs and 
Albanians, among others Vlachs, Greeks, Armenians, Saxons and Bulgarians. However, the 
Ottoman tax-register of 1455, which took into account religion and language, shows the 
population share of 65% Serbs and only 4-5 % Albanians.47 After the death of tsar Stefan Dusan, 
the Serbian state dissolved into many smaller vassal territories. The Ottomans took the 
advantage of the weakened Serbian power and invaded the country. 
                                                          
46 Becker, Jens: The Kosovo Conflict: Political and Socio-Economic Aspects, pp. 10; Ptolomey in the 2nd century AD names an 
Illyrian tribe living in the territory of today´s central Albania as "Albanoi" See http://www.britannica.com/eb/topic-
12564/Albanoi (visited 30.04.2008) 
47 Becker, Jens: The Kosovo Conflict: Political and Socio-Economic Aspects, pp. 11 
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 On 28th June 1389, the united Christian army of the prince (knez) Lazar Hrebljanovic 
suffered a crushing defeat from the sultan Murat I. in what is now known as the first battle at the 
Kosovo Polje.48 Both of the rulers had been killed during the fight. Serbia maintained its 
independence and a sporadic control over Kosovo until the final defeat in 1455, however, the 
battle was a fatal blow to the Serbian resistance and subsequently became the main symbol of 
national heroism and unity of the Serbs. The mysterious death of Lazar, executed by the Turks 
or slain on the battlefield, has been regularly commemorated (the cult of Lazar).49 
Together with the anti-Ottoman fight Hunyady in the neighbouring Hungary, Skanderbeg in 
Albania and Vlad III. Tepes in Wallachia, was the Serbian resistance one of the main braking 
factors to the overwhelming Ottoman expansion to Europe, which gave important time to the 
Habsburg territories and Italian states to prepare for the defence. 
The Ottoman rule was to last for next five centuries. Within the Ottoman territorial 
division, Kosovo had a status of vilayet.50 During the war of 1683-1699, the region was 
temporarily occupied by the Habsburg forces under leadership of Margrave Ludwig von Baden 
(October 1689) which found a great support from the local Christians, but was soon pushed 
back by the Ottomans (summer 1690). That year, the Serbian Patriarch of Pec Arsenije III. led a 
wave of cca 37,000 Christian (mostly Serb) families from Kosovo, to evade the Turkish 
vengeance. Waves of Christian (which meant mainly Serb) emigration from Kosovo continued 
throughout the whole 18th century. There is an evidence of increasing Albanian population Over 
the 17th century, initially around Metohija, which is considered to be a result of out of the south-
west (i.e. modern Albania). In 1766, the Ottomans abolished the Pec Patriarchate and 
considerably reduced the Christian rights in the region. During the whole period of the Ottoman 
rule the area was subjugated to an extensive islamisation, during which majority of the Albanian 
population converted to Islam.  
 In 1878, representatives of the four Albanian-inhabited vilayets (See Appendix VIII) 
founded the League of Prizren in order to demand autonomy from the Ottoman power and 
resist the territorial claims of the emerging Balkan states. The establishment of the League was 
an important landmark in the movement for Albanian self-determination. In 1910, an Albanian 
uprising begun in Pristina and soon spread over the whole Kosovo and western Macedonia, 
demanding autonomy and modulation of taxation. The revolt was initially supported by the 
Young Turk movement who promised to fill its demands. However, after the Young Turks came 
                                                          
48 Second battle of Kosovo Polje was fought in 1448 between the Ottoman army lead by sultan Murat II and the Hungarian army 
lead by John Hunyady. Although the battle was larged than the first battle at Kosovo Polje, it had the same result. The Hungarian 
army was pushed out of the field but Hunyady was able to maintain Hungarian resistance against the Ottoman expansion over 
his lifetime. Both of these battles had a significant role in the anti-Ottoman resistance in the Balkans.  
49 Becker, Jens: The Kosovo Conflict: Political and Socio-Economic Aspects, pp. 10 
50 Vilayet – geographical administrative unit within the Ottoman Empire. 
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into power, they soon forsaken their promises and in June 1910, the Turkish army brutally 
suppressed the uprising. The Albanian nationalist organisations were outlawed, Albanian schools 
were closed down and the entire cultural life was paralysed.  
Even if proclaimed already in 1912 during the first Balkan War, the independence of 
Albania was officially sealed by the Treaty of Bucharest in November 1913, closing the second 
Balkan war. The decision was strongly opposed by Serbia, who wanted to acquire corridor to the 
Adriatic through the Albanian-inhabited territories, but the Serbian demand was rejected by 
Austria and Italy. However, still about a half of the Albanian population was left outside the 
borders of the newly formed Kingdom of Albania.51 Large territories where Albanians created 
majority were to be found in Montenegro (around the town of Ulqin on the Adriatic), Serbia 
(Kosovo and Polog, i.e., the Western part of Vardar Macedonia), and Greece (Çamçria region in 
the Epirus Mountains). 
The territory of Kosovo was annexed by the Kingdom of Serbia and by the Kingdom of 
Montenegro (Metohija) during the first Balkan War. This territorial division was confirmed by 
the Treaty of London in January 1913. From the Serbian point of view, it was the “fulfilment of 
a national vision”,52 whereas the Albanians regarded it as a division of their nation. The new 
borders were more a matter of political and military ambitions of the particular Balkan states 
resp. protégés of the European great powers and were largely ignoring the right of self-
determination of the local populations.  
After the World War I.53 both of the Kingdoms (Serbia and Montenegro) became parts 
of the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians (KSCS). The new state did not grant the 
Albanian population with a minority status and the cultural rights going with it. The leading 
nation – Serbs regarded Kosovo as their ancestral homeland and the Albanians were being 
regarded as aliens. Education and publication in Albanian language was prohibited, voting right 
was granted, but the strong intimidation of the only substantial Albanian political party – the 
Dzemijet movement, prevented it from obtaining a single mandate at the parliamentary elections 
of 1925.54 There were several evacuation campaigns to Turkey and increasing discrimination and 
repression from the side of the state authorities such as arrests and single killings.55 This 
treatment increased the irredentist moods, which escalated in the uprising of 1923-1924,56 when 
the guerrillas partly succeeded to drive out the Yugoslav forces and liberate separate areas where 
                                                          
51 Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 2 
52 Cit. Becker, Jens: The Kosovo Conflict: Political and Socio-Economic Aspects, pp. 11 
53 During the war Kosovo was occupied by the Austrian army. 
54 Becker, Jens: The Kosovo Conflict: Political and Socio-Economic Aspects, pp. 12 
55 Becker, Jens: The Kosovo Conflict: Political and Socio-Economic Aspects, pp. 11 
56 The „Kacak“ movement ("Committee for the National Defence of Kosova"), formed in 1918 in Shkoder, with aim to unify all 
Albanian lands. The movement enjoyed considerable support from Albania, especially after 1920 when some of the well-known 
Kosovar Albanians became senior officials in Albania's government.  
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they established a kind of self-government. The Serb armed forces had a great difficulty to 
suppress the revolt, using methods as punishment of whole families.57 The suppression leaved a 
constant negative factor in the Serbo-Albanian relations. Over the period of the KSCS (1918-
1929), Kosovo was split into four districts (counties), whereas three were part of the entity of 
Serbia (Zvečan, Kosovo and southern Metohija) and one of Montenegro (northern Metohija) 
and the proportion of the Serbian population in Kosovo considerably increased. The 
dictatorship of the king introduced in 1929 led only to further decline of the political life in the 
country.  At that time, Kosovo was one of the most under-developed regions of southern 
Yugoslavia. Between the world wars (1918-39), approximately 87% of the population – 
Albanians, Serbs and others – still worked within the agricultural sector.58  
 After the partition of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia during the World War II., most of the 
territory of Kosovo was joined under the Italian-occupied Greater Albania and smaller parts 
were under the German-occupied Serbia and Greater Bulgaria. The partisan movement, led by 
the Communist party of Yugoslavia (CPY) had great difficulty to find the support among the 
local population in comparison with other regions of the ex-Yugoslavia.59 After the experiences 
stressed above, the Albanians were largely sceptical to the cooperation with the other Yugoslav 
nations and a smart occupation policy of Italy and Germany, playing on the nationalist feelings 
(creation of the Italian-occupied “Greater Albania” and the Albanian Waffen-SS Division 
Skanderbeg), won the hearts of many Albanians. As well as in other parts of the ex-Yugoslavian 
kingdom, also in Kosovo the whole period of 1941-1945 was characterised by mass ethnic 
violence and brutal repressions. Thousands of Serbs were forcibly expelled out of the region by 
armed Albanian paramilitary groups. The death-toll figures are estimated at 10,000-40,000 people 
and 70,000-100,000 refugees.  
After Italy withdrew from the war in the fall of 1943, Kosovo subsequently became part 
of the Serbian Republic within the post-war Yugoslavia (1944), although Western Macedonia was 
granted status of a new Yugoslav Republic.60 Shortly before the end of the war there were 
tendencies from the side of the Communist Party of Albania, to join Kosovo to Albania, 
however, they were explicitly rejected by the CPY.61  
 Nevertheless, the victory of the communist partisans in World War II put through the 
theory of equal rights for all the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia, meant a revaluation of 
the status of Kosovo, which obtained the status of an autonomous region of Serbia (1946). This 
                                                          
57 Becker, Jens: The Kosovo Conflict: Political and Socio-Economic Aspects, pp. 11-12 
58 Becker, Jens: The Kosovo Conflict: Political and Socio-Economic Aspects, pp. 12 
59 Becker, Jens: The Kosovo Conflict: Political and Socio-Economic Aspects, pp. 12 
60 Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 2 
61 Becker, Jens: The Kosovo Conflict: Political and Socio-Economic Aspects, pp. 12 
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rather low degree of autonomy was considerably upgraded when it became an autonomous 
province in 1963.62 Over the time, the local Kosovo authorities subsequently became in hands of 
the ethnic Albanians. The local Serbs, complaining of discrimination and often becoming targets 
of unpunished ethnic motivated attacks, started to migrate out of the province since the 1960s.63 
This, along with the higher fertility of the Albanian population caused that the ethnic Albanians 
constituted an overwhelming majority of the population of Kosovo. By 1968, when a wave of 
Albanian demonstrations had arisen in Pristina, Albanians in Kosovo already represented 67.2% 
of the total population, while Serbs only 23.6%.64 At that time, Kosovo was still one of the 
poorest regions within the whole country, with a standard of literacy only on 25,7 % (1981).65 
 
 
2.2 From the Constitution of 1974 till Armed Conflict (1998) 
The adoption of the new federative constitution in 1974 was a major step in the 
devolution of government to the republics. The problem of the disproportional size of Serbia 
(40 % of the total population of Yugoslavia) was resolved by giving large degree of autonomy to 
the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. The provinces were given by an extensive political, 
cultural and economical autonomous status within Serbia (although not yet a full republican 
status which would notionally grant the right to secede).66 They became constituent members of 
the federation with their own separate seat within the rotating collective state presidency, 67 
provincial assembly (parliament), special representation in the Serbian parliament with a veto 
right against legislation, separate central bank, police, autonomous educational and judiciary 
system, and also a provincial communist party (League of Communists of Kosovo). Albanians 
thus obtained key positions in the party and provincial government.68  
Over 1980s, the tensions between the communities in Kosovo intensified, as the Albanian 
community favoured greater autonomy and the Serbs plus other minorities on other hand 
preferred closer ties with Serbia. There was no will for unification with Albania among the 
Kosovo Albanians yet, as the country was ruled by a Maoist regime at the time with considerably 
worse living conditions. In March 1981, the Kosovo Albanian demands for a full republican 
                                                          
62 Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 2 
63 KOSOVO/KOSOVA As Seen, As Told, pp. 29 
64 Becker, Jens: The Kosovo Conflict: Political and Socio-Economic Aspects, pp. 14 
65 Becker, Jens: The Kosovo Conflict: Political and Socio-Economic Aspects, pp. 13-14 
66 “The provincial government was allowed to make bilateral contracts, i.e. concerning economic matters, to formulate an 
independent educational policy, by running an Albanian-speaking university, and to set up its own media.” See Becker, Jens: The 
Kosovo Conflict: Political and Socio-Economic Aspects, pp. 13 
67 This practice actually started after the death of Tito in 1981. 
68 Reuter, Jens: Kosovo 1998, pp. 183 
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status for the province broke out into mass student protests followed by violent riots, which met 
with a brutal police repression.69 The government in Belgrade proclaimed a state of emergency 
over the province and deployed the federal army. According to official figures, the unrest 
continued over the next seven years, during which 7,000 Albanian activists received short prison 
sentences and over 1,750 others were sentenced for longer terms up to 15 years.70  
Albeit majority of the subjects of the human rights violations in Kosovo after 1981 were 
Albanian nationalists, the law enforcement bodies of the Kosovo autonomous province were 
already mostly staffed by Albanians. This made the local Serbian population to feel as the 
disadvantaged minority as well. The sentiments were finally stirred up by the publication of the 
Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in September 1986. The 
memorandum, including issues as an alleged conspiracy against Serbia by Slovenia and Croatia, 
warned the Kosovo Serbs, that they would face total genocide unless they could reverse the 
"Albanianisation" of the province.71  
On 24 April 1987, Slobodan Milosevic, at that time already a prominent figure in the 
Serbian communist party, was meeting the local Serbian representatives at the place of the 
ancient battle at Kosovo Polje. During his speech72 a large crowd demonstrating in his support 
was brutally driven out by the local police forces.73 Milosevic used the opportunity, came out and 
addressed them in front of the television cameras saying "no one should dare to beat you". This 
gained him a status of hero and a protector of Kosovo Serbs. Milosevic, playing skilfully the tune 
of the Serbian nation under eternal threat was by the end of September 1987 the most powerful 
person in Serbia, in control of both the republican communist party and government, putting a 
strong impulse to escalation of the crisis in Kosovo. In summer 1998, Serbian was made the only 
official language in Kosovo, pushing Albanian aside from the official communication. 
Simultaneously, massive Serb demonstrations asked for withdrawing the autonomy status of 
Kosovo and Vojvodina. The discontent of the Albanian population culminated in february 1989 
in a strikes and demonstrations.74 The Belgrade government sent in the army and federal police 
and imposed state of emergency, which lasted till 1992. 
Over 1988, several proposals were made to revise the autonomy status of Kosovo and 
Vojvodina and transfer the crucial powers75 back to the republican government in Belgrade. The 
                                                          
69 “At the University of Pristina chanting students “We are Albanians, not Yugoslavs”, “Unity with Albania” provoked fierce 
reactions from the Yugoslav authorities. Cit. Becker, Jens: The Kosovo Conflict: Political and Socio-Economic Aspects, pp. 16 
70 KOSOVO/KOSOVA As Seen, As Told, pp. 27 
71 KOSOVO/KOSOVA As Seen, As Told, pp. 28 
72 „Nobody Should Beat You“ – A Speech of Slobodan Milosevic at Kosovo Polje from April 24-25, 1987 
73 The police used battons against the demonstrants. See KOSOVO/KOSOVA As Seen, As Told, pp. 28 
74 Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 3 
75 E.g. transferring the control of police, court system, economy, education system and language policies back to the republican 
government in Belgrade. See KOSOVO/KOSOVA As Seen, As Told, pp. 28 
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leading members of the communist parties in both provinces resigned and the Serbian 
parliament approved the appropriate constitutional amendments (March 1989). In the same 
month, under a deliberate intimidation by secret police and great political pressure from 
Belgrade, the Kosovo Assembly voted in favour of these amendments,76 which were further 
approved by the republic-wide referendum (July 1988). Subsequently, the final steps of the 
removal of the autonomy including dissolving of the provincial assemblies followed. What 
remained was only the participation of the provincial representatives in the collective SFRY 
presidency and in the Federal Assembly.77 The new order met with a strong opposition from the 
side of Kosovo Albanians, who refused to participate both in the referendum and the following 
elections. Because the 50 % participation clause was not fulfilled, the new Kosovo assembly 
could not be established. Expectedly, it triggered off mass demonstrations which were brutally 
suppressed by Serbian security forces resulting in an unknown number of casualties.  
Milosevic later even further fan the fire when, during his speech at the celebration of the 
600th anniversary of the historical battle of Kosovo polje on 28 June 1989, called for a Serbian 
re-settlement of Kosovo. Mass demonstrations and violent clashes with police followed for all of 
1989 and spring of 1990, culminating in late January with a death toll of at least 27 Albanians.78 
In the meanwhile, the Serb authorities started a wave of cleansing the Albanians from all 
positions in the public and economic spheres in Kosovo. At least 100,000 people were fired 
from police, judiciary, civil and public services, municipal and regional authorities, schools, 
hospitals, cultural institutions, media, factories, mines, etc., and replaced by Serbs, Montenegrins, 
Turks or pro-Serbian Albanians. Simultaneously, all Albanian political organisations as well as all 
cultural and sports associations were forbidden and most Albanian print and other media closed 
down.79 On 3rd September 1990, the mass dismissal resulted  in a general strike with 
participation of up to 200,000 people. The state authorities retaliated by preventing their return 
to the work places.80  
The dissolution of the Kosovo Assembly in July 1990 evoked another strong wave of 
Albanian protests. Afterwards, on 2nd July 1990, 114 of its former deputies (out of 180)81 
secretly met and declared Kosovo as an “independent and equal entity within the framework of 
the Yugoslav federation and an equal subject with its counterparts in Yugoslavia.”82 At that that 
time, most of Kosovo Albanians were still favouring secession from Serbia but staying within the 
                                                          
76 With 168 against 10, with 2 abstentions. See Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 3 
77 KOSOVO/KOSOVA As Seen, As Told, pp. 28 
78 Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 3 
79 Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 4 
80 Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 4 
81 “Albanian, Turkish and Muslim delegates” Cit. Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 3 
82 Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation army, pp. 10 
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Yugoslav federation.83 The act was condemned and proclaimed as illegal by both Serbia and 
SFRY. In September 1991, the former Kosovo deputies organized a referendum on sovereignty 
and subsequently, on 7th September, at a secret meeting in Kacanik, 111 of the former Kosovo 
Assembly deputies proclaimed a full independence of Kosovo. The Belgrade authorities 
immediately brought criminal charges against the persons involved. The republic-wide 
parliamentary elections in December 1990 were boycotted by most of the Kosovo Albanians. 
The results showed 100 % in favour of independence out of 87 % turnout and subsequently, a 
provisional government was formed.84 The “Republic of Kosovo” was recognized only by the 
parliament of Albania (22nd October 1991), however not by the Albanian foreign ministry.85 The 
European Community´s (EC) “Badinter Abitration Commission”,86 drawing up 
recommendations for the recognition of the former Yugoslav republics, did not consider the 
formerly autonomous provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina within the Socialist Republic of Serbia 
to be federating sovereigns of the Socialist Federal Republic Yugoslavia with the right to form 
their own state,87 notwithstanding the fact that according to the valid constitution of 1974, the 
federation was constituted by eight units, with the two autonomous Serbian provinces (Kosovo 
and Vojvodina) having de facto same status as the six republics.88 Surely, the analogy with the 
situation of the Serbs in Krajina in Croatia, also could put an political element in the EC 
position, while some of the member states (Germany) were afraid of an encouragement of 
Krajina Serb separatism by a recognition of an independent Kosovo. The EC however, 
considered the Krajina issue promising in the interest of pressing Belgrade to restore Kosovo´s 
autonomy.89  
In order to increase the state control over the province, the Belgrade government started 
to replace the state officials in the province en masse by Serbs and loyal Albanian, explaining it as 
de-communisation. The dissatisfaction of the Albanians broke out into a general strike in 
September 1990. In March 1991, the Kosovo representative to the Serbian Assembly was 
                                                          
83 Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation army, pp. 10 
84 KOSOVO/KOSOVA As Seen, As Told, pp. 28 
85 Reuter, Jens: Kosovo 1998, pp. 184 
86 Special permanent body of the European Community under the chairmanship of Robert Badinter. The five-member 
Commission consisting of the presidents of Constitutional Courts of the member states, was to draw up opinions for the 
particular cases. During its existence, the Commission handed over fifteen opinions on the major legal questions arisen by the 
split of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Of the 3 Yugoslav republics, whcih the EC had recognized at the end, the 
Badinter Commission Report supported only the claim of Slovenia. The report also supported the claim of Macedonia, but the 
recognition was blocked by Greece because of the dispute considering the official name.  
87 Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 4 
88 However, the EC also did not question the Kosovo and Vojvodina right for autonomy. See Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo 
Conflict 1998, pp. 5;  “At the beginning of 1992 Western diplomats - off the record - justified this position by arguing that it 
would be necessary to impose substantial sacrifices on the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and for that reason one could not demand 
that they relinquish Kosovo as well. There were rumours at the time that the West had explicitly concluded a deal with Miloševic 
on this matter - that, in return for the Serbian President's agreement that Blue Helmets could be stationed in Krajina, the Kosovo 
problem would not be put on the international agenda.” Cit. Reuter, Jens: Kosovo 1998, pp. 183-184 
89 Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 5 
Vladimír Randáček                                                                 The OSCE Kosovo Verification mission 1998-1999 
34 
 
recalled for “anti-Serbian activities” and his post was abolished.90 Although the decision was 
soon revised, the tensions finally lead to a departure of the Kosovo delegation out of the 
assembly two months later, when the Assembly confirmed a candidate chosen by Serbia as a new 
Kosovo representative for the federal presidency.  
In the meanwhile (1991), Yugoslavia received a new moderate government headed by the 
Prime Minister Milan Panic, an American businessman of Serbian origin, who promised the 
renewal of Kosovo´s autonomy. However, Panic lost his office in December 1992, without 
having enough time to carry out his plans.91  
Followingly, the Serbian government tightened its policy, closing public media in 
Albanian language and abolishing the teaching in Albanian in most of secondary schools and 
finally at the University in Pristina. Albanians responded by boycotting the state schools and 
maintaining a parallel system of Albanian-language education, often provided by teachers who 
had lost their jobs. The first parallel elections took place in May 1992. By this time the SFRY 
ceased to exist as four of its constituent republics had declared independence, and 28th April 
1992 Serbia and Montenegro formed new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). However, the 
act was not recognized by the Western countries at that time.  
 On 24 May 1992, the Kosovo Albanian „shadow“ state organised its parliamentary 
elections. The elections were overwhelmingly won by the democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), 
lead by Ibrahim Rugova, who was proclaimed as the President of the Republic of Kosovo.92 But 
at that time the attention of the international community was mainly focused on the events in 
Bosnia. The inter-ethnic tension was again increased during the massive re-settlement campaign 
of cca 10,000 Krajina Serbs into Kosovo in 1995. Many Albanians also felt betrayed when 
Kosovo was left off the agenda of the Dayton peace talks in November 1995. The absence of 
gains of Rugova´s non-violence policy further undermined his position at the home-front, 
although it reached a certain success when the Yugoslav authorities approved the renewal of the 
Albanian educational curriculum the following year (1996). However, before the decision could 
be implemented, the situation again deteriorated as the police brutally suppressed another 
student demonstrations.  
In February 1996, France surprisingly recognized the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
supposingly in return for the release of two French bomber pilots, which has been negotiated 
                                                          
90 KOSOVO/KOSOVA As Seen, As Told, pp. 28 
91 Reuter, Jens: Kosovo 1998, pp. 188 
92 „...with a 89.32 per cent, 96 seats went to LDK, 29 to other Kosovo Albanian parties, and 5 to "people of Muslim 
ethnicity.".Fourteen seats remained vacant; they were reserved for Montenegrins and Serbs from Kosovo should they decide to 
take them. On the same day, elections for the Presidency of the Republic of Kosova took place. In addition to 766,069 voters in 
Kosovo, also 105,300 Kosovo Albanians abroad participated. With 99.56 per cent, Rugova, the only candidate, was elected.“ Cit. 
Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 4 
Vladimír Randáček                                                                 The OSCE Kosovo Verification mission 1998-1999 
35 
 
during the secret negotiations in 1995. Soon followed the recognition from the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, Italy and Germany. Once again (after the 
recognitions of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 and 1992),  the EU had failed in co-ordinating a 
common policy towards Belgrade. It was of little effect that the European Parliament, referring 
to the continuing violations of human rights in Kosovo, criticized the decision of these member 
states.93  
In the night of 10-11th September 1997, KLA launched an coordinated assault on police 
facilities and vehicles. Yugoslav forces retaliated with a series of raids in the KLA stronghold of 
Drenica.94 In November of the same year, the KLA made its first public appearance of IRA 
fashion, when its uniform fighters appeared during the funeral of a killed Kosovo Albanian 
teacher.95 On 1 October 1997, several thousands of students went in the streets of Pristina to 
demonstrate for the establishment of the Education Agreement from 1996. While on this 
occasion the police did not intervene, another student demonstration on 30th December 1997 
was brutally supressed. Over the rest of 1997 and 1998, the violence continued. In March 1998, 
the second parallel elections were organised by the Kosovo Albanians, again convincingly won 
by Rugova´s LDK.  
The demographic development in the province was unambiguous (See Tab. 1). As the 
only safety-valve for the steep Kosovo Albanian population growth was the large labour 
migration.96 The number of Kosovo Albanians living in the Western countries, mainly in 
Germany, Switzerland and Scandinavia, was estimated to 600,000 plus another 300,000 in the 
U.S. and Canada.97  
 
 
                                                          
93 Reuter, Jens: Kosovo 1998, pp. 184 
94 Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 6 
95 Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 6 
96 Kosovo has the highest birth rate in Europe (23.1 per 1000 in 1989). See Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 1 
97 Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation army, pp. 10; „From 1991 to 1994, an 
estimated number of 400,000 Kosovo Albanians have left Kosovo for political reasons for Switzerland and the European Union, 
in particular, Germany, Austria and Sweden. By the end of 1995, 340,700 Kosovo Albanians had sought political asylum outside 
the FRY. According to UNHCR estimates and figures given by the governments of Albania and Montenegro, the Kosovo War 
of 1998 resulted in the flight of another 98,100 Kosovo Albanians to Montenegro (42,000), Albania (20,500), other parts of 
Serbia (20,000), Bosnia-Herzegovina (8,600), Macedonia (3,000), Slovenia (2,000) and Turkey (2,000). In addition 200,000 
Kosovo Albanians were dislocated within Kosovo. Funds sent to Kosovo from the Kosovo Albanians living in these countries 
were also the backbone of the later LDK´s parallel Kosovo self-government, as the exiles introduced the so called „homeland 
tax“ amounting to 5% of the individual income. There was also a considerable number of Kosovo Albanians living in Albania. 
However, there were also population movements of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo. Between 1991 and 1996, some 
19,000 Serbian refugees from Bosnia, the Krajina and other parts of Croatia were resettled in Kosovo, whereas during 1998, 
several tens of thousands Kosovo Serbs fled or were forced to leave the region to the own Serbia. In the spring of 1997, almost 
the entire Croat population of Kosovo had emigrated to Croatia.“ See Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 1; Funds 
sent to Kosovo from the Kosovo Albanian diaspora countries were later the backbone of the LDK´s parallel Kosovo self-
government, as the exiles introduced the so called „homeland tax“ amounting to 5% of the individual income. There was also a 
considerable number of Kosovo Albanians living in Albania. See Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the 
Kosovo Liberation army, pp. 13 
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Tab. 1: Total population of Kosovo and population by ethnic origin 1948-1991 
 
Source: http://www.reintegration.net/europa/download/Maps_Statistics.pdf (visited 02.05.2008) 
 
 
2.3 Escalation of the Violence (March–June 1998) 
Over the second half of 1997, the nature of the conflict substantially changed. Rugova´s 
government could no longer monopolize the Kosovo Albanian political landscape, as the so far 
minor radical political force – the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA),98 violently entered the stage 
by launching a guerrilla campaign under the device of liberation of all territories inhabited by 
Albanians and uniting them into a “Greater Albania”.99 At the beginning, Rugova´s LDK firmly 
denied the existence of the KLA or claimed that it was a puppet of the Yugoslav secret service. 
However, after more than 50 Serb policemen and number of Albanian “collaborants” were killed 
, the KLA´s existence could no longer be denied.100 Throughout the competition among the 
Kosovo Albanian factions over the question of violence during the late 1990s, NATO’s 
increasing involvement rewarded the KLA’s provocateur strategy and undermined the Rugova´s 
moderates, whose initial goals were actually more compatible with the officially proclaimed aims 
of both Contact Group and NATO. Still more, mainly young unemployed men from rural areas, 
students and exiles both from Albania and the West, started to join the KLA. The population 
shift101 as well as the flow of the rural Albanians from the battle areas to THE cities, radicalised 
the urban population and contributed to decline of influence of the LDK.102  
                                                          
98 The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), in Albanian Usthtria Clirimtare e Kosoves (UCK), should not be mistaken with its 
counterpart in FYROM – the National Liberation Army (NLA), in Albanian Ushtria Clirimtare e Kombetare (UCK), what bears 
the same acronym. 
99 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 505 
100 “More than forty communiqués issued by the UCK have served the purpose of claiming responsibility for such actions and 
have also named the goals of the organization.” Cit. Reuter, Jens: Kosovo 1998, pp. 191 
101 Kosovo Albanians were the "youngest" people of Europe with 45 % under the age of 18, and 70 % under 30. See Troebst, 
Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 1 
102 Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation army, pp. 12 
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The most onerous problem which paralysed the military power of the KLA – the lack of 
weapons – was resolved in a „Deus-ex-machina“ manner, when the deep political crisis and 
following collapse of state authorities in neighbouring Albania during March and April 1997, 
relieved a flood of small arms from the looted Albanian military and police armouries, which 
were being smuggled into Kosovo in mass numbers. At that time, the price of an automatic gun 
at the local black markets was reportedly reaching to 15 DM or 8 USD.103 The growth of the 
KLA fire force was simultaneously followed by a campaign of terror against the Yugoslav 
security forces, state officials, Serb civilians, Albanians who worked for the authorities, 
supported the Serbian authorities or who just did not sympathize with the KLA aims.104 With the 
inaction of the international community, the KLA subsequently started to transform into a 
dominant (Kosovo Albanian) political element, which was soon to be respected (involuntarily) 
even by popular Rugova. The power shift was definitely confirmed in July 1998, when the 
unofficial Kosovar parliament (with the majority of seats possessed by the Rugova´s LDK) 
recognized the KLA as "the legitimate fighting force" of the Kosovars and accepted military 
force as a means of liberation.”105  The Yugoslav authorities responded with substantial increase 
of the federal security forces presence in the province in January 1998. The security forces began 
reprisals using military helicopters and APCs,106 which were mainly targeted against villages, 
which the Albanian fighters used as their bases.107 As it is usual by guerrilla warfare, this caused a 
spiral of violence, where many Kosovo Albanians, even previously supporting Rugova´s non-
violent resistance, started to actively support the KLA.  
The strongest wave of violence was stirred up by assassination of four Serb policemen on 
28th February 1998. Yugoslav authorities responded with a wave of offensives and extensive 
police roundups, attempting to deliver final blow to the KLA.108 The offensive against the KLA 
stronghold of Drenica resulted in 25 killed KLA fighters. Another heavy attacks followed on 5th 
and 7th March, taking 58 lives.109 On 23rd April, the Yugoslav forces killed another 22 Kosovo 
                                                          
103 Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation Army, pp. 13; Reuter, Jens: Kosovo 1998, pp. 
191 
104 “The UCK intensified its activity in 1997 and early 1998, with attacks on police stations, police officers, Serb civilians and 
Kosovo Albanians working for or with the authorities, but in the two years up to mid-January 1998 it had only claimed the killing 
of a total of 10 Serbian police and other officials, and 11 Kosovo Albanians.” Cit. KOSOVO/KOSOVA As Seen, As Told, pp. 
29 
105 Cit. Reuter, Jens: Kosovo 1998, pp. 192 
106 KOSOVO/KOSOVA As Seen, As Told, pp. 29 
107 “Two such attacks on villages in  late February were followed by an assault on the village of Donji Prekaze/Prekazi i Poshtem 
(Srbica/Skenderaj municipality) in early March, where at least 54 people were killed including a local UCK leader, most of his 
family and other women, children and elderly men. The reprisals continued with further attacks on villages in the central Drenica 
region, causing many villagers to flee their homes.” Cit. KOSOVO/KOSOVA As Seen, As Told, pp. 29 
108 “It was considered certain that it was not an army but a group of lightly armed fighters, whose total numbers at the beginning 
of 1998 were estimated by the Serbian Ministry of the Interior at no more than 2,000. But it was also clear to the Serbian 
authorities that these numbers would grow like an avalanche if they were unable to smash the organization in time.” Cit. Reuter, 
Jens: Kosovo 1998, pp. 191 
109 Reuter, Jens: Kosovo 1998, pp. 191 
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Albanian fighters. Another offensive followed in March, in the central and western part of the 
province. The KLA counterstroke in the west, mainly around the city of Pec and along the 
borders with Albania.110 On 5th March 1998, the U.S. Special Envoy to the Balkans Robert 
Gelbard condemned the Yugoslav reaction and threatened to use force.111 The actions against 
the KLA aroused massive demonstrations in Pristina, which were brutally suppressed by the 
police. The Rugova´s shadow government organized elections (boycotted by the KLA), which 
were again overwhelmingly won by the Rugova´s LDK with more than 90 % of the vote.112 The 
Contact Group tried to use this fact and reward the LDK´s policy of non-violence by treating 
Rugova as a negotiation counterpart and representative of the Kosovo Albanians.  
On 9th March 1998, the Contact Group113 threatened with an imposition of international 
sanctions against Serbia, in order to increase the pressure on the Serbian authorities for 
negotiations on the autonomy of the province.114 The Yugoslav diplomacy succeeded to achieve 
a 5-day prolongation of the deadline (9th March), but when the Contact Group met again in 
(Bonn, 25th March) , the deadline was extended for another four weeks, notwithstanding that a 
new Serbian revenge crackdown on three villages near the town of Decani the previous day, 
resulted in more than 40 Kosovo Albanian casualties.115 
The UN Security Council reacted with the Resolution 1160, condemning the violence 
and “acts of terrorism”, imposing an arms embargo on Yugoslavia (31st March 1998) including 
the “terrorists” in Kosovo and demanding political solution of the crisis “based on the territorial 
integrity” of the FRY. The development in Serbia, however, proceeded in the opposite way. In 
the referendum held on 23rd April, Milosevic gained an overwhelming support (95%) for his 
policy of rejection of an international mediation of the Kosovo crisis.116 At this point, the LDK 
started to be disunited over the issue of nonviolence. Rugova had to compile a Contact Group 
negotiations team for the first time representing all the fractions. 
In the meanwhile in Kosovo, intensive fighting in the West flared up again in the second 
half of April, resulting with another more than 20 killed Albanians.117 On 30th April 1998, the 
                                                          
110 Reuter, Jens: Kosovo 1998, pp. 191 
111 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 506 
112 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 506 
113 France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom and the USA 
114„Contact Group announced to "reconsider the measures we have now adopted", while in the case of non-compliance "a freeze 
on the funds held abroad by the FRY and Serbian governments" was envisaged.“ Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 
9 also  KOSOVO/KOSOVA As Seen, As Told, pp. 29 
115 Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 9 
116 Reuter, Jens: Kosovo 1998, pp. 189; KOSOVO/KOSOVA As Seen, As Told, pp. 29; Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 
1998, pp. 9 
117 „On 16 and 20 April, Yugoslav border guards and UÇK fighters crossing into Kosovo from Albania clashed, and on 22 April 
Serbian security forces shelled the Deçan village of Baballoç (Babaloc). On 23 April 1993, a two-day battle took place near the 
border village of Kozare between some 200 UÇK guerrillas and Yugoslav troops resulting in 23 killed Kosovo Albanians. During 
the following days, newly brought-in army units shelled villages with artillery and tanks, while UÇK fighters attacked police posts 
in the Dakovica region to the South of Deçan.“ Cit. Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 9 
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NAC condemned “the excessive use of force by the Yugoslav army” but also that NATO 
“firmly opposed to independence for Kosovo” and to “all use of violence ... by terrorist 
groups”.118 European Union remarked that the Kosovo Albanian precondition-demand of 
independence now directly conflicted with the UNSCR 1160.  
On 24th May, the Yugoslav security forces launched another massive operation in the 
Decan region, trying to destroy the new KLA operation base by cutting off its supply routes 
from Albania. The operation drove out up to 60,000 refugees, cca 100 Kosovo Albanians were 
killed. 119 Another meeting of Milosevic and Rugova in Belgrade in June 1998, mediated by the 
U.S. President Clinton´s Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke did not bring any results as the KLA 
launched a its first major offensive. On 9th June, EU finally banned new investments to Serbia. 
The decision mainly affected Italy and Greece. Simultaneously, NATO increased its military 
presence in the neighbouring FYROM and Albania. On 15th June 1198, 83 NATO aircraft 
joined the Exercise "Determined Falcon" taking place in an immediate proximity of the FRY 
border, a move severely criticized by the Russian Federation.120  
By early July, the KLA controlled about 30 – 40 % of the province, but later suffered 
heavy losses as the Yugoslav forces stared to retake the lost territory.121 The difficulty of 
                                                          
118 NAO Press Release (98) 51 (30.04.1998) 
119 „With the danger of Western sanctions thwarted, Milošević immediately ordered several thousand heavily armed special police 
officers and VJ troops to carry out a massive offensive in the Deçan region and to destroy the UÇK’s new operation base by 
cutting off its supply routes to Albania. On 24 May, villages along the Peja-Gjakova highway were attacked by tanks and artillery, 
and depopulated by scorched-earth tactics. The regional center Deçan was turned into rubble and almost all of its 20,000 
inhabitants fled. The UÇK stronghold Junik, a village in the vicinity of Deçan, was said to be bombed on 5 June by four Serbian 
military aircraft. Several Serbian policemen and up to 100 Kosovo Albanians were killed. Villagers fled by the tens of thousands 
into the neighboring Kosovo regions around Gjakova and Malisheva (Mališevo), 7,000 into Montenegro and another 11,000 into 
Albania, while some 20,000 were trapped in between the front lines. According to Western observers, the aim of the offensive 
was "to have an eight to 10 kilometer wide stretch where no neutral people live." In addition, the Yugoslav army planted 
landmines in the new cordon sanitaire along the 130 km border to Albania. By June it became obvious that the UÇK counter-
strategy of defending whole villages against superior Serbian firepower instead of flexibly withdrawing and striking again at night 
caused disastrous results. On 13 June 1998, Western media reported, "according to intelligence estimates, 9,000 to 11,000 
Yugoslav troops have surged into Kosovo, backed by 175 tanks, 200 armored personnel carriers and 120 artillery batteries, as 
well as 7,000 to 10,000 police or paramilitary troops." The Serbian side exploited the growing weakness of the UÇK by launching 
a major attack on villages to the West of Gjakova, where tens of thousands of refugees were seeking shelter. On 11 June, shelling 
of the town of Gjakova itself and its immediate surroundings began and lasted for several days.“ Cit. Troebst, Stefan: The 
Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 10 
120 Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 10 
121 „By mid-July, the Yugoslav army and special police forces were under heavy pressure by the UÇK. Fighting broke out in up to 
then peaceful large towns like Prizren, and on 17 July, UÇK launched a full-fledged "conventional" attack on the town of 
Rahovec (Orahovac) in South-western Kosovo and captured it. The attack was parallelled by the unsuccessful attempt of 1,000 
UÇK fighters to cross the Albanian-Serbian border into Kosovo. After four days of heavy fighting, Serbian forces reconquered 
Rahovec. One hundred and ten people, among them 34 UÇK guerrillas, were said to have died during the fighting, while 25,000 
inhabitants fled the town. The success of Rahovec encouraged Milošević to carry out his coup de grace-scheme according to a 
two-phase scenario: First, UÇK communications and supply lines had to be severed while Serbian ones would be restored; and 
secondly, the remaining UÇK strongholds in Central and Western Kosovo should be destroyed completely. Immediately after the 
retaking of Rahovec, Serbian forces attacked UÇK posts along the Prishtina-Peja and Prishtina-Prizren highways and cleared 
them completely. The "liberated territory" in Central Kosovo was now split into two parts. On 28 July, Serbian forces marched 
from three different directions on the town of Malisheva where the UÇK general staff was located. Obviously, the UÇK did not 
make a serious attempt to defend the town, but retretated in disarray together with several tens of thousand inhabitants and 
refugees. In military as well as in political terms, this was the turning point of Round One of the Kosovo War: The myth of the 
UÇK as a modern, omnipresent and ultimately superior force and as such the nucleus of a new nation-state of the Kosovo 
Albanians – if not of all Albanians – was seriously damaged. During the first half of August, the Serbian side succeeded in 
crushing the remaining UÇK strongholds in Drenica and in the West among them the strategic villages of Llikovc (Likovac) on 6 
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Rugova´s negotiating position at that time could be illustrated by the fact, that on one hand the 
Serbian government insisted that the Rugova´s government should recede from its demand for 
secession and denounce the KLA, and the KLA in return requested that Rugova should either 
align himself with the KLA or resign.122 Few days later, the Yugoslav security forces launched a 
new offensive against the KLA and the support for Rugova among the Kosovo Albanians 
rapidly lapsed. He came out with a series of meetings with the highest international actors as the 
UN Secretary General Annan or the U.S. president Clinton. The Contact Group including Russia 
had further increased the economical pressure on Yugoslavia by banning the foreign investment 
to the country,123 demanding immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from 
Kosovo. Meanwhile, the KLA had increased its attacks and the Yugoslav authorities with 
sending substantial military reinforcements to the province during May 1998.124 On 13th June 
1998, increasing the hopes of the KLA, NATO began military exercises over Macedonia and 
Albania.125  
Over the next days, the peace initiatives continued and the Yugoslav leadership through 
Russian mediation agreed to restart negotiations with the LDK on “forms of autonomy” of the 
province, to stop reprisals against the civilian population, to guarantee free access to Kosovo for 
diplomats, international organizations, and humanitarian NGOs and to withdraw the security 
forces “to the extent that terrorist activities are halted.” However, the negotiations stopped at a 
dead-point as the Albanian side did not find an internal consent between Rugova´s moderate 
autonomists and the KLA radical separatists, which totally opposed the negotiations.126  
During July 1998, the fighting spread into the south-west, resulting in another 110 
casualties on the Kosovo Albanian side127 and relieving extensive wave of refugees, estimated by 
the UN up to 50,000-60,000.128 NATO continued to show its muscles. On 8th July 1998, four 
NATO warships docked in the Albanian port of Durres what was according to General Clark 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
August, and the by now legendary Junik on 15 August. By applying a step-by-step approach Belgrade made sure that the 
campaign did not provoke strong reactions by the international community. According to Western observers, the new Serbian 
tactics was "A village a day keeps NATO away." On 17 August, regional UÇK leaders in the Peja area and Serbian forces agreed 
upon a cease-fire mediated by KDOM in order to allow international aid agencies to reach civilians displaced and wounded in 
recent fighting.“ Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 11 Another view presents Reuter, Jens: Kosovo 1998, pp. 192: 
“By the beginning of August (1998) it could be seen that the Serbian forces had for the most part destroyed the Kosovo 
Liberation Army and were once again in control of the situation. But that is by no means a final victory. The UCK has lost more 
than 500 fighters and key strategic positions as well…But the UCK has not been defeated because it still (or again) has more than 
35,000 fighters and because its logistic base and military nerve centre is unassailably located in northern Albania.”; Wag the Dog: 
The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation army, pp. 15 
122 Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation army, pp. 12 
123 Yugoslavia´s international assets were already frozen. See Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 507-508 
124 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 507-508, KOSOVO/KOSOVA As Seen, As Told, pp. 29 
125 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 508 
126 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 508 
127 Reuter, Jens: Kosovo 1998, pp. 191 
128 Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation army, pp. 15 
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(SACEUR) a “demonstration of NATO´s determination to help resolve the Kosovo conflict”.129 
He further indicated possible NATO operations against the KLA.130 At the same time the 
Contact Group announced new steps in cutting funding of the KLA from abroad, but what was 
more important, NATO send a clear warning to the KLA by doing nothing to stop the Yugoslav 
summer offensive.  
Ignoring these warnings, the Yugoslav forces continued their anti-partisan cleaning 
actions, concentrating on the Drenica region and the territory along the south-western border, 
using artillery fire and causing a large wave of refugees estimated to 200,000-300,000 between 
April and September 1998.131 By late July, the KLA was pushed back to the hills and the 
Yugoslav authorities were again controlling most of the province. This encouraged and enabled 
the Kosovo moderates to move closer to the intended internal political consent. This had the 
first results, as the KLA for the first time in touch with the international community on 29th July 
1999.132 The negotiations did not bring any success, however, it brought the KLA into the light 
and increased its vulnerability to coercion. On 9 August, the Contact Group proposed a plan 
giving the province an autonomous status while remaining a “special part” of Serbia.133 The KLA 
condemned it, insisting on their ultimate requirement of total independence. This resulted in the 
fact, that when Rugova was summoning up new negotiations team, the KLA was not on the list. 
That was for please of both NATO and Yugoslav side, the KLA was sidelined. Since the KLA 
was not a party to them, the efforts to impose a ceasefire failed in 1998 failed. In mid-August a 
NATO military maneuvres took place in Albania and on 24 August, the Security Council called 
again for a ceasefire, what allowed the Albanian negotiation team to increase their positions. But 
Milosevic consistently opposed any scheme that would give Kosovo status equal to Serbia and 
Montenegro.134 However, on 2nd September 1998, Christopher Hill, the US ambassador to 
FYROM announced that both Milosevic and Rugova had expressed a willingness to sit behind 
the negotiation table.  
 
 
2.4 The Holbrooke Agreement 
On 23rd September 1998, concerned by reports of widespread violence against civilians 
by the both sides, increasing presence of the Yugoslav security and paramilitary forces menacing 
                                                          
129 Cit. Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 509 
130 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 509 
131 KOSOVO/KOSOVA As Seen, As Told, pp. 29; http://www.afsouth.nato.int/ operations/deteagle/Eagle.htm 
132 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 509 
133 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 509 
134 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 510 
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to flow into an extensive humanitarian catastrophe, the UN Security Council adopted the 
Resolution 1199, demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities by both of the sides, 
withdrawal of Yugoslav security forces “used for civilian repression“, freedom of movement for 
international monitors and humanitarian organisations, return of the refugees and a “meaningful 
dialogue on future of the province.”135 Notably, Russia did not veto this resolution.  
By 4th October, the cleaning operations against the KLA were completed and the 
Yugoslav security forces started to retreat to the barracks. However, due to the ongoing 
humanitarian crisis NATO threatened Yugoslavia with issuing an Activation Order 
(ACTWARN) with a fixed deadline for air strikes. The Russian Federation and France reacted 
with summoning the Contact Group and reactivating the UN and the OSCE. On 8th October, 
the Contact Group Foreign Ministers met with the U.S. President Special Envoy Holbrooke and 
OSCE Chairman-in-Office Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek and decided the 
following:  
"We agreed tonight that Dick Holbrooke should return straight to Belgrade, with the full 
authority of the Contact Group and the backing of all the nations represented on the Contact 
Group. We are also clear that compliance with Resolution 1199 must involve 6 clear measures:  
 
• first, an end to offensive operations and hostilities by both sides;  
• secondly, the withdrawal of Belgrade's security forces to their positions before March and 
the withdrawal of heavy weapons;  
• thirdly, freedom of access for the humanitarian agencies to get on with their important 
relief work;  
• fourthly, full cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal to make sure those 
who have committed atrocities are brought to justice;  
• fifthly, the facilitation of the return of refugees to their homes without fear;  
• and finally, but critically, a start to negotiations on the Hill proposals which have been 
endorsed by the Contact Group.  
 
We are also agreed that any settlement that offers compliance with 1199 must be irreversible. 
That is why we agreed tonight that if Mr Holbrooke is successful in obtaining agreement from 
President Milošević, then that agreement must be open to a full and credible verification, and the 
provision on the ground to verify that agreement must be on a scale and with the freedom 
                                                          
135 UN Security Council Resolution 1199 (1998) 
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necessary for full and credible verification.”136 Subsequently, the Yugoslav President Milutinovic 
in his television speech to the nation, announced an agreement upon "principles for a political 
solution" of "the problems in Serbia’s southern Province of Kosovo-Metohija in a peaceful way" 
including a timetable for implementation of "an agreement on the status of the international 
presence, including verification, OSCE and other elements," by 19th October, "the completion 
of an agreement containing core elements for a political settlement in Kosovo" by 2nd 
November and "the completion of rules of procedure for elections" by 9th November.137  
Subsequently, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) authorized gen. Wesley Clark (the 
SACEUR), to seek forces from NATO members for use in Kosovo.138 On 1st October 1998, 
Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced that the United States was ready to begin air 
strikes in two weeks and on 5th October Russia expressed “deep disquiet” over NATO’s threats. 
After the following meeting of the Contact Group at the London Heathrow airport, Russia 
indicated that it would veto any UN authorization for airstrikes against Yugoslavia.139 On 12th 
October 1998, NATO's highest decision-making body – the North Atlantic Council (NAC), 
issued another ACTWARN to the SACEUR to prepare for “limited air strikes and a phased air 
campaign” in case Yugoslav authorities refuse to comply with the international demands of the 
UN within 96 hours.140 On the same day, President Slobodan Milosevic and Richard Holbrooke 
announced that they reached an (oral)141 agreement. Milosevic unilaterally pledged the FRY to 
complete an agreement on the “core elements” of a settlement by 2nd November 1998,142 
whereas any solution of the Kosovo crisis had to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty 
of the FRY.143 Concretely, Milosevic agreed to withdraw the federal armed forces deployed in the 
province after February 1998 back to Serbia, leaving their number on approximately 25,000 men. 
The remaining Yugoslav Army (YA) units would return to the barracks, except of limited force 
guarding the Yugoslav-Albanian border. The numbers of the police were also to be decreased, 
while their main task would be securing the vital lines of communication.144 The withdrawal had 
                                                          
136 Cit. Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 13 
137 Cit. Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 13 
138 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 510 
139 “According to Holbrooke, Igor Ivanov, the Russian foreign minister, sent a signal of tacit assent to independent NATO 
action: “If you take it to the UN we’ll veto it. If you don’t we’ll just denounce you . . . we’ll just make a lot of noise.” The same 
day he said in public that Russia opposed NATO air strikes, because they would “strengthen Milosevic”” Cit. Crawford: Pivotal 
Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 510  
140 NATO Secretary General Press Statement, 13th October 1998 
141 “To allow Milošević to save face no formal document seems to have been signed by him and Holbrooke – at least none was 
made public.” Cit. Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 14 
142 Later on, this agreement became known as the “Holbrooke Agreement”. 
143 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 511 
144 “While Holbrooke according to Western media reports had been pressing for a maximum of 17,500 police and army 
permanently stationed in Kosovo, Milošević succeeded in securing a ceiling of 15,000 VJ troops and 10,000 MUP forces.” Cit. 
Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 13; “Milosevic agreed to withdraw Serb forces deployed in Kosovo after 
February 1998. The VJ elements that remained would return to their barracks, except for limited numbers that were to defend 
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to be verified by 2000 unarmed OSCE ground monitors combined with a NATO air-
surveillance, in order to verify the compliance with the UNSCR 1199. An important detail is, that 
the Holbrooke agreement did not bar the right of the Yugoslav side for security operations. 
While the SACEUR General Wesley Clarke and Chairman of the (NATO) Military Committee 
German General Klaus Naumann were translating the broad language of UNSCR 1199 into 
clearly defined military clauses,145 the NAC decided to maintain the pressure on Belgrade, 
ordering the airstrikes to be launched after another 96 hours (13th October).146  
On 15th October 1998, an agreement had been signed by the YA Chief of Staff General 
Momçilo Perišić and the NATO SACEUR Clarke, approving the establishment of a NATO air 
verification operation over Kosovo (Operation “Eagle Eye”), a complement of the ground 
verification provided by the OSCE.147 The OSCE Permanent Council simultaneously expressed 
its readiness to carry out the ground verification with its Decision Nr. 259.148 Subsequently, on 
16th October 1998, an agreement on the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission was signed in 
Belgrade by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FRY Zivadin Jovanovic and the OSCE 
Chairman-in-Office, Polish foreign minister Bronislaw Geremek, determining its duration for 
“period of one year, with extensions upon request of either of the sides.”149 On 17th October, the 
first U-2 verification flight was flown from Aviano air base and two days later, the 
reconnaissance team of the NATO Kosovo Verification Coordination Centre (KVCC; NATO 
aerial verification coordination body) was established in the town of Kumanovo in the 
neighbouring FYROM,150 in order to coordinate the activities of the NATO Air Verification 
Mission for Kosovo with the OSCE KVM in Prishtina and with the new NATO Extraction 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the Serb-Albanian border. The activities of the police forces would also be scaled back, their chief task to maintain twenty-seven 
“observation points” along critical lines of communication. Cit. Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 511 
145 „Clark and Naumann kept pressuring Milosevic to commit to real numbers and then comply with  them. They hammered on 
two themes: if he did not comply, NATO would bomb; if he did comply, he could “turn the table so that the KLA [were] seen as 
the bad guys.” Cit. Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 511 
146 “Ambassador Holbrooke reported that there has been progress. He stressed that the process was largely due to the pressure 
of the Alliance in the last few days and that we have to maintain this pressure in order to ensure that the process continues. In 
response, just a few moments ago, the North Atlantic Council decided to issue activation orders - ACTORDs - for both limited 
air strikes and a phased air campaign in Yugoslavia, execution of which will begin in approximately 96 hours.“ Cit. NATO 
Secretary General Press Statement of 13.10.1998 
147 „The Agreement established a Mutual Safety Zone composed of Kosovo and a 25-kilometre corridor extending beyond the 
contiguous boundaries of Kosovo. Unarmed NATO aircraft were allowed free reign over Kosovo.“ Cit. Troebst, Stefan: The 
Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 15 
148 OSCE Permanent Council Decision Nr. 259 
149 Agreement on the KVM from 16th October 1998, Chapt. I Art. 9; The mission itself was formally established on 25th October 
1998, by the the OSCE Permanent Council Decision Nr. 263. See OSCE Permanent Council Decision Nr. 263 
150 The Kosovo Verification Co-ordination Centre (KVCC) was a multinational NATO headquarters, part of NATO Eagle Eye 
operation, serving as the primary liaison between the OSCE ground- and NATO air verification. It coordinated NATO unarmed 
air verification flights and operated unmanned aerial vehicles flights. Besides that, the KVCC also provided coordination with 
FYROM airspace control and the NATO Extraction Force Headquarters. The KVCC was based in Kumanovo (FYROM) and 
commanded by the British Brigadier D.W. Montgomery, who reported to the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern 
Europe (CINCSOUTH) in Naples, Italy. The KVCC was comprised of approximately 150 military staff from NATO member 
states. See http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/deteagle/kvcc/kvcc.htm 
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Force (XFOR, Operation "Joint Guarantor").151 On 21st October, the North Atlantic Council 
approves Eagle Eye operation.152 On 24th October, both of the verification missions were 
endorsed by the Security Council Resolution 1203 (1998).153 The Belgrade government 
immediately started to meet its obligations, so already on the same day, the KDOM had reported 
"the withdrawal from Kosovo of over 90% Serbian Interior Ministry (MUP) reinforcements.”154 
By the 27th October deadline, Belgrade had complied.155  
The (including the Rugova´s LDK) felt obviated as they were not invited to participate in 
the Holbrooke agreement. Moreover, their objective of deployment of NATO ground forces in 
Kosovo was not reached.156 The KLA sharply criticized the Holbrooke agreement insisting that 
“all solutions but independence … are not acceptable.”157 However, unwilling to gain reputation 
as warmongers it also declared “unilateral” ceasefire.158 NATO, hoping that it was a chance for 
the LDK to use this progress to make further steps in the negotiations with Belgrade, heightened 
its rhetoric towards the KLA.159 However, as the Yugoslav forces started to withdraw, the KLA 
came down from the hills and launched a campaign of provocations. The Kosovo Albanian 
fighters occupied and fortified all the key positions vacated by the Serbs, ambushed police 
patrols and even fired upon the diplomatic observers from the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer 
                                                          
151 On 2nd December 1998, the Macedonian government approved stationing this French-led force of 1,500 to 1,700 personnel 
from several NATO countries in Kumanovo and on 5 December the ACTORD for XFOR was issued. Its mandate was to 
"extract" individual or all members of the OSCE KVM or other designated persons from Kosovo in an emergency. Troebst, 
Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 17 
152 Operation Eagle Eye - NATO air force operation consisting of manned and unmanned verification flights over Kosovo in 
compliance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1199, established by the North Atlantic council decision of 30th October 
1998.. Eagle Eye flights were coordinated with the KVM. The operation was a result of the NATO-FRY agreement, signed in 
Belgrade on October 15th 1998, under which the FRY agreed to the establish an “air surveillance system comprised of NATO 
non-combatant reconnaissance aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles.” The operation was officially launched by activation order 
on 30th October 1998. It was conducted under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). 
Responsibility for the successful execution of the operation lied with the Commander in Chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe 
(CINCSOUTH), headquartered in Naples, Italy. The air component commander of the operation was the Commander of Allied 
Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH), using the 5th Allied Tactical Air Force, Combined Air Operation Center 
(5ATAF CAOC). The Combined Air Operation Center, located in Vicenza, Italy, tasked and controlled national air assets 
contributing to Eagle Eye. The other component of the operation was the Kosovo Verification Coordination Centre (KVCC). 
The Eagle Eye flights ceased together with the withdrawal of KVM on 24th March 1999. See 
http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/deteagle/Eagle.htm  
153 UN Security Council Resolution 1203 (1998)  
154 “The KDOM counted 4,126 police personnel moving out of Kosovo or into established garrisons late yesterday and today. 
[...] KDOM is unaware of any Serbian Army (VJ) forces currently deployed out of garrison other than three company-sized units 
(approximately 360 troops), and the normal border guard units patrolling the frontier. KDOM also reported the withdrawal of 
tanks and armoured personnel carriers by VJ and MUP forces. According to the US Department of State, by 29 October a 
decrease of VJ troops in Kosovo from 16,000 to 17,000 down to 13,000 had taken place, whereas the British Ministry of Defence 
estimated a presence of 15-16,000 VJ troops and 9,000 MUP forces.” Cit. Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 16 
155 As General  Naumann later said: „Milosevic really did what we asked him to do, he withdrew  within 48 hours some 6,000 
police officers and the military back into the barracks.”  In return, Naumann and Clark had assured him that NATO would “try 
to control” the KLA.2 Cit. Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 512 
156 Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 17 
157 Cit. Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 512 
158 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 512 
159 As the U.S. Secretary of state Madeleine Albright stated: “We have . . . delivered a clear message to the leadership of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army: there should be no attempt to take military advantage of the Serb pull-back. Neither side can achieve 
military victory in Kosovo.” Cit. Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 512 
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Mission (KDOM).160 Because the international community did not intervene, the ceasefire gave 
the KLA almost undisturbed conditions to regroup and evolve in a considerable, centrally 
organised fighting force and leading political fraction among the Kosovo Albanians.161 In the 
contemporary documents of OSCE, NATO and UN, the KLA is obviously described as 
responsible for the most of ceasefire violations.162 Also many of the key actors expressed in this 
sense.163  
However, as it is easier to verify an established government than a partisan army, the eyes 
of the international community have been focused mainly on the Belgrade government.164 On 
the way to the NATO intervention, the Western leaders largely suppressed this version of the 
story. This was why the Western media depicted the Yugoslav government and security forces as 
the oppressors and the main generator of the violence. This drew water on the KLA´s mill. The 
Rugova´s LDK was definitely pushed of the running. As it lost the control over the situation and 
had to conform to the KLA demands, otherwise it risked marginalization or even branding as 
traitors.165 This was clearly shown by the radical shift in the LDK´s fundamental demands over 
1998 and later when the head of the KLA Political Department Hashim Thaci deliberately took 
the lead of the Kosovo Albanian delegation during the talks in February 1999, sidelining the 
elected Rugova´s LDK.166 The statement of Adem Demaci, the KLA political spokesman from 
17th November 1998, saying that “Rugova can sign anything, but there can be no deal without 
(KLA´s) consent”, speaks for itself. 167 On 5 December 1998, the KLA announced that it would 
not “settle for anything less than full independence” and “called on the international community, 
first and foremost the United States of America, to support Kosovar independence.” The 
impudence of the KLA went so far, that on 8 December Demaci said, that the new Hill plan was 
“utterly unacceptable” and recommended the U.S. government to fire both Holbrooke and 
Hill.168 
                                                          
160 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 513; Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) - ????????? 
161 Soon, the OSCE reported that “central control and unified political and military strategy are increasingly visible aspects of 
KLA activity“In the words of one KLA general, “the ceasefire was very useful for us, it helped us to get organized, to consolidate 
and grow.” Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 513 
162 We call upon the armed Kosovar elements to cease and desist from provocative actions and we call upon the FRY and 
Serbian authorities to reduce the number and visibility of MUP special police in Kosovo Cit. M-NAC-2(98)143 (08.12.1998) 
163 During the confidential meetings of NAC the KLA was described as „the main initiator of the violence” and blamed from 
launching “what appears to be a deliberate campaign of provocation.” According to Gen. Naumann William Walker reported to 
the NAC in private that “the majority of violations were caused by the KLA.” Cit. Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo 
War, pp. 513-14 
164 As the Director of the KVM Walker stated on 8th January 1999: “There have been instances of noncompliance on both sides. 
In our view, the majority of the instances ... have emanated from the [Serbian] government side. But that is also perhaps a 
function of the fact that we have asked more of them. When I say that they’re not cooperating in terms of landing rights for 
planes that might be bringing in supplies or quibbles at the border over customs, this sort of thing, those are things you ask of a 
government; you don’t ask that from the KLA.” Cit. Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 513 
165 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 505 
166 Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation army, pp. 16 
167 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 517 
168 Cit. Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 518 
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By stepping up its military operations, the KLA practically ensured the leading position at 
the Rambouillet peace talks.169 Between the Holbrooke agreement and the Rambouillet talks the 
KLA deliberately blocked any progress towards a political settlement, i.e. the official goal of the 
Contact Group and NATO. This is evident since the Contact Group as well as the Yugoslav 
authorities sought for a solution in a form of Kosovo´s political autonomy that would avoid the 
need for deployment of NATO peacekeepers. The Kosovo Albanian side, on the other hand, 
continued to demand independence and that “NATO ground troops deploy in Kosovo.“170 Not 
wanting to seem more impenient than Belgrade, the Albanian delegation stated, that it is ready 
for an interim political settlement, however, it was conditioned by an independence-plebiscite 
clause, what was unacceptable both for the Serbs and the international community.171 The 
situation finally culminated by the incident in the village of Racak, during which the Yugoslav 
security forces killed 45 Albanians, which lead to the summoning of the so called Rambouillet 
peace talks.  
 
For what followed these events, please see Chapter 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
169 Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation army, pp. 16 
170 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 517 
171 Both Yugoslavia and the Contact Group insisted upon the preserving of the Yugoslavia´s territorial integrity. See Crawford: 
Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 517 
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3 THE BELLIGERENTS 
3.1 The Yugoslav Security Forces 
uring January and February, the Yugoslav command started to move large 
reinforcements to Kosovo, in order to wipe out the growing KLA. The Yugoslav 
security forces comprised of police, army (YA) and paramilitary units. Their 
numbers can be only estimated.  
The police units comprised of the regular police (“Milicija”) plus three specialized police forces 
of the Public Security service of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia (Služba javne 
bezbednosti Ministerstva unustrašnjih poslova Republike Srbije, MUP): 
 
 Special Police Unit (Posebna jedinica Policije, PJP) 
 Special Purposes Police Units (Jedinice posebne namjene policije, JPNP; also called "Red 
Berets") 
 Special Anti-Terror Units (Specialne antiteroristicke jedinice, SAJ)172  
 
Characteristically, the forces under the interior ministry received a priority in resource 
allocation from the Milosevic government, on the prejudice of the YA. This was in order to 
increase the general control over the state as well as to secure his own political survival. The 
police was equipped with light machine guns and APCs and was identifiable by its dark blue 
camouflage uniforms. The militia maintained checkpoints in the towns and rural areas as well as 
actively operated against the KLA. The PJP were most numerous from the three special MUP 
special forces. They were more mobile than the regular police, they wore blue camouflage 
uniforms with body armour with a "Policija" placard and their strength was around 400-500 
men.173 The SAJ, reported to be present in two companies, totalled approximately 200 men. They 
wore green camouflage uniforms and used armoured vehicles (Praga, Pinzgauer and armoured 
vans) and even some T-55 tanks. Within the towns, the SAJ was seen to operate in white Audi- 
and black BMW cars.174  
The strength of the interior ministry forces in Kosovo was estimated between 13,000 and 
30,000-40,000 men.175 
                                                          
172 Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 2 
173 Kosovo/Kosova as Seen, as Told, pp. 46 
174 Kosovo/Kosova as Seen, as Told, pp. 46 
175 “On 1 March 1998, the Prishtina daily KOHA Ditore reported, "Kosova has 13,000 Serb police forces – 25,000 
reinforcement units can be transferred from central Serbia within 72 hours." The same source put the strength of the Army of 
Yugoslavia in Kosovo at 6,500 and mentioned in addition emergency plans for the deployment of 10,000 troops from Niš, 
Leskovac and Užice in the interior of Serbia. The figure of army reservists ready for action in Kosovo was given as 4,000; that of 
D 
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The Yugoslav army (YA) units in the area comprised mainly of the 52nd Army Corps 
(“Pristina Corps”, part of the Yugoslav 3rd Army) based in Prishtina, under command of Major-
General Nebojsa Pavkovic. The 52nd Corps comprised of:176 
 
 15th Armoured Brigade, Pristina 
 243rd Armoured Brigade, Urosevac 
 125th Motorized Brigade, Kosovska Mitrovica 
 Tank Battalion, subordinated to the 125th Motorised Brigade, Pec 
 549th Motorized Brigade, Prizren 
 52nd Artillery Brigade, Gnjilane 
 52nd Military Police Battalion, Pristina 
 
Besides that, the 52nd Corps close air support was provided by the 83rd Aviation Regiment 
(located at Pristina Airfield), 98th Air Force Brigade (Kraljevo), the 172nd Air Force Brigade 
(Podgorica), and the 119th Helicopter Brigade (Nis).177. In addition, the 354th Infantry Brigade 
was located in Kursumlija, close to the Kosovo border in Serbia proper. VJ reserves needed to 
be drawn from Serbia proper, because of the limited number of male Serbs reservists available in 
Kosovo.  
The YA was basically divided in two basic elements – the “regular YA” and the 
“reservists”. While the regular units were designed to an overall defence of the FRY, the reserve 
units were responsible only for their own areas. In case of Kosovo, the local units had to be 
supplemented from Serbian proper, as the numbers of the local Serbs was low.178 
The YA was a Soviet style-built army. In Kosovo it was equipped mainly with the T-55 
(Soviet made) tanks, later also with M-84A tanks (Yugoslav version of Soviet T-72), M-80 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the paramilitary Tigrovi ("Tigers") of the notorious Željko Ražnjatovic ("Arkan") as 400. In January 1998, an unidentified OSCE 
source was quoted as putting the mobile components of the 52nd Army Corps in Prishtina commanded by Major-General 
Nebojša Pavkovic at 140 tanks and 150 armoured vehicles. In late February 1998, a Belgrade paper reported, "in Kosovo there 
are permanently between 30,000 and 40,000 policemen". On 29 October 1998, the US Department of State informed, the 10,000 
regular police, SAJ, JPNP and PJM officers plus 11,000 to 12,000 VJ troops stationed in Kosovo in February, were from March 
on reinforced by another 4,000 policemen plus about 5,000 additional army personnel.” Cit. Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo 
Conflict 1998, pp. 6-7; “From late February to mid-October 1998, the Yugoslav and Serb authorities had deployed 13,000 police 
forces and 6,500 Yugoslav National Army (YNA) troops and 400 Serbian paramilitaries (Tigers) in Kosovo.” Cit. Wag the Dog: 
The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation army, pp. 15; “In Kosovo, there were approximately 15,000-
16,000 VJ troops in early 1999 and up to 20,000 by the end of April. There were in addition nearly 30,000 police and irregulars 
(volunteers and paramilitaries).” Cit. Kosovo/Kosova as seen as told 
told, pp. 46 
176 Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As Told, pp. 46 
177 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/serbia/army.htm (visited 11.05.2008) 
178 “The extent of the mobilization in Kosovo from March 1999 depleted the civilian sector. For example,  where there had 
formerly been 148 employees in the local government administration in Gnjilane/Gjilan, after March only 52 remained out of 
uniform and working as normal.1 Thus, although widespread mobilization took place, the VJ in Kosovo was still supplemented 
by "volunteers" and "armed civilians". Cit. Kosovo/Kosova as Seen, as Told, pp. 46 
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armoured fighting vehicles, M-60 APCs, BRDM-2 and BOV M-86 wheeled reconnaissance 
vehicles, 2S1 (122mm) self propelled guns, D-30 (122mm), M-1 (155mm) and M-84 (152mm) 
towed howitzers, M-63 (128 mm) and M-77 (128mm) multiple-rocket launchers, M-69 (82mm), 
M-74/75 (120mm) mortars and the Czechoslovakian M-53/59 Praga armoured trucks with 
mounted 30mm anti-aircraft cannons.179 The Yugoslav Air Force squadrons providing the close 
air support for the ground operations were equipped with new Orao-2, Super Galeb and Jastreb, 
and older P-2 Kraguj.180 According to the Clark-Naumann agreement of 25th October 1998 the 
strength of the 52nd Corps (including the 52nd Military Police unit) had to be 9,068.181 
According to the list of equipment, given by the Yugoslav authorities to the KVM during its 
establishment, the YA in Kosovo declared to have 197 tanks, 178 ACV/APC/AIFV3 and 358 
artillery, plus 37 MiG-21 jets at the Pristina Airfield. Besides that, additional equipment was 
present in Kosovo, such as anti-tank and surface to air weapons (AT-3 and SA-9 respectively), 
were monitored under a separate agreement.182 
The YA also was tasked with securing the 261 km long border with Albania, running 
through mountains up to 2,600 m high. Along the border, there was a 5 km-wide security zone, 
but there was no fence or other physical boundary. There were 32 border posts and observation 
towers, however, the towers were not usually manned as people from the Albanian side of the 
border used them as targets. YA patrols rarely patrolled along the actual border, as the danger of 
being shot was too high. In the border area, the YA manned 32 platoon-sized field posts and six 
company positions. In addition, there were three "Quick Reaction" battalions, held in barrack 
locations, which were ready to reinforce or deal with large-scale border incidents/incursions. On 
4 March 1999, the security zone in the border area was increased to a width of 10 km. At this 
stage, the OSCE-KVM estimated that there were already at least 15 combat teams out of 
barracks - five times as many as had been agreed under the Clark-Naumann.183 
The estimates of the total numbers of the YA units in the province (with reinforcements 
from other YA formations outside Kosovo) are between 6,500-10,000 (early 1998) to 15,000-
16,000 men (early 1999) and up to 30,000 by the end of April 1999.184  
 There was also a number of paramilitary units operating alongside the Yugoslav armed 
forces. Reportedly, there had be around 3 volunteer brigades organised, comprised of Serbs and 
                                                          
179 Kosovo/Kosova as Seen, as Told, pp. 46 
180 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/serbia/airforce.htm (visited 11.05.2008) 
181 Kosovo/Kosova as Seen, as Told, pp. 46 
182 Kosovo/Kosova as Seen, as Told, pp. 46 
183 Kosovo/Kosova as Seen, as Told, pp. 46 
184 Kosovo/Kosova as seen as told, pp. 46; http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/serbia/army.htm (visited 11.05. 2008); 
Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 7 
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Montenegrins living in Kosovo (1000-1200 men), and the famous “Arkan´s Tigers” (400 men).185 
Besides them, there were reports of presence of foreign volunteers and mercenaries.186 Refugees 
reported mainly of Russian- speakers, as well as about Greeks. Besides these, the KLA claimed 
several other nationalities including Romanians, Bulgarians, Germans and French volunteers.187  
By early 1998, the anti-KLA operations in the province were primarily under the 
responsibility of the MUP forces, while the YA´s primary responsibility was the border security. 
Apart of limited actions of the Military police, the YA units were not used for fighting the KLA 
before mid-1998.188 This was mainly to avoid negative reactions of the public towards possible 
casualties among the draftee soldiers. However, the situation changed as the conflict got out of 
possibilities of the police during the mid-1998, the YA became actively involved in the security 
operations, mainly trough providing heavy battle support (tanks, artillery and aerial support), 
which the police did not have at its disposal in sufficient quantities. Following the arrival of the 
KVM (October 1998), the YA initially restricted its involvement in the anti-KLA operations to 
some extent and started to be active through the military “excercises”, which were taking place in 
constantly changing location all over Kosovo.189 According to some sources, the YA later took 
over the command from the police.190 
 
 
3.2 The Armed Forces of Kosovo (FARK) 
The Albanian society is traditionally heavily militarized and possession of weapons is in 
certain areas a part of everyday´s life. This has its origins deep in the rough history of the region, 
which over the time exchanged many foreign rulers and where the defence and security of the 
people was often in their own hands, especially in remote and inaccessible mountainous 
territories.191 Until recently, the social relations were mostly governed by a medieval set of rules – 
the Kanun, what was one of the reasons why the Albanian society was many times referred as 
feudal.192 Weddings are often celebrated by firing guns into the air and most Albanian 
households are usually having at least one “family gun”, in majority of the cases a hunting or 
                                                          
185 “In addition, three volunteer brigades with 1,000 to 1,200 men comprising of Serbs and Montenegrins living in Kosovo were 
said to have been organised.” Cit. Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 5 
186 “Tensions were further heightened in the area and a blockade erected for more than 75 days by the Kosovo Albanians in 
protest of the proposed deployment of Russian KFOR troops. Kosovo Albanians in Orahovac believe that during the war 
Russian mercenaries fought alongside the Yugoslav and Serb security forces that attacked the city and therefore opposed any 
Russian presence in the city.” Cit. Mitchell, Sandra: Human Rights in Kosovo, pp. 251 
187 Kosovo/Kosova as seen as told, pp. 46 
188 Kosovo/Kosova as seen as told, pp. 46; http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/serbia/army.htm (visited 11.05.2008) 
189 Kosovo/Kosova as seen as told, pp. 46 
190 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/serbia/army.htm (visited 11.05.2008) 
191 Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation army, pp. 8 
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World War II rifles, which had been after 1997 mostly replaced by automatic weapons.193 This 
invoked a simultaneous armament of the other Kosovo ethnic groups, mainly the Serbs. Like in 
the case of Bosnia, they had been largely given by the weapons by the Yugoslav police and 
military forces during their withdrawal.194 
Although the non-violent nature of its policy, the Rugova´s (respective the prime 
minister Bukoshi´s) duplicate Kosovo government expected a confrontation with Serb forces 
and was actively taking measures in order to prepare for case of major atrocities.195 The main task 
was the creation of its own police and military forces – the Armed Forces of Kosovo (FARK). 
The FARK units consisted mainly of former ethnic Albanian officers of the Yugoslav army and 
only small number of rank and file soldiers.196 Besides recruiting new members its main efforts 
were towards acquiring new armaments.197 In 1990, the Kosovo Albanian “Defence Ministry” 
started to work on creation of a territorial defence system with a mobilisation capacity of 40,000 
reservists, but the goal was never fully achieved.198 The formation of the system interrupted in 
1993, when the Serbian police arrested almost all the members of the FARK general staff. The 
remaining members fled to Albania, where they regrouped and received regular military 
training.199 In late March/April 1998, faced with the increasing strength of the rival KLA within 
Kosovo, the Rugova´s government decided to launch its own military actions. At the end of June 
1998, three FARK brigades in strength of cca 300 men200 crossed the Kosovo-Albanian border 
and fought two battles against the Yugoslav forces near the villages of Lodja and Junik. Over the 
time, around 3,000 fighters joined the FARK units in Kosovo. The FARK attempted to get all 
the other armed units in Kosovo under its control, but majority of the local KLA commanders 
refused to subordinate. Moreover, the KLA started to arrest and disarm the FARC members. 201 
It is evident, that after these incidents, the FARK had to accept the military dominance of the 
KLA in Kosovo. When another FARK brigade entered Kosovo in November 1998, both of the 
“armies” already closely cooperated. Parts of the FARC joined ranks with the KLA and the KLA 
held all the key command positions.202 Subsequently, the FARK dropped its original name and 
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start to call itself a part of the overall KLA. However, even after this development, the rest of 
the FARK members under Rugova´s command was arrested and tortured by the KLA.203  
The estimations of number of the FARK personnel differ. Mainly they move around 
600-3,000 men, although during the war Bukoshi claimed FARK to have 4,000 fighters.204 
However, this seems to be more a propaganda than the real number. The estimations are even 
more complicated as many of the FARK members fought under KLA command. In 2001, the 
“Association of FARK veterans” claimed to have 1,200 members.205 
 
 
3.3 The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
The KLA´s primary objective was not to protect the civilian Albanian population against Serb 
attacks, as it could sometimes appear from the media picture, but to fight for a full independence 
of Kosovo or creation of a “Greater Albania.” Its deliberate strategy was to launch a war against 
the Serb authorities206 and through using guerrilla tactics and terrorist practices to foment 
violence and provoke their reprisals in order to achieve the intervention of NATO. According to 
some of the former members, the KLA was aware that its objectives did not have to be in line 
with the public will and used deliberate threats to the civilian population in case of their 
inconsistence.207 The KLA leadership ignored the basic rule for every partisan movement – to 
strike quickly and then make itself invisible. Instead of that, the KLA was establishing in small 
towns such as Orahovac and Mališevo and rather than just cutting the important 
communications it tried to control certain segments of them. These strategic mistakes were taken 
advantage by the Yugoslav security forces. Using their superior heavy weapons they were 
retaking the villages occupied by the KLA and recovering control over the most important traffic 
arteries. The KLA had attempted, far too early, to put into practice the concept of "liberated 
territories". By July 1998, it managed to take control over as much as 40 % of the territory of 
                                                          
203 Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation army, pp. 11 
204 Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation army, pp. 15 
205 Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation army, pp. 15 
206 “(KLA) Commander Remi leaves no doubt that it was a deliberate strategy of teh KLA to launch, conduct and win a war. In 
contrast to the international media, which concentrated on the civilian victims of the Serb-kosovar escalation, the KLA´s main 
idea was not to protect Kosovo´s populace against Serb attacks, but to fight a war for independence.” Cit. Wag the Dog: The 
Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation army, pp. 15 
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the Kosovo Liberation army, pp. 15 
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Kosovo, but it was precisely what made them an easy target for their much better armed 
opponents. This strategy was indeed the main reason of the huge civilian suffering.208   
The KLA never accepted the elected Rugova/Bukoshi´s government and openly 
disrespected its policy. It ignored the Rugova´s desperate appeals to submit under political 
control in June 1998 and constantly undermined Rugova´s negotiating position by fomenting the 
violence during the 1998-1999 peace talks. That could be partly a result of the fact, that a 
considerable number of the KLA commanders originated from FYROM.209 The conflict 
between them was not only about the leadership of the Kosovo Albanian movement, but also 
about the question of exposing the civilian population to the consequences of guerrilla war. Thsi 
was also the difference between the FARK, which used a more “regular” type of armed 
resistance, whereas the KLA used a guerrilla tactics.210  
The origins of KLA stay unclear. It emerged from an union of various underground 
organizations, presumably having joined together in 1993.211 Some authors consider the Popular 
Movement for Kosovo (LPK) to be the primary maternal nucleus, others lay the beginnings of 
the KLA into Macedonia of 1992. The LPK was founded by the Kosovo Albanian diaspora in 
Germany in February 1982, during the violent suppression of the Kosovo Albanian 
demonstrations by the Serb police forces in Pristina during March/April 1981.212 The LPK 
promoted the idea of armed resistance from its very beginning. During the 1980s, although 
receiving some support from the communist Albania,213 it remained a radical, but however 
marginal political force within Kosovo. It launched its first actions after the abolition of Kosovo 
autonomy in 1989, mainly combating the police.  
Another hypothesis argues, that the KLA derived from the National Movement for the 
Liberation of Kosovo (LKCK) - a splinter faction of the LDK, founded in Pristina in May 1993. 
LKCK, mainly active among the Kosovo Albanian diaspora in Germany, reportedly formed its 
own military force.214 However, as its military activities never became apparent, it is doubtful 
whether the KLA really derived from this group. Both of the organisations (LPK and LKCK) 
were generally popular mostly among the younger generations of Kosovo Albanians both within 
and outside Kosovo. The links between the Kosovo Albanian political scene, the exile and the 
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emerging KLA structures were kept confidential and even the field commanders in the early 
stages did not know the full extent of these networks.215  
Till 1994, several different armed groups acted independently of each other. The original 
core of the KLA was supposedly consisted of former Marxist-Leninist Enverists, but after the 
re-settlement of 10,000 Krajina Serbs into Kosovo and the disillusion from the Dayton 
agreement (November 1995), veterans which previously fought against the Serbs within the 
Muslim and Croat forces in Croatia and Bosnia, former Yugoslav officers as well as the Kosovo 
Albanians from the diaspora started to join the KLA. It is estimated that over 5,000 ethnic 
Albanians fought within the Croat and Muslim military forces during the wars in Croatia and 
Bosnia, and many of them later created the bulk of KLA.216 This new wave to a large extent 
changed the character of the organisation, making it more heterogeneous. During the next three 
years, two diverse ideological factions evolved within the KLA – radical rightists, with sentiments 
to the World War II Italian-organised fascist militias and German-organised Waffen-SS 
volunteer division “Skanderbeg” and the “Kacak” rebels who fought the Serbs along the 
Austrian army during the World War I on one hand, and radical leftists with a xenophobic and 
Stalinist tendencies á la Enver Hoxha.217 Coordinated preparations and activities, including 
systematic training and arms acquisition began since 1994. Regular training provided by the 
Albanian military began in 1996.218 
From the operational point of view, in the summer of 1998, the KLA consisted of 165 
„brigades“ with some 12,000 permanent fighters, most of whom had little or no prior military 
training or experience.219 Before the Rambouillet talks there was reportedly no general command 
structure established within the KLA.220 Since February 1999, the KLA had a General Staff and 
was divided into seven operational zones. In the same month (February 1999) a Political 
Directorate was formed headed by the former student leader Hashim Thaci. However, it was 
more a political tool for promoting the KLA interests during the Rambouillet talks rather than it 
would have any substantial influence over the military command.221 The KLA fighters were 
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compartmentalized into small units (cells) on a local basis (territorial militia) and one highly 
maneuvrable strike force comprised of several hundred well trained commandos ready to be 
deployed anywhere at any time within the region.222 However, the KLA remained a loosely 
coordinated organisation with to a large extent independent regional fractions competing for 
influence, which were often even not sharing information with each other. 
The strength of the KLA had been considerably growing over the time, starting at some 
500 active members at the beginning of 1998 to 20,000 in June 1999.223 Estimations considerably 
differ as there had been no central evidence. Many local units fought without much contact with 
the KLA headquarters and many civilians joined the fights only temporarily and in specific times. 
The identification of the fighters with the KLA rose and fell with the course of war. As General 
Maissoneuvre writes “with was the chance of the agreement on the final status of Kosovo 
getting closer, the ranks of KLA were swelled by men of all ages anxious to be able to say that 
they played a part in the ´liberation´… what actually created problems for the KLA which had 
no means of training or employing so many raw recruits.”224 When the international Organisation 
for Migration (IOM) started to register the former KLA members at the end of the war (late 
1999) for the purposes reintegration assistance of, it received 25,723 applications.225 However, 
many of the Kosovo Albanian men wanted to claim themselves as the KLA veterans at the end 
of the war, in order to gain social prestige and benefits, but it is highly questionable how many of 
them realy were active members of it.226 According to some authors, the KLA´s permanent 
strength amounted approximately from 8,000 to 12,000 fighters. The new recruits had first to 
undergo a “security checks” before being admitted to join the force. Since 1996, the permanent 
members of the KLA had been professionally trained in camps in northern Albania, with 
assistance of the British and German military instructors. 227  
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Analogous to the war in Bosnia, there has been international volunteers fighting on the 
side of the largely muslim Albanians. The report of the International Crisis Group estimated 
their number to 11,000, but that seems to be an exaggerated figure.228 Indeed there had been 
foreign volunteers and mercenaries mainly from the muslim countries as Albania, Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Croatia, but their number seems to be around several 
hundreds.  Most of them were mujahedeens – fighters and veterans from the wars in Lebanon, 
Bosnia and Afghanistan fighting for the idea of islam. Besides them, there has also been a unit 
comprised of 400 Albanian Americans – the so-called „Atlantic brigade“.229  
The key event for the rise of power of the KLA was the collapse of Albanian state in 
December 1996. Police and military armouries were plundered and about 600,000 small arms got 
in the hands of civilians. Only a small part of this arsenal was recovered by the Albanian 
authorities and it is estimated that about 500,000 of the guns remained among the population 
(mainly Chinese and Soviet/Russian made guns) and were smuggled into Kosovo in mass 
numbers. Presumably, another large amount of weapons has been bought the Kosovo Serbs 
after the Belgrade authorities provided 75,000 AK-47s (“Kalashikov”) from the federal 
armouries to arm the local Serb militias.230 In early February 1997, the Yugoslav authorities 
stated, that they had seized an arms contraband (weapons, ammunition and uniforms) worth 
500,000 USD intended for KLA smuggled from Croatia.231 It is not clear to what extent did this 
events increase the firepower of the KLA and how many of the guns actually got into its hands. 
Some of the authors put the number at 100,000, others mention that the KLA´s armaments still 
remained “poor and insufficient”,232 while the latter position is supported by the accounts of 
former KLA members.233 Except small arms, the KLA disposed with mortars and a small arsenal 
of shoulder-fired anti-tank missile launchers, rocket-propelled grenades and some tripod-fixed 
anti-aircraft machine guns.234 The lack of weaponry thesis can be to some extent supported by 
the fact, that the fighters were sometimes equipped with World War II weapons such as the PPS-
41 automatic or MP-40 rifles, although the ratio of modern equipment including 
telecommunication systems, etc. was much higher.235 However, during its offensive in summer of 
1998, the KLA captured several arsenals of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons of the Yugoslav 
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army236 and by the end of 1998, it is said to have at its disposal "significant amounts of anti-tank 
rockets, anti-aircraft guns, shoulder-fired Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, and long-barrelled sniper 
rifles that can pierce armoured vehicles [...] from three-quarters of a mile away."237 
There were also discussions considering to the links between the KLA and the Kosovo 
Albanian organised crime in Western and Central Europe, regarding to the financial support 
from drug dealing, weapon smuggling and trafficking. Some authors cite intelligence reports 
claiming that until March 1999, the KLA received around 500 million DM, both from the 
diaspora and criminal sources, while Serbian sources estimates the income up to 900 million 
DM.238 These allegations were of also additionally fed by the Rugova´s government, but there is 
too much information to conceive that there were no such links.239  
KLA´s main tactical advantage laid in the intermingling with the civilian population, 
which made it almost impossible for the Yugoslav security forces to locate the fighters. In the 
early stages, the KLA focused mainly on ambushing the police patrols and assassinations of 
Albanians, who collaborated with the Serbian authorities. From spring 1998 onwards, the KLA 
started to attack the Serb settlements around Klina, Decani and Djakovica and the refugee camp 
of Baboloc, unleashing a Serb reaction in form of extensive police roundups against the 
Albanians suspected of being KLA members or collaborants.240 By early July 1998, the KLA 
forces controlled about 30-40 % of the territory of the province.241 A typical way of KLA actions 
were the acts of violence performed separately by small units of three to five men.242 The lesson 
of Dayton for the Kosovo Albanian radicals was, that civilian suffering and columns of refugees 
were more likely to lure Western action than Rugova´s nonviolent resistance.243 
 
 
3.4 The Role of the International Community 
 
Although at the time of the Kosovo crisis the Western Balkans region had still quite a 
long way towards integration to the European and Transatlantic structures, the general stability 
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242 Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation army, pp. 15 
243 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 504 
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of the region, especially with pictures of the bloody Bosnian war still on mind, it was an 
important security interest of both NATO and EU to keep it stable. However, while Kosovo 
was a basic issue of territorial integrity and state security for the FRY, none of the NATO 
members had any vital interests in Kosovo and none of them was willing to contribute its troops 
for a risky ground operation. The leaders of both of the parties well realised this. Therefore, a 
basic precondition for a successful deterrence to any side of the conflict was to show, that in 
case of shortfall of their compliance with the UN demands, the international community (resp. 
NATO) was ready and willing to strike against any of the sides, although its real motivation for 
doing so was much weaker. As NATO used the threat of force towards the Yugoslav authorities, 
the possibilities to deter the KLA were more complicated. Without ground troop deployment, 
and considering that air strikes are not effective strategy when used against partisan movement 
hiding in the hills or among the civilian population, there was only one way how to squeeze the 
KLA – to menace it with isolation.244 However, although there had been several such warnings, 
they could not have any effect, as the unofficial policy of the West proceeded in a different 
direction. There was a substantial contradiction in the NATO policy - on one hand it officially 
opposed the Kosovo Albanian demands for independence, but it also blocked the efforts of the 
Yugoslavian authorities to defend their state integrity and fight against the armed rebellion, 
which imposed its own state aparatus. It is still surprising, how little was made to lay pressure on 
the KLA, although the UNSC Resolutions were addressed to both of the parties equally and thus 
empowered to stop the KLA provocations as well as the Yugoslav repressions. The more it is 
beyond all understanding, that the very demands of the Contact Group were much closer to 
those of Yugoslavia than the demands of the Kosovo Albanians. Yugoslavia as well as NATO 
and the Contact Group (at least officially), sought for a political settlement through granting 
autonomy to the province, but keeping the integrity of Yugoslavia.245  
Although the KLA was supplied mainly through Albania, NATO hesitated to put 
stronger pressure on the new and still unstable Albanian government. Albania´s reluctance to cut 
off the main supply routes of KLA in the north of the country was one of the substantial factors 
of the failure of the peace process.246 Though it would certainly not paralyse the KLA´s fighting 
force completely, it could at least have burdened its supplies and give more credibility to the 
                                                          
244 As Richard Holbrooke stated, when asked about the danger of KLA provocations: “there was no guarantee” that NATO 
would intervene. Kosovo Albanians “would then be on their own, face to face with Milosevic’s tanks and helicopter gunships.” 
The U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated:  succinctly: NATO demanded that the KLA behave “reasonably” or “they 
would lose completely the backing of the United States and the Contact Group.”  On 17 November 1998, the U.S. State 
Department warned the KLA that if it “doesn’t hold to the cease-.re and conducts provocations, that will negatively affect 
international support for their cause.” Cit. Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 514 
245 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 517; “Stability harmed the KLA’s goals more than Serbia’s, and 
stability is what NATO tried to achieve.” Cit. Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 514 
246 “This was most evident in Tirana’s at refusal to exert any authority over affairs in the north, where the major hubs of KLA 
support operated.” Cit. Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 515 
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threat of isolation. NATO could also have launched limited airstrikes or impose naval screening 
operation around the Albanian coast.247 However, nothing was done, and the arms were almost 
freely flowing into the province.248 Although it was clear that the KLA commits grave acts of 
violence and, although even the U.S. (as the leading military power) condemned them and many 
times named the KLA as terrorist group,249 it never added the KLA to the official list of terrorist 
organisations.250 Designating the KLA as terrorist organisation would have been very likely 
followed by the other Western countries, thus delivering serious blow to the vital KLA supply 
chain through freezing its funding abroad (see Chapt. 2.1).  
However, it is highly questionable, whether it was ever possible, that the real interest of 
the West to weaken the KLA, as there are many indications that the KLA was indirectly 
supported by the U.S. and other Western countries already since 1996.251 Clearly, the Albanian 
government played a crucial intermediary role in channelling this support to the KLA.252 Since 
1998, the Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) – a private U.S. security 
company and several German private security companies, provided training for the KLA. MPRI 
also subcontracted two British security companies. Besides Albania, the training was taking place 
in Italy, Turkey, Germany and in Kosovo itself, assisted by the U.S. and German intelligence and 
“serving members of the Britain´s 22nd SAS Regiment”.253 Results of this policy strongly 
contributed to the practical victory of the radicals (KLA) over the moderates (LDK) within the 
Kosovo Albanian political scene and lead into the violence of 1998-1999. 
 
 
 
                                                          
247 E.g. to cut off the vital “Koman” ferry link on the main supply route to the border area with Kosovo. See Crawford: Pivotal 
Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 501 
248 Hashim Thaci stated in May 1999: “NATO has not supported us with arms, but has not impended the process of arming us” 
Cit. Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation army, pp. 16 
249 „On 23 February 1998, the Special Representative of the US President and the US Department of State for the 
Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, Robert S. Gelbard, repeated and underlined two essentials of US policy towards 
Belgrade and Prishtina: First, no unilateral change of international border, and second, the activities of the UÇK were labeled 
"terrorism" whereas those of the Serbian security forces were called "police violence." Cit. Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 
1998, pp. 7; In the same month „Rober Gelbard...characterized the KLA as follows: ´The great majority of this violence we 
attribute to the police, but we are tremendously disturbed and also condemn very strongly the unacceptable violence done by 
terrorist groups in Kosovo and particularly the UCK - the Kosovo liberation Army. This is without any question a terrorist group 
… you strip away the rhetoric and just look at actions. And the actions of this group speak for themselves.´” Cit. Wag the Dog: 
The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation army, pp. 15 
250 E.g. the U.S. State Department in its annual report on terrorism “Patterns of Global Terrorism” (1998) noted, that “Albania’s 
poor internal security provides an environment conducive to terrorist activity,” but the KLA was conspicuously not mentioned. 
See Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 515 
251 “After the war some CIA officers admitted to having developed close ties with the KLA under the guise of the OSCE KVM 
in fall 1998 and spring 1999. The CIA officers provided the KLA with American military training manuals and field advice on 
fighting the Yugoslav army and police.” Cit. Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation army, 
pp. 13 
252 Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation army, pp. 16 
253 Cit. Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation army, pp. 16 
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4 THE OSCE KOSOVO VERIFICATION MISSION 
4.1 First Activities of the OSCE 
 
he CSCE began monitoring the situation in Yugoslavia already in 1970s. Over the 
years, the CSCE, later OSCE authorities repeatedly called upon the parties involved to 
resolve their disputes by peaceful means, but their appeals remained largely unheed. It 
became clear, that consensus on potential OSCE action would be impossible to achieve without 
the cooperation of the FRY. Therefore it was agreed to apply for the first time the „Consensus 
minus one“ 254 principle against the FRY and to suspend it from participating in the CSCE (8th 
July 1992). On 12th May 1992, a declaration on Bosnia and Herzegovina was issued by the 
OSCE Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), condemning the hostilities in the country and lack 
of commitment from the Yugoslav authorities. It stated that „in the view of clear, gross and 
uncorrected violations of CSCE commitments appropriate action on matters relating to the crisis 
will until 30 June be taken in the absence of the consent of the delegation of Yugoslavia.”255 This 
preliminary suspension allowed the “consensus minus one” principle to be used concretely for 
the issues concerning the crisis in Yugoslavia. However, the regional situation did not improve 
and on 10th July 1992 at the 4th Plenary Meeting of the CSCE, the suspension was extended as 
Yugoslavia would not be permitted to participate in the CSCE till it would demonstrate the 
respect for human rights and other OSCE principles. The suspension has been subsequently 
four times extended, but it did not have any official impact regarding the relationship of the FRY 
to other international organisations. Since the OSCE membership is politically binding, it does 
not allow revoking the compliance with the principles which has been once agreed. Therefore, 
the diplomatic agreement was considered to be held even in the case of suspension and the FRY 
was still expected to comply with the OSCE principles and commitments, including the 
acceptance by and cooperation of FRY authorities with any possible CSCE or other missions to 
Yugoslavia.256  
                                                          
254 OSCE Press Release (25.09.2000): OSCE and Yugoslavia – Important dates, timeline; Consensus minus one: the 2nd CSCE 
Council in Prague on 30 and 31 January 1992 (Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institutions and Structures) decided that 
in cases of a State’s “clear, gross and uncorrected violation” of CSCE commitments, decisions could be taken without the 
consent of the State concerned. In other words “Consensus minus one” allows for action to be taken by the CSCE in the 
absence of consensus, so that one participating State cannot by itself block CSCE actions. This exceptional principle cannot be 
invoked indiscriminately, but can be used in cases of clear violations of CSCE norms and principles. The principle was intended 
to allow an appropriate response to situations in which the human rights and the rule of law had to be protected, regardless of 
the opposition of one state (presumably the nation accused of the violations). See Prague Document on Further Development of 
CSCE, Part 4, § 16  
255 Life Begins At 30: Helsinki Monitor Conference, pp. 98 
256 The FRY delegation was not allowed to attend OSCE meetings or functions, or to participate in OSCE discussions or 
debates. The OSCE upholds its commitments to the FRY through continuing communications with the FRY, short of 
T 
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Besides external monitoring and expressing its concerns regarding to human rights 
violations, border disputes and other problems in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the CSCE 
with the permission of the contemporary Yugoslav prime minister Milan Panic,257 sent its firs 
fact-finding mission to Kosovo in May 1992,.258  
Later the same year, on 14th August 1992, the first CSCE long-duration Mission to Kosovo, 
Sandjak and Vojvodina - i.e. regions, where the non-Serb nationalities created majority 
(Albanians in Kosovo, Muslims in Sandjak and Hungarians in Vojvodina) was established 
(operational since 8th September 1992).259 The mission maintained permanent offices in Pristina, 
Pec and Prizren.260 Although covering remote areas of the country, the mission strength did not 
exceed 20 persons.261 There were attempts made to send a military mission, however they met 
with a refusal of the Yugoslav side.262 The Decision of the CSO from 14 August 1992 provided 
the mission with a mandate to:263 
 
 promote dialogue between the public authorities and representatives of the populations 
and communities  
 collect information on violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as 
promote solutions for such problems 
 establish contact points for the solution of problems, and  
 provide assistance in obtaining information on relevant legislation in the fields of human 
rights, protection of minorities, freedom of the media, and democratic elections  
 
In regard of human rights, it was the first step towards the internationalization of the 
Kosovo problem. The work of the mission was consistent with the policy of the contemporary 
pro-Western Yugoslav government of Prime Minister Milan Panic and Foreign Minister Ilja 
Djukic,264 and even Slobodan Milosevic stated that the mission had reported objectively and that 
its long-term character was more useful than a short-term mission.265 However, the mandate of 
the mission could not be extended beyond 28 June 1993, as the new Yugoslav government tied 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
participation. The FRY delegation did still receive all OSCE documents maintained an embassy contact point. The delegation 
could also circulate documents to the OSCE member delegations.  
257 Reuter, Jens: Kosovo 1998, pp. 187 
258 Reuter, Jens: Kosovo 1998, pp. 187 
259 OSCE and Yugoslavia – Important dates, timeline; Eiff, Hansjörg: The OSCE Mission in Kosovo, pp. 283 
260 Reuter, Jens: Kosovo 1998, pp. 187 
261 Eiff, Hansjörg: The OSCE Mission in Kosovo, pp. 283 
262 Eiff, Hansjörg: The OSCE Mission in Kosovo, pp. 283 
263 Eiff, Hansjörg: The OSCE Mission in Kosovo, pp. 283-284 
264 Eiff, Hansjörg: The OSCE Mission in Kosovo, pp. 284 
265 “Even Slobodan Milošević told international visitors that the OSCE Mission had reported objectively and that its members 
stayed longer in the country and were more useful than short-term international visitors.” 
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the extension with Yugoslavia's readmission to the CSCE. The mission was withdrawn on 29th 
June 1993. Over the next five years, there was no intergovernmental presence in Kosovo.266 The 
OSCE continued to monitor the development in the region through gathering the information 
from the bilateral diplomatic missions of the member states, which were regularly reporting to 
the headquarters in Vienna.267  
In 1997, the contemporary Chairman-in-Office, Danish foreign minister Niels Helveg 
Petersen appointed the High Commissioner on national Minorities van der Stoel as his Special 
Representative in Kosovo (SRK).268 His primary task was to examine the possibilities for 
reducing tensions and creating a constructive dialogue in Kosovo. However, since the Yugoslav 
authorities considered that OSCE had no legitimacy to play role in Yugoslav internal affairs as 
long as the FRY was prevented from participation in the OSCE decision-making, he was not 
given permission to visit Kosovo until January 1998, his options were largely reduced.  
Moreover, the Kosovo Albanians were having reservations to the very office of the High 
Commissioner, as they did not consider themselves a minority within Kosovo.269 By the end of 
1997, many attempts were made to find a way to readmit the FRY into the organisation and at 
the same time save its face, however, none of them the was successful.270 Therefore, in late 1997 
and January 1998 i.e. at the time when diplomacy might have been most effective, the 
impossibility of a direct intervention of the OSCE SRK, could be seen as a crucial failure.  
In October 1997, the Ambassador Faber-Rod, head of the OSCE Spillover Monitor 
Mission in Skopje (FYROM), at the meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council informed about 
„early warning“ signs indicating the radicalisation of the ethnic Albanian community in FYROM 
and its connection to the deterioration of the situation inside Kosovo.271 On 13th November 
1997, the High Commissioner on National Minorities van der Stoel submitted a similar warning 
report on the growing tensions and radicalisation in Kosovo. He indicated to the OSCE 
Permanent Council that his message constitute an “early warning” of impending crisis, and urged 
the Council and the member states to give as much attention to Kosovo as they were giving to 
Bosnia, in order to address the situation before it generated into a war.272 However, both of these 
warnings were left unheard and the international community reacted only when the situation 
overgrew into a serious crisis one year later.  
                                                          
266 Eiff, Hansjörg: The OSCE Mission in Kosovo, pp. 284 
267 Hopmann: Building Security in Post–Cold War Eurasia, pp. 22 
268 Annual Report 1997 on OSCE Activities, pp. 6 
269 Reuter, Jens: Kosovo 1998, pp. 188 
270 Hopmann: Building Security in Post–Cold War Eurasia, pp. 23 
271 Hopmann: Building Security in Post–Cold War Eurasia, pp. 21 
272 Hopmann: Building Security in Post–Cold War Eurasia, pp. 21 
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In January 1998, the OSCE decided to send Polish, Danish and Norwegian Ambassadors 
to Yugoslavia on a fact-finding mission to Pristina. However, after their arrival in Kosovo they 
were not received by the Serbian authorities. In February 1998, the OSCE SRK Stoel received 
the Yugoslav visa and departed for Kosovo for talks with the Kosovo Albanian leaders.273 OSCE 
was invited to observe the “Milosevic´s” referendum of 23rd April 1998 on international 
mediation of the Kosovo crisis, however, it rejected the invitation stating that it was more a 
mockery rather than a serious effort to improve the situation.274 
Another OSCE presence in the country was the OSCE Technical Assessment Mission 
which was deployed between 14th-22nd July 1998. This mission was a fact-finding observation 
mission with the task to provide necessary observations and assessments for potential revoking 
of the suspension. The mission observed various degrees of support for the renewed 
participation among the Yugoslav authorities, Serbian opposition, and Montenegrin and 
Albanian representatives. The central issue of the subsequent talks was considering to the 
conditions of the renovation. The OSCE insisted upon the return of its Mission of Long 
Duration to Sandjak, Kosovo and Vojvodina, support for the mission of the personal 
representative of the OSCE CiO Felipe Gonzales and peaceful addressing the conflict in 
Kosovo. The talks came to a dead point over the sequence of the particular steps. The OSCE 
insisted upon the prior resumption of its Missions of Long Duration, while FRY proposed the 
deployment following the lifting of the suspension, noting that the other OSCE Missions all take 
place within OSCE participating States. Later, the FRY delegation suggested that the Mission of 
long Duration would be permitted simultaneously with lifting the suspension. Subsequently, the 
OSCE assumed, that this approach was not sufficient and pointed out, that the FRY would have 
to go through the normal application procedure as its legitimacy was put in question by the other 
ex-Yugoslavian succession states, pointing out that the identity of the state was substantially 
changed. Subsequently, no date was set for next round of the talks. 
However, after the escalation of the violence during the summer 1998, the Yugoslav 
government, under a high pressure from the international community agreed on establishment of 
the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission. 
 
 
 
                                                          
273 Reuter, Jens: Kosovo 1998, pp. 188 
274 „The referendum that President Miloševic held in Serbia on 23 April 1998 was perceived as an affront to the OSCE and to all 
mediation efforts at other levels. With a great outpouring of propaganda, 95 per cent of the population were persuaded to vote 
against the involvement of international mediators in settling the Kosovo conflict. It sounded like mockery when the Yugoslav 
Foreign Minister invited the OSCE to monitor this pseudo-referendum. The OSCE rejected the "invitation" with the observation 
that it was mere rhetoric, not a serious effort to improve the situation” Cit. Reuter, Jens: Kosovo 1998, pp. 189 
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4.2 Mandate  
The KVM was legally established by the OSCE Permanent Council Decision 263 on 25th 
October 1998, pursuant to a Security Council Resolution 1203, calling upon the OSCE to carry 
out this duty. It was established for a period of one year, with extensions upon the request either 
the OSCE CiO or the Yugoslav government.275 The area of concern covered the Kosovo-
Metohija province of Serbia, adjacent territories of proper Serbia and neighbouring countries 
that may be needed to support the KVM, including FYROM, Greece and adjacent countries.276 
Pending KVM´s establishment, the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM)277 had to 
act in its place, while once was the KVM operational, the KDOM had to be absorbed by the 
OSCE.278 The Mission was granted by a diplomatic entity referring to the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations.279 The FRY guaranteed the safety and security of the mission members, 
their complete freedom of movement on the ground as well as free airspace access. Further, the 
Yugoslav authorities had to provide the mission with their full cooperation, including fuel 
supply, medical support as well as full cooperation in case of emergency evacuation (when 
assessed by the Mission Director).280   
The scope of the Mission tasks was quite extensive. The verifiers had to verify the 
compliance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1199 (1998),281 resp.:282 
1. verify compliance by all parties in Kosovo with UN Security Council Resolution 1199, 
and report instances of progress and/or non-compliance to the OSCE Permanent 
Council, the United Nations Security Council and other organizations. These reports 
will also be provided to the authorities of the FR;  
2. establish permanent presences at as many locations throughout Kosovo;  
                                                          
275 OSCE Permanent Council  Decision No. 263, § 3 
276 OSCE KVM: Concept of Operation 
277 The Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM), established by the USA and the Russian Federation started to operate 
on 6th July 1998. Soon reaching a strength of 200 members, this mission functioned under the political guidance of a 
coordinating group consisting of the ambassadors of the Contact Group countries in Belgrade as well as the Ambassadors of 
Austria (representing EU Presidency) and Poland (representing the OSCE Chairman-in-Office). See Troebst, Stefan: The 
Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 11, “Existing patrols of KDOM will provide some initial verification capability for KVM, and will 
continue to do so until the vehicles and eqpt of KVM Verifiers begin to flow into the regions after integration at the KVMIC. As 
the KVM teams roll into th regions, KDOM eqpt can be removed from service and pooled fro return to the nation concerned. 
As the KVM teams arrive into the region, they will be married up with KDOM personnel who are destined to remain as part of 
KVM and proceed with verification tasks.” Cit. OSCE KVM RC Activation Plan from 3th december 1998 
278 Agreement on the KVM from 16th October 1998, Chapt. I Art. 5 
279 “The Mission will enjoy the privileges and immunities conferred by such status, as will its members, in accordance with the 
Vienna Convention.” Cit.  Agreement on the KVM from 16th October 1998, Chapt. I Art.. 8, http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/ 
Kosovo/Kosovo-Documents3.htm 
280 Agreement on the KVM from 16th October 1998, Chapter I Art. 6,7,10 + Chapt. III Art.  I 
281 Agreement on the KVM from 16th October 1998, Chapter II Art. 1 
282
 Agreement on the KVM from 16th October 1998 
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3. maintain close liaison with FRY, Serbian and, as appropriate, other Kosovo authorities, 
political parties and other organizations in Kosovo and accredited international and 
non-government organizations to assist in fulfilling its responsibilities;  
4. supervise elections in Kosovo to ensure their openness and fairness in accordance with 
regulations and procedures to be agreed; 
5. report and make recommendations to the OSCE Permanent Council, the UN Security 
Council and other organizations on areas covered by UN Security Council Resolution 
1199.  
Particularly, the verifiers were supposed to: 
 
 seek for lines-of-communications barriers such as roadblocks which were imposed for 
other than traffic or crime control purposes, or other unusual emplacements. Upon such 
information, the Mission Director had to contact the relevant authorities requesting 
explanation and in case removal of these;283  
 observe police and border control facilities and units or accompany them as they 
perform their duties284  
 assist the UNHCR, ICRC and other (including NGO) international personnel as well as 
the federal or local (Serb or Albanian) authorities, mainly in delivering the humanitarian 
aid and facilitating the return of displaced persons;285  
 convene the representatives of national communities and authorities to exchange 
information and provide guidance on implementation of the agreement establishing the 
Verification Mission“;286 
 if the settlement is achieved, provide reconstruction planning, election support (voter 
registration, supervision) and assistance in the establishment of local institutions and 
police287  
 
In order to exercise these duties they enjoyed a complete freedom of access to barracks and 
all other military and police facilities and to accompany them in the field, to receive “respective 
weekly reports” from relevant Yugoslav authorities (within Kosovo), regarding movements of 
forces into/out or within Kosovo and (if requested by the Head of Mission) also reports and 
                                                          
283 Agreement on the KVM from 16th October 1998, Chapter III Art. 3 
284 Agreement on the KVM from 16th October 1998, Chapter III Art. 4-5 
285 Agreement on the KVM from 16th October 1998, Chapter III Art. 6 
286 Agreement on the KVM from 16th October 1998, Chapter III Art. 10 
287 Agreement on the KVM from 16th October 1998, Chapt. II Art. 4, Chapt. III Art. 7 
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periodic updates concerning eventual allegations of abusive actions by military or police 
personnel and status of disciplinary or legal sanctions against the individuals concerned.288 The 
Serb policemen were instructed to warn the KVM away from areas of conflict, but they were not 
to stop them from travelling into or through those areas.289 
 The escalation of the violence in the early 1999 (Racak killings), had a major impact on 
the character of the KVM, as it brought the human dimension to the foreground, shifting the 
focus of the monitoring towards the human rights violations, thus increasing the importance of 
the Human Rights Division within the KVM (HRD).290 The tasks performed by the KVM HRD 
included:291 
 
 monitoring and verifying the human rights situation using international standards ratified 
by the FRY as a baseline 
 daily and bi-weekly reporting 
 inquiries and interventions 
 working with local NGOs to increase their capacity to perform similar tasks 
 
The overwhelming number of human rights violation complaints received by the HRD 
throughout 1999 (approximately 5,000), made it impossible to investigate each one thoroughly. 
The HRD faced this shortage by identifying priorities, which put priority on monitoring and 
documentation of human rights violations (this was even more enforced after the investigators 
from the ICTY were prevented from entering Kosovo after the Racak incident in January 1999) 
and intervening the Yugoslav security forces and KLA on individual basis. 292 In terms of 
prioritizing the human rights violations, 30 categories were created, including both civil and 
political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights. Within this system, the HRD 
focused on: 293 
 
 the right to life 
 right to liberty 
 rights related to detention and fair trials  
                                                          
288 Agreement on the KVM from 16th October 1998, Chapter III Art.. 2+8 
289 OSCE KVM: Concept of Operation, Annex 1, pp. 2 
290 Mitchell, Sandra: Human Rights in Kosovo, pp. 246  
291 OSCE Kosovo Mission – Outline for Future Tasks and Organisation, Acc. to CIO.GAL/8/99 
292 Mitchell, Sandra: Human Rights in Kosovo, pp. 244 
293 “(Within the collection in the refugee camps) efforts were made … to collect information from both genders, all age groups 
(except children because field personnel were not properly trained to do so) and different socio-economic groups with 
geographic diversity.” Cit. 
Mitchell, Sandra: Human Rights in Kosovo, pp. 245 
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 issues relating to missing persons.  
 
In regard of the basic human rights, the verifiers had to observe and report concretely (but not 
exclusively), these types of human rights violations:294 
 killings, mass executions, death threats 
 torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment; rape or sexual assault 
 arbitrary or secret arrest; incommunicado detention; forced disappearances 
 police brutality, intimidation; threats; unreasonable search and seizures 
 due process violations; unfair trials; summary judgements; forced confessions 
 persecution or discrimination on political, ethnic or religious grounds 
 restricted freedom of movement 
 obstructed access to food, shelter or medical care 
 hate speech; restrictions on the media 
 
The verifiers also had to monitor the supply and distribution of food, clothing, hating 
supplies, building materials and other assistance which facilitates the return of displaced persons 
and give their (verifiers) full co-operation to UNHCR, ICRC and other agencies in this regard.295 
During performance of their duties, the verifiers had to obey the following personal safety rules 
and recommendations (cited from the OSCE KVM Manual):  
 
 write a report on any human rights violations or allegations of violations 
 report any activity or event that you think would violate the law in your own country 
 never refuse to receive information or make a report when requested to do so 
 after submitting a report, coordinate follow-up activities with your supervisor, if you 
think a follow-up visit would be helpful, do it; if a problem persists, regional centres 
should bring it to the attention of the KVM HQ 
 realise that you exert influence simply by your presence 
 never jeopardise the safety of yourself or others 
 make no promises that the OSCE or any other organisation can provide an immediate 
solution to the complaint 
 do not raise expectations 
                                                          
294 OSCE KVM Manual, Chapt. V. Human Rights Guidance 
295 OSCE KVM Manual, Chapt. V. – Human Rights Guidance 
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 remember you are in Kosovo to verify, monitor and report 
 
The agreement, on which the operating framework of the KVM was based, implied an 
existence of permissive environment and cooperation of both sides.296 Although the KVM 
adopted robust security procedures, it was unable to conduct its duties in an open armed conflict 
environment. According to the KVM safety instructions, the KVM were not supposed to enter 
dangerous areas and if a situation became dangerous, the KVM personnel was supposed to 
leave.297 This implies, that although having a wide range of tasks and duties, the KVM was 
essentially designed as more or less an observation mission, with advisory and consultative 
competencies. If it had to improve the situation, than only by means of its presence, credibility 
and know-how (guidance).  
 
 
4.3 The Establishment and Deployment 
“Never before had the OSCE set up such an extensive and complex mission” writes 
General Maissoneuvre, the former KVM Chief of Operations, in his article about the KVM.298 
As the CiO Geremek described, the KVM was “a tremendous challenge and a tremendous 
opportunity” for the organization.299 The OSCE called up all the 54 member states to provide 
their help and cooperation in organising the mission. Gen. Maissoneuve continues “The mission 
truly started with a clean sheet of paper. There was little that existed: there was no prior OSCE 
experience, there were no personnel, no equipment, no concepts, and little knowledge of the 
ground.“300 The OSCE KVM Technical Reconnaissance team was sent to Belgrade already on 
17th October 1998. The elements of the HQ (Advanced HQ)) arrived to the scene already one 
month after and the first verifiers were deployed to the field on 28th November 1998. Within 
first 90 days, the Mission was deployed all over Kosovo, although still lacking considerable 
number of personnel.301 The KVM was primarily established to verify the compliance with the 
Resolution 1199 - to report progress and/or investigate non-compliance to the OSCE 
Permanent Council, The UN Security Council and other organisations as well as to authorities of 
                                                          
296 OSCE KVM: Concept of Operation, Annex E, pp. 3 
297 OSCE KVM: Concept of Operation, Annex E, pp. 3 
298 Maisonneuve: The Osce Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 50 
299 Hopmann: Building Security in Post–Cold War Eurasia, pp 24 
300 Maisonneuve: The Osce Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 50 
301 Maisonneuve: The Osce Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 53; „The Mission was able in only a few months to establish four 
regional centres and ten local offices, a network that essentially covered the entire territory.” Cit. Eiff, Hansjörg: The OSCE 
Mission in Kosovo, pp. 285 
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the FRY.302 It was intended to deploy over the whole territory of Kosovo, to maintain close 
liaison with the local (meant both Serb and Albanian) authorities303 and also to supervise the 
fairness of the intended elections.  
The deployment and the general operational concept of the mission was initially divided into 
four basic phases: 304 
 
 15th October 1998 – begin of Phase One → design of the mission, gathering 
information and establishment of the structure, funding agreements and policies 
necessary to enable the organisation 
 18th November 1998 – begin of Phase Two → establishment of the Advance HQ with 
Operation Centre and essential security, communications and medical support structures, 
integration of KDOM reporting, whilst concurrently establishing the Verification 
Baseline 
o 23 November 1998 – begin training at the KVMIC (Induction Centre)  
 02 December 1998 – begin of Phase Three → completion of deployment (incl. medical, 
communications and security support structures), establishment of the RCs 1-5  
o 30 January 1999 – All 5 regional centres up and running→ achieving a full 
operational capability  
 1st February 1999 – begin of Phase Four → Election preparations 
o July 1999 Elections (involve additional 1000 personnel) 
 October 1999 – Mandate end 
 
In order to overcome the transitional period before the deployment of the KVM, the 
Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM),305 which had been operating since the summer 
1998, was temporarily expanded to act in its (KVM´s) place.306 
Following the establishment of the Advance HQ, the KVM Induction centre (KVMIC) 
was opened in Brezovica in November 1998. It provided a four-day induction training, 
                                                          
302 Agreement on the KVM from 16th October 1998, Chapter II Art. 1, Chapter III Art. I 
303 Agreement on the KVM from 16th October 1998, Chapter II Art. 2+3 
304 OSCE KVM Manual, Chapt. I, OSCE KVM: Concept of Operation 
305 The Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM), established by the USA and the Russian Federation started to operate 
on 6th July 1998. The KDOM, later reaching a strength of approximately 300 members (November 1998), was comprised mainly 
of U.S. personnel (cca 60%). The mission functioned under the political guidance of a coordination group consisting of the 
ambassadors of the Contact Group countries in Belgrade as well as the Ambassadors of Austria (representing EU Presidency) 
and Poland (representing the OSCE Chairmanship). After the OSCE deployment, the KDOM was absorbed by the KVM. See 
Loquai, Heinz: Kosovo - A Missed Opportunity for a Peaceful Solution to the Conflict?, pp. 84; Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo 
Conflict 1998, pp. 11 
306 Loquai, Heinz: Kosovo - A Missed Opportunity for a Peaceful Solution to the Conflict?, pp. 84 
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compulsory for all the mission members.307 On 16th November 1998, there were 60 OSCE 
international personnel (HQ and KVMIC; See Fig. 3) plus 294 members of the KDOM.308 
Approximately 1/3 of the international personnel were the verifiers in the area to be observed. 
The number of the personnel constantly grow over the time, and shortly before the withdrawal 
(18th March 1999), there were already 1387 OSCE international staff in the mission, i.e. 
approximately 65% of the intended strength.309 The support personnel (interpreters, clerks, 
security guards, etc.) at strength approximately corresponding with the number of the 
international staff (see Fig. 3) was hired locally.  
 
 
4.4 Structure 
The agreement of 16th October 1998 provided enough organisational flexibility, that the 
structure of the KVM could be adapted to the actual requirements. However, the U.S diplomacy 
presented its concrete “suggestions” about its structure already on the same day. This 
surprisingly early presentation caused unease among some of the European countries, as the U.S. 
evidently tried to have a crucial influence over the mission. This was further proven, when on 
17th October – 8 days before the mission was officially established by the OSCE Permanent 
Council (25th October), without any consultation with the other member states, the OSCE CiO 
Geremek appointed the former head of the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern 
Slavonia,310 U.S. diplomat William G. Walker, as the head of the (still non-existent) Mission.311 
Appointed as the first Deputy Director was Gabriel Keller (France), and a British, Russian, 
Italian and German were appointed as the additional deputies.312 Norway offered to be the lead 
                                                          
307 “The OSCE/ODIHR in cooperation with UNHCHR, ICRC and UNHCHR, was in charge of organizing a briefing on 
human rights and humanitarian issues. The continuation of training was conducted directly at the Regional Centres as well as at 
Co-ordination Centres. See Kosovo/Kosova as Seen, as Told, pp. 36 
308 Loquai, Heinz: Kosovo - A Missed Opportunity for a Peaceful Solution to the Conflict?, pp. 84 
309 According to OSCE KVM Interim Reports 1998-1999 
310 Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 16 
311 “The United States had already presented its views on the Mission's structure and working methods on 16 October in Vienna. 
This unexpectedly rapid presentation of their standpoint caused a certain unease amongst a number of countries. Although the 
American speakers described their ideas as suggestions, the polished and detailed presentation gave a clear indication of the 
American desire to control proceedings for which the other countries had as yet no definite conception. American resolve was 
further reflected in the fact that on 17 October 1998, i.e. before the OSCE Permanent Council had even officially adopted the 
decision to establish the Mission, and without prior consultation with other countries - which is the usual practice in making such 
appointments - the American diplomat William Walker had been named Head of the Verification Mission by the Chairman-in-
Office of the OSCE, the Polish Foreign Minister, Bronisław Geremek. The Europeans, who had also been interested in the top 
job, were left with the deputy positions. A Frenchman, Gabriel Keller, became First Deputy. An Englishman, a Russian, an 
Italian and a German were chosen as additional Deputies.” Cit. Loquai, Heinz: Kosovo - A Missed Opportunity for a Peaceful 
Solution to the Conflict?, pp. 83 
312 Loquai, Heinz: Kosovo - A Missed Opportunity for a Peaceful Solution to the Conflict?, pp. 83 
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state for the Headquarters (HQ). On 27th October, the KVM Support Unit (KVMSU) was 
established within the OSCE Secretariat for a support liaison purposes of the mission.313  
 Although the agreement defined the mission force up to 2000 international personnel 
(incl. headquarters and international support staff),314 the real number was far lower over the 
time, as the personnel generation process did not manage to meet the desired requirements.  
The Mission Headquarters were based in Pristina and a small liaison office was 
established in Belgrade.315 As one of the initial steps in the establishment of the mission, the 
KVM Induction center (KVMIC) was opened in Brezovica in November 1998. The operational 
concept fragmented the province into five Regional Centres (RCs) and a net of Coordination 
Centres (CCs) in capital of every opstina.316 Every CC coordinated one or more sub-stations (Field 
Offices), based in smaller towns or villages, where usually one or two teams of verifiers resided 
permanently and used them as bases for their patrols (See Fig. 1).317 Locations and frequency of 
the Field Offices as well as the number of personnel in them was determined by the security 
conditions of the area, i.e. demographic conditions and past conflict situation. Each 
Coordination Centre or Field Office was supposed to maintain a close liaison with the local 
authorities or local ethnic leadership. The Mission HQ reported directly to the OSCE Permanent 
Council, the UN Security Council, to the NATO KVCC, to the government of the FRY and its 
findings were also available to the ICTY international tribunal.318   
The verifiers, worked in teams of at least two internationals and one interpreter, with 
designated areas (sectors) of responsibility. The teams were to patrol within their sectors and get 
into contact with the local inhabitants and authorities in order to effectively direct the 
humanitarian aid and quickly sense any change of situation.  
A special unit for monitoring of human rights violations was established within the KVM – 
the Human Rights Division (HRD). The HRD became operational in December 1998 and was 
deployed across the province by end of January 1999.319 Initially, because the recruitment for the 
KVM, initially focused on those with military and police backgrounds there were only 11 
members in the Human Rights Division at the end of December 1998, but by the end of January 
1999 the HR officers were present in all five RCs and most of the FOs. At the time of the 
                                                          
313 OSCE KVM: Concept of Operation 
314 Agreement on the KVM from 16th October 1998, Chapter IV Art. 2; The mission was composed of seconded national experts 
provided by the OSCE member states. V.R. 
315 Maisonneuve: The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 50; However, Troebst states that by December 1998, the mission 
was at strength of only approximately 600 verifiers. „And on 28 December (1998), the outgoing OSCE Chairman-in-Office 
Geremek announced that if the fighting would go on "the OSCE would have to reconsider” ... withdrawing its by now 600 
verifiers.” Cit. Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 18 
316 „Opstina“ – a small Yugoslav local government unit (municipality) – there were 200 opstinas in the FRY in 1998-1999 
317 See OSCE KVM Manual – Chapt. I. (Structure), Chapt. II. (Resident choice) 
318 Monitoring the Northern Ireland Ceasefires, pp 5 
319 Mitchell, Sandra: Human Rights in Kosovo, pp. 242 
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withdrawal there were approximately 75 staff members in the HRD (10 in HQ plus 65 deployed 
in the RCs and FOs).320 In addition to RCs and FOs, the HRD established an additional net of 
Outreach/Contact Offices” to provide contact place for citizens to submit their complaints of 
human rights violations and reports about disappearances of persons.321 The Racak incident (15th 
January 1999) resulted in a shift in the operational structure and creation of the "rapid response 
teams" (RR), designed to deploy immediately to places of incidents. The teams included 
personnel specially trained in interviewing and investigative techniques, equipped with video and 
other documentation equipment. The RR teams were already used to investigate the followings 
incidents in the villages of Rogovo and Rakovina.322 
In addition, small medical teams were assigned to each RC, with lightly larger group in 
Pristina with an air-ambulance (rescue helicopter) available at the airport.323 The teams were 
designed to provide immediate medical aid. Casualties who would be severely hurt or in critical 
condition, would be evacuated from Kosovo by air, probably to Skopje (FYROM).324  
There were also special security entity established within the KVM structure – the security 
teams and a professional security experts serving in each HQ element.325 
The information from the ground were provided by the KVM (firstly by the KDOM), 
and from the air by NATO aerial surveillance were transmitted to the KVCC (film and image 
data from NATO aerial surveillance were first delivered to NATO processing stations). The 
information were than analysed by NATO and national information centres, resulting in daily 
reports elaborated by NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). This 
daily reports were transmitted to the North Atlantic Council, which determined, if the parties 
were or were not compliant. This assessments were subsequently transmitted to OSCE and 
UN.326 
 
 
4.5 Training 
The KVM Induction center (KVMIC) was opened in the Hotel Narcis in  Brezovica (Strpce 
municipality) in November 1998, it was made operational on 23rd November 1998. It provided a 
                                                          
320 Kosovo/Kosova as Seen, as Told, pp. 36 
321 OSCE Kosovo Mission – Outline for Future Tasks and Organisation, Acc. to CIO.GAL/8/99; Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As 
Told, pp. 33 
322 Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As Told, pp. 33 
323 OSCE KVM: Concept of Operation, Annex F, pp. 7  – Medical Support 
324 Letter from the OSCE Secretary General Geremek, to H.E. Mr. Ognen Maleski, Ambassador and the Head of OSCE Mission 
to FYROM, from 18th November 1998 
325 OSCE KVM: Concept of Operation, Annex E, pp. 3 
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four-day induction training compulsory for all the mission members.327 The curriculum of the 
course included:328 
 
 The Mission 
 Local history, customs and culture 
 Human Rights issues 
 Verification tasks 
 Humanitarian tasks 
 Communications and IT training 
 Security and mines awareness 
 First Aid 
 Code of Conduct 
 Reporting procedures 
 Recognition Training 
 Driver briefing (Defensive/ winter driving and licence issue) 
 
 
4.6 Equipment 
The verifiers, mostly of military or police background, wore civilian clothing,329 but were 
provided by orange OSCE ballistic helmets, armbands, caps and flak-jackets (issued at the 
KVMIC).330 Each team (2+ verifiers) was equipped with an orange 4x4 diesel fuelled vehicles 
with cross-country capability of two single brands – armoured and soft-skin.331 The vehicle count 
had to maintain a vehicle-to-personnel ration 1:5 in all locations, while HQ and KVMIC were 
additionally supported by trucks and buses. Although the final number (18th March 1999)  of 291 
soft-skin vehicles (Mitsubishi Pajero, Landrover 110 or equivalent) exceeded the planned 
number of 267, the equipment process generated only 142 (18th March 1999) out of the 188 
                                                          
327 “The OSCE/ODIHR in cooperation with UNHCHR, ICRC and UNHCHR, was in charge of organizing a briefing on 
human rights and humanitarian issues. The continuation of training was conducted directly at the Regional Centres as well as at 
Co-ordination Centres. See Kosovo/Kosova as Seen, as Told, pp. 36 
328 OSCE KVM: Concept of Operations, Annex C, pp. 2 
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civilian clothing with an OSCE-provided overgarnment, helmet, armband, cap and flak-jacket.” The verifiers were further 
recommended to have own binoculars, compass and first aid kit, which could be eventually provided by the member states. See 
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planned armoured vehicles (Jeep Cherokee or equivalent).332 The numbers of the armoured 
vehicles were planned to be 13 per opstina, 11 per district and 3 at the KVM headquarters, while 
they were primarily provided for the verification teams in areas of higher security risk, area 
directors and security teams (for other personnel only if required). The soft skin vehicle number 
was initially planned to 5 per opstina, 20 per RC and 100 for the HQ. The communication 
equipment of the verification teams consisted of GPS and cell phones.333  
 
 
4.6 Operational Environment  
The area of Kosovo (in Albanian “Kosova”) is 10,887 sq. kilometres.334 From the military 
and logistic point of view, the terrain is extremely difficult. The most part of Kosovo is 
mountainous, with the “Albanian Alps” along the border with Albania (south-west), the Sar 
mountains located along the border with FYROM (south), and Kopaonik mountains in the 
north. The central part – the regions of Drenica, Crnoljeva and Goljak – is hilly, with two main 
plains – Metohija (west) and Kosovo (central-east). The terrain is rugged (52% agriculture, 39% 
forest), with mostly rotten weather and poor roads.  
The security situation throughout the KVM deployment can be characterized as 
volatile/tense.335 There were regular reports of guerrilla raids, shelling, gunfire exchanges and 
deliberate attacks on police and military facilities.336 Despite the formal agreement of the FRY 
with the ceasefire, the Yugoslav armed forces, upon these provocations, maintained systematic 
security operations, causing many casualties among the (Albanian) civilian population. Both sides 
also extensively used landmines. The main areas of fighting were along the border with Albania 
and FYROM,337 with the traditional KLA strongholds in the regions of Drenica and Llapi.338  
As the members of the KVM stated, the behaviour and approach of the Kosovo Serbs 
was in “absolute majority of cases reasonable and cooperative”.339 However, they felt the Kosovo 
problem should be dealt with exclusively by the local authorities alone, without an involvement 
of the international community, but although the majority of them had shown their cooperation. 
The KVM officials of all levels were also meeting regularly with the KLA and Yugoslav 
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commanders, “most of them were also professional in their approach.”340 Relations with the 
local authorities (prefects, mayors, elders and political party leaders) were generally good.341 
Experiences with the Yugoslav and Serbian authorities varied and co-operation depended to 
some degree on personalities and sometimes also on the nationality of the present KVM staff.342 
However, the conditions in the area were very tense and the security situation constantly 
deteriorated over the time. The mistrust between the two parties was too deep and it never 
weakened. The mission permanently extinguished the ceasefire violations throughout the 
province.343 Human rights violations such as torture, beatings, rapes, arbitrary executions and 
extra judicial killings were daily agenda, although the KVM was often denied to carry out the 
investigation.344 The local population was already used to such environment and vacated their 
home area very quickly with the sound of fire (or upon the rumours of an on-coming one) with 
the necessary property on their backs.345 Both of the parties were often retaking the areas, where 
the other had withdrawn from. Those who suffered the most were the civilians. Most frequent 
were the cases when a dead body was found without any transparent explanation. E.g. at the end 
of February 1999, over 70 bodies had been found, usually left by the roads with visible signs of 
beating and execution. There were also many cases of kidnapping, whereas sometimes the 
responsibility was indorsed, but most cases were closed as committed by “uncontrolled 
elements.” 346  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
340 Cit. Maisonneuve: The Osce Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 51 
341 Maisonneuve: The Osce Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 51 
342 Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As Told 39 
343 „The Kosovo Diplomatic Observation Mission (KDOM) notes that the Albanian rebels and the Serb police forces are not 
respecting the United Nations resolutions calling for an end to hostilities and maintenance of a limited number of Serb troops 
and police forces in the province.“ Cit. Council of Europe: Crisis in Kosovo and situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Report, 26.01.1999); “On the one hand was a government that was doing some very bad things, in terms of denying rights to the 
Albanian community, which was 90 percent of the population of Kosovo. When the security services were, quote, "in pursuit of 
a terrorist or a band of terrorists," unquote, they would go in and just destroy a village. On the other side, you had the KLA, 
which also did some bad things, but it was usually of a scale that was totally different. So maintaining that even-handedness was 
difficult.” FRONTLINE - Interview with William Walker, Former Director of the KVM 
344 Monitoring the Northern Ireland Ceasefires, pp 4 
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5 THE SIX MONTHS IN REVIEW 
5.1 Introduction 
hroughout the informal ceasefire which started on 12th October 1998, 170 incidents 
occurred, resulting in the death of 200 persons.347 The standstill ended on 14th 
December 1998, with a fierce clash between the Yugoslav border guards and KLA 
fighters, trying to penetrate into Kosovo from Albania near Prizren. During the fight, KLA 
suffered 37 casualties. Later on the same day, 6 Serbian youngsters were killed with automatic 
gunfire while sitting in a café in the town of Peja, in what appeared to be a revenge attack.348 On 
21st December, a Serb policeman was killed in the town of Podujevo and kidnapped and killed a 
Serb Deputy Mayor of Kosovo Polje, whose body was later found on a side of a road.349 
Simultaneously, the KLA had taken positions around the town, threatening the main access 
roads from Serbia.350 Three days later, the worst fighting since the beginning of the “cease-fire” 
broke out in the region of Llap near Podujeva, where the Yugoslav security forces started what it 
called the “Christmas Offensive” (24th-27th December 1998).351 During the four-day operation, 
to which 100 tanks were deployed, the Yugoslav forces drove out the KLA from Poduljevo and 
killed 14 KLA fighters, while more than 5,000 civilians escaped from their homes.352 On 26th 
December, NATO SACEUR Clark condemned the Yugoslav armed forces activities, however, 
not mentioning the Albanian participation on the violence.353 On 27th December the OSCE CiO 
Geremek joined the criticism and threatened with withdrawal of the KVM.354 However, one day 
later he succeeded to mediate another ceasefire.  
Over the first quarter of 1999 Kosovo was a place of war, sometimes more or less 
restrained.355  In early January, the KLA initiated a series of ambushes and kidnappings in the 
southern Kosovo, including 3 police officers. It also increased aggressive patrolling of major 
roads in the area. On 8th January, the OSCE reported that “the irresponsible actions by the KLA 
since yesterday morning are the main reasons for a considerable increase of tension in 
Kosovo...These actions are in direct contradiction of solemn promises from the KLA of 
                                                          
347 Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 17 
348 Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 17 
349 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 518 
350 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 518 
351 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 518 
352 Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 17 
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violence by the Serb side. The Yugoslav Army has broken its promises to NATO." Cit. Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 
1998, pp. 18 
354 "The OSCE would have to reconsider the forms of its actitivities in Kosovo” Cit. Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, 
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showing restraint and of maintaining the ceasefire agreement.”356 Yugoslav forces retaliated by 
ambushing KLA columns from Albania and by a number of local raids.  
The majority of humanitarian law and human rights complaints received by the OSCE 
KVM during this period involved:357 
 
 extra-judicial killings 
 summary executions 
 disappearances and abductions 
 incommunicado detention 
 abuse by the police and security forces 
 disproportionate use of force against the civilian population (destruction of civilian 
property, pillaging, illegal property evictions 
 restricted freedom of movement for Kosovo Albanians (in the time of fighting) 
 
The most reported incidents in the first three months of 1999 were the arbitrary killing of 
unarmed civilians. There were as well killings by the Kosovo Albanians by the Serbian security 
forces, as well as killings by the KLA of Serbs and Kosovo Albanians who were believed to be 
"collaborators" or sympathizers with the Yugoslav authorities.358 In early 1999, except of the 
incidents in Racak, Rogovo and Rakovina (January and February 1999), the most frequent 
occurrence were killing on an individual basis.359 There were many individual killings which 
appeared to follow a given pattern and to be linked to the hostility, however they were 
impossible to be attributed to one side or another. Evidently, the effect of these crimes was to 
heighten fears and tensions in all communities. Events verified by the OSCE KVM indicated 
presence of arbitrary detentions, extra-judicial killings and the mutilation of unarmed civilians by 
Yugoslav and Serb security forces.360 
 With an increasing tendency, arbitrary arrest and detention, and the violation of the right 
to a fair trial, were becoming a common practice in the Yugoslav controlled administration of 
justice towards the Kosovo Albanians. From the very beginning, the KVM received many 
complaints concerning torture and ill-treatment. Many of them were confirmed by medical 
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359 Mitchell, Sandra: Human Rights in Kosovo, pp. 245 
360 Mitchell, Sandra: Human Rights in Kosovo, pp. 245 
Vladimír Randáček                                                                 The OSCE Kosovo Verification mission 1998-1999 
79 
 
records or photographic material.361 Brutal violence was used against the persons under arrest or 
in detention. It appears, that it was systematically applied in order to emphasize the authority 
over the detainees, to extort "confessions" of criminal and "terrorist" activities, naming of other 
suspects or for promise of future co-operation.362 The trials of people facing charges relating to 
"terrorism" or "subversive activity" were taking place already from the beginning of 1990s. 
However, the physical evidence was often insufficient and the convictions were usually based on 
"confessions" were obtained under intimidation or ill-treatment.363  
 
 
5.2 The Racak Incident and Aftermath 
On 15th January 1999, during a combined clearance operation in the village of Racak (30 
km from Pristina), the Yugoslav armed forces killed 45 Kosovo Albanians, including an 18-year-
old woman and a twelve-year-old child. The incident became a turning point regarding efforts to 
peacefully resolve the Kosovo conflict.  
 After the KVM verifiers arrived to the stage, they started to transport the wounded 
civilians in their vehicles to the local hospital. The Mission immediately established a permanent 
presence (Field Office) in the village to calm down the population and carry out the 
investigation.364 The next day, 45 dead bodies of the villagers were found on the scene. The 
KVM Head of Mission Walker declared the Yugoslav authorities responsible and called upon the 
Office of the Prosecutor of ICTY, to investigate the killings. When the ICTY's Chief Prosecutor 
attempted to travel to Kosovo, the Yugoslav authorities did not allow her to enter. In the 
absence of the ICTY, OSCE KVM human rights officers documented the crime scene, obtained 
statements from survivors and witnesses and endeavoured to preserve forensic evidence until 
experts from Finland arrived.365 What was unusual on Racak was, that the incident occurred in 
area where the verifiers were actively patrolling.366 From this moment on, the security situation in 
the province again started to deteriorate seriously. The Yugoslav security forces increased their 
presence throughout the province and began re-establish their control with a heavy use of 
force.367 The Racak incident was the first worldwide broadcasted example of the violence in 
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Kosovo. The pictures of Director Walker walking over the dead bodies flooded the world media 
and triggered a vigorous international response. It raised a worldwide outrage against Belgrade 
government and diverted the attention from the KLA’s provocations. On 17th January, the 
NATO Secretary General Javier Solana announced that Milosevic would be held personally 
Responsible and the NATO SACEUR Clarke went to Belgrade to confront him personally.368 
The Contact Group called for a peace talks to be held at Rambouillet at the end of the month. 
 Two weeks later, during another roundup in the village of Rogovo, the Yugoslav forces 
killed 24 KLA members, including several alleged civilians. The KVM reacted immediately with 
opening a permanent Field Office and starting an investigation.  
At the end of February 1999 another security action executed by the Yugoslav forces 
took place in the village of Randubrava over two subsequent nights. The first night the Yugoslav 
police was checking the village, while the KLA opened fire upon them. At the time when the 
KVM arrived on the scene, a violent, though localized firefight had begun. The police agreed to 
cease the fire and return to the barracks as well as the KLA. The incident claimed lives of 2 
civilians, while one elderly woman was wounded. Followingly, the KLA reinforced the defence 
of the village with heavy machine guns and defensive works. In the eve of the next day, an ethnic 
Serb shepherd got accidentally into the KLA lines and was taken captive. The police sent a 
rescue force including several APCs. After heavy machine-gun fire-fights began, the verifiers 
succeeded to persuade both of the parties to cease the fire by convincing the Serbs that they will 
take action to facilitate a quick release of the detainee and convincing the KLA, that the police 
forces will withdraw again. The police agreed to fulfil this condition and retreated to the rear. 
The release of the shepherd was facilitated during the night, whereupon he was handed over to 
the Yugoslav authorities. 369  
In the meanwhile, two more Serbs who were cutting wood were kidnapped by the KLA 
near Orahovac. This incident turned out to be very explosive as armed Serb civilians threatened 
to take action to release the captives. The case was resolved after several “very tense”370 meetings 
with the local authorities and a heavy pressure on the KLA, the woodcutters were again released, 
however, one of them was already dead.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
villagers in Vucitrn municipality in February and March 1999, a military and police offensive in Kacanik in February in which the 
tactic of burning and destroying civilian homes to clear the area of the KLA was employed, and a violent crack-down in an 
Albanian quarter of Priština in early March after the killing of two police officers. Cruelty These events reveal patterns of grave 
abuses by Yugoslav and Serbian forces against the civilian population.” Cit. Mitchell, Sandra: Human Rights in Kosovo, pp. 248 
368 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 519 
369 As the story is described in Maisonneuve: The Osce Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 51 
370 Cit. Maisonneuve: The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 51 
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5.3 The Rambouillet Talks 
The Racak massacre became a turning point of the crisis. On 19th January 1999, the UN 
Security Council condemned the attitude of the Yugoslav authorities as contrary to its 
resolutions and relevant agreements.371 On 29th January the Contact Group appealed the both 
sides to cease the violence and summoned their delegations to Rambouillet again. On the 
following day (30th January 1999), the North Atlantic Council delegated the NATO Secretary 
General to authorize air strikes against the Yugoslav targets, if the demands of the international 
community will not be respected. The statement explicitly involved warning to both of the sides, 
not only the Yugoslav government, saying „cease fire or we will bomb you“ to the Serbs and 
„make peace or we will abandon you“ to the KLA.372  The Yugoslav delegation protested against 
the NATO menace referring to Article 53 of the UN Charter and repeatedly refused to sign the 
agreement. 373 The Contact Group simultaneously drafted a set of non-negotiable principles 
demanding restoration of Kosovo´s pre-1990 autonomy status and democratisation supervised 
by international community and it called for an international conference to be summoned in 
February 1999. That was an offer KLA could not refuse, otherwise it risked abandonment by the 
West.  
The conference took place in the chateau of Rambouillet near Paris. The talks began on 
6th February, and were mediated by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana. The Yugoslav 
delegation was led by the federal president Milutinovic (Serbian president Milosevic remained in 
Belgrade), the Albanian delegation was headed by the political spokesman of the KLA Hashim 
Thaci.374 
 The first phase of the negotiations was promising.375 However, the talks came to a grief 
on the issue of the status of the international civilian and military personnel. The NATO and 
namely U.S. diplomacy pressed for a deployment of NATO peacekeeping force with a quite 
extensive status, which was unacceptable for the Yugoslav side.376 Another difficulty was the 
proposed status of the province. The Serbs opposed the retainment of the pre-1990 status and 
any international role in the governance of Kosovo, the Albanians on the other hand were 
                                                          
371 Gazzini: NATO Coercive Military Activities in the Yugoslav Crisis (1992-1999), pp. 406 
372 „.The NATO Secretary General will take full account of the position and actions of the Kosovar leadership and all Kosovar 
armed elements in and around Kosovo in reaching his decision on military action. NATO will take all appropriate measures in 
case of a failure by the Kosovar Albanian side to comply with the demands of the international community.“ Cit. NATO Press 
Release (99) 12, Art. 5 
373 Gazzini: NATO Coercive Military Activities in the Yugoslav Crisis (1992-1999), pp. 407 
374 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 520 
375 Contact Group Statement – Rambouillet, 23.02.1999 
376 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 519, see also The Rambouillet Agreement, Appendix B: Status of 
Multi-National Military Implementation Force, See Appendix I 
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unwilling to accept that it would officially remain a part of Yugoslavia. The talks overran the 
intended deadline of 19th February, so they were extended for another month.  
One day before the second deadline, on 18th March 1999, the U.S., British and Albanian 
delegation in an independent initiative came up with a document later called as the „Rambouillet 
Accords“, which contained all the points of dispute from the past weeks (particularly the military 
Appendix B)377 and which were clearly unacceptable both for the Contact Group and the FRY. 
Further they announced a “signing” conference to be held in Paris on 15th March 1999. As 
expected,378 the Accords were refused by both Yugoslav and Russian delegations. The Yugoslav 
delegation reacted with proposing a strictly revised version of the agreement, however, the 
document was found unacceptable even by the Russians. Things then started to move fast. On 
19th March 1999, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office issued the decision to withdraw the KVM for 
safety reasons.379 The withdrawal took place on 22nd March 1999. On 23rd March the Yugoslav 
National Assembly made its last stand when accepting the principle of autonomy for Kosovo 
and the non-military part of the agreement. But it came too late. One day later, the bombing 
began. 
 
 
5.4 The Withdrawal 
Throughout the March 1999, the situation in Kosovo started to deteriorate rapidly. 
Ceasefire violations and provocations by the both sides became an every day practise and were 
often merging into heavy fighting. The presence of the Yugoslav armed forces in the province 
including heavy weapons considerably increased as well as the flow of armed irregulars from 
Albania. The verifiers in their jeeps were now facing tanks and APCs and were often being 
denied of free access to the places of incidents and thus prevented from carrying out their 
mandate.380 On 19th March 1999, with the collapse of the Rambouillet peace talks the new OSCE 
                                                          
377 See the Appendix I (Rambouillet Agreement) 
378 E.g. the British defence minister Lord Gilbert said: "I think the terms put to Milošević at Rambouillet were absolutely 
intolerable; how could he possibly accept them; it was quite deliberate. That does not excuse an awful lot of other things, but we 
were at a point when some people felt that something had to be done, so you just provoked a fight." See The House of 
Commons: Examination of witness, Question 1086; „The Rambouillet text, which called on Serbia to admit NATO troops 
throughout Yugoslavia, was a provocation, an excuse to start bombing. Rambouillet is not a document that an angelic Serb could 
have accepted. It was a terrible diplomatic document that should never have been presented in that for“ Cit. Henry Kissinger: 
Interview for Daily Telegraph, June 28th 1999 
379 OSCE Chairman-in-Office Press Release, 19.04.1999 
380 „...almost every day, there was another incident, another indication that things were getting relatively unsafe, and more so with 
each passing day. It was also becoming much more difficult, if not impossible, to do our verification. Our patrols were being 
denied access to places. We were supposed to have total access wherever we wanted to go, and all of a sudden we were running 
into roadblocks of tanks, or armored personnel carriers, and they'd say we can't go through. We're unarmed and they're armed, so 
you can't push it too hard. So it became increasingly difficult for us to do the job...And it became increasingly more dangerous 
for my people. This information was going back to the capitals, and to the chairman in office. I was asked for my 
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Chairman-in-Office, Norwegian foreign minister Knut Vollebaek, issued the decision to 
withdraw the KVM for safety reasons381 and presumably also as another means to increase the 
pressure on the Yugoslav authorities, who were being under the menace of NATO air strikes. 
The evacuation begun on 22nd March. It went swiftly,382 within only 6 hours as the Yugoslav 
authorities provided full cooperation in facilitating clear exits. This time the withdrawal was 
taken advantage by the Yugoslav side, so the tanks and APCs were sometimes imminently 
following the withdrawing OSCE columns.383  
The KVM regrouped in Ohrid, in the south-west of Macedonia. The OSCE, trying to 
save the costs, immediately reduced the Mission personnel from actual size 1350 to a “Core” of 
250 by 31st March 1999,384 while Russia and Belarus, in protest against the NATO operation, 
withdrew its personnel from it. The bulk of the members was repatriated, the Core 
Headquarters, responsible for planning for the future re-entry of the OSCE presence to Kosovo, 
were temporarily based to Skopje, while the “Task Forces” served over the next two and half 
months in Albania and FYROM, providing assistance to the UNHCR and governments by 
registering the refugees, collecting evidence on human right violations from the refugees, etc.385 
The Kosovo Verification Mission was finally terminated by decision of the OSCE 
Permanent Council by 9th June 1999, succeeding the creation of the “Task Force for Kosovo” (8. 
June 1999), primarily tasked with preparing for re-deployment to Kosovo and continuing to 
assist the UN and other international organizations.386 The Task Force for Kosovo was dissolved 
on 1 July 1999 and replaced by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
recommendation, and I said that we should depart at some point, or someone's going to get hurt....He said the decision had been 
made to pull us out.“ Cit. FRONTLINE - Interview with William Walker, Former Director of the KVM 
381 OSCE Chairman-in-Office Press release, 19.04.1999 
382 Maisonneuve: The Osce Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 52 
383 „What we quickly discovered, somewhat to our chagrin, was that the reason we got out in six hours instead of eight or ten 
hours was that the security services did everything to facilitate our exit. We started hearing about this with our last people coming 
out. . . . Some of them were saying that right behind us were the tanks and the armored personnel carriers. It was obvious that 
the Yugoslav forces had a plan to move in right behind us.“ Cit. FRONTLINE - Interview with William Walker, Former 
Director of the KVM; Later speculations were talking about an „Operation Horseshoe“ (name given by the German 
government) – a plan of the Yugoslav government to expel the entire Albanian population out of Kosovo. It was used in support 
of the later NATO boxing campaign against the FRY targets. Eventhough it has been later investigated by the ICTY, its veracity 
remains uncertain.  
384 Survey of OSCE Long-Term Missions and other OSCE Field Activities, pp 77; Other authors state that te remaining 
personnel amounted 350. See Eiff, Hansjörg: The OSCE Mission in Kosovo, pp. 286 
385 Survey of OSCE Long-Term Missions and other OSCE Field Activities, pp 77; Eiff, Hansjörg: The OSCE Mission in 
Kosovo, pp. 286 
386 OSCE Permanent Council Decision Nr. 296 (8. June 1999) 
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6 KEY FINDINGS 
6.1 Mission Mandate 
ver the period of its deployment, the KVM evolved into a quasi enhanced-
peacekeeping mission, maintaining the ceasefire on a local level and keeping the 
violence on the ground.387 However, comparing to other missions with similar tasks 
(e.g. the Independent Monitoring Commission for Northern Ireland (IMC) or the mission of the 
Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995, the KVM had 
several significant disadvantages, which resulted from the very circumstances, under which the 
mission had to operate.388 These disadvantages substantially affected its performance. 
 
 After its deployment, the KVM percepted to be mainly a „verification“ mission (as 
expectable from its very name), i.e. mostly performing duties as counting of weapons and 
forces and reporting the compliance with the October agreement. That indeed was to 
happen occasionally, but the verifiers soon had to found themselves performing mostly 
different tasks. Soon it turned out, that the central scope of the work will be maintenance 
of the ceasefire,389 instead of its verification (later the scope expanded even more, 
towards the human dimension), as it was the basic prerequisite for carrying out its 
tasks.390 The verifiers had to react upon local violations of the ceasefire in order to 
restore it and continue to perform their initial duties. Due to this mission creep, the 
KVM´s ability to perform the verification tasks  was considerably decreased. 
 Although the KVM was in charge of monitoring the implementation of the October 
agreement, it had no direct mandate for verifying the KLA activities, as the KLA was not 
a signing party of the agreement.391 The Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement did not include 
any provisions for disarming the KLA. In this regard, the verifiers were backed only by 
the broad language of the Security Council resolutions. The initial absence of the political 
recognition of the KLA had clearly deeper political consequences (See Subchapt. 3.3 and 
3.4). However, this absence was to the prejudice of the mission´s impartiality, as it laid 
unequal pressure on the belligerents. As the HoM Walker described: “There have been 
                                                          
387 Maisonneuve: The Osce Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 54 
388 “The Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina had many tasks, but among them is the power to impose 
sanctions on those local actors it deems to be obstructing the implementation of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, including 
measures similar to those which the IMC in Northern Ireland may recommend…The exercise of OHR’s powers has had a 
generally positive effect on the Bosnian political situation, and the IMC has similar potential in Northern Ireland.” Cit. 
Monitoring the Northern Ireland Ceasefires, pp. 1 
389 Maisonneuve: The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 50 
390 „Should the cease-fire fail, no other task could be carried out.“ Cit. Maisonneuve: The Osce Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 
50 
391 Eiff, Hansjörg: The OSCE Mission in Kosovo, pp. ????????????????? 
O 
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instances of noncompliance on both sides. In our view, the majority of the instances ... 
have emanated from the government side. But that is also perhaps a function of the fact 
that we have asked more of them. When I say that they’re not cooperating in terms of 
landing rights for planes that might be bringing in supplies or quibbles at the border over 
customs, this sort of thing, those are things you ask of a government; you don’t ask that 
from the KLA.”392  
 The mandate did not provide the mission with any authority to enforce the compliance 
with the agreements. The main task of the verifiers was to report the non-compliance 
and to investigate and ensure documentation in case of HR violations. The findings of 
the KVM investigations could be prosecuted by the ICTY, however, the KVM was 
authorized to raise the prosecutions, detain the suspects or impose sanctions or penalties. 
This provided rather an indirect deterrent with insufficient effect in the field. However, 
even if the mission would be given with such authority, it is questionable how would it 
be able to carry it out as it had no physical means of enforcement. According to the 
agreement of 16th October 1998, the verifiers were unarmed.393 They could not carry 
weapons even for self defence, nor there was any backing by an independent 
(international) armed force, as it is a common practice by such missions. This shortage 
made the verifiers less credible and substantially decreased their ability to prevent the 
violations.394 The verifiers constantly faced restricted movement and restricted access to 
official personnel, courts, hospitals and other public services. Particularly, the KVM did 
not obtain the full co-operation of the judiciary, nor the health-care system.395 Both KLA 
and Yugoslav authorities set up checkpoints, and refused the verification teams to enter 
the areas beyond these checkpoints without any legitimate reason.396 As the HoM Walker 
stated: “We're unarmed and they're armed, so you can't push it too hard. So it became 
increasingly difficult for us to do the job.” 397 However, it is doubtful, that even an armed 
                                                          
392 Cit. Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 513 
393 Agreement on the KVM from 16th October 1998, Chapt. IV Art. 2 
394 Monitoring the Northern Ireland Ceasefires, pp 4 
395 “E.g. in Pristina District Court, the Public Prosecutor and the President of the Court refused to meet HR officers. Trial 
schedules were difficult to obtain and the KVM was often misinformed about scheduled trials. In one instance, a HR officer was 
only allowed in the courtroom after senior mission staff intervened. Court officials displayed a high degree of distrust to the 
KVM and alleged that the KVM was likely to believe "Albanian propaganda". The KVM verifiers encountered frequent obstacles 
to its access to Pristina hospital. This was particularly acute when human rights officers attempted to verify the location and 
condition of those wounded who were suspected of terrorist acts. The KVM was often refused access to medical staff to discuss 
allegations of medical discrimination against Kosovo Albanians. Access to the morgue to verify the identification and condition 
of dead bodies was routinely denied. On several occasions, access was granted only after the Head of Mission intervened with 
officials in Belgrade. Freedom of movement was a problem throughout the time the KVM was deployed in Kosovo. The same 
was with KLA, which restricted access to their controlled areas, denied the KVM access to monitor their "trials" and to 
detainees.” Cit. Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As Told 38-39 
396 Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As Told 39 
397  Cit. FRONTLINE - Interview with William Walker, Former Director of the KVM 
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KVM or protected by some kind of international military force might have prevented the 
tragedy that was to come. 
 The safety of the mission was guaranteed by the Yugoslav government – i.e. one of the 
parties to the conflict.398 This was indeed one of the weakest points of the mission.399 In 
the given security environment, it was undoubtedly to the prejudice of the verifiers 
impartiality in the eyes of the Albanian population and on many occasions it had been 
putting their lives into a serious risk.400 Yugoslavia agreed to guarantee the security of the 
KVM personnel. However, the Yugoslav rescue system was not very efficient in 
emergencies. Moreover, it was one of the parties of the conflict. Switzerland made a 
rescue helicopter available, but despite intervention at the highest levels, the Yugoslav 
government refused to let the helicopter to enter the country, pointing instead to its own 
rescue system.401  
 The only actual deterrent which stood behind the verifiers was the imminent threat of 
NATO airstrikes. However, it was a backsword as it constituted threat only for the 
Yugoslav side. On the contrary, for the KLA side, international military intervention of 
any form was actually the main strategic goal (see Subchapter 3.3).  
 Although the agreement between the FRY and the OSCE granted complete freedom of 
movement and access to Mission personnel, the obligation of the parties to provide 
information and cooperation in other respects were quite limited. For instance, the 
reporting requirement on the movements of forces was only retrospective, i.e. those that 
had taken place during the preceding week. With the procedures as they were it was very 
difficult to prevent the violations with a timely deployment. 402 
 The observations of the OSCE Technical Assessment Mission (July 1998) concluded, 
that the cease-fire could not be guaranteed without the tough presence of international 
military forces.403 
                                                          
398 Agreement on the KVM from 16th October 1998, Chapt. I Art. 6; This seems to be one of the key conditions and tactical aims 
of the Yugoslav side during the negotiations leading to the agreement of 16th October 1998. As Director Walker rememberes: “I 
spoke several times to Milosevic, and dozens of times to his representatives in Kosovo, saying, "Diplomatic missions usually have 
a security force - not the verifiers themselves - but an armed security force to guard the buildings or individuals within the 
mission. This is common practice throughout the world. So why can't we have permission for some of our people to go armed?" 
He always said, "No, we're responsible for your safety. We will take care of you."” Cit. FRONTLINE - Interview with William 
Walker, Former Director of the KVM 
399 As the Director Walker later remembered: „Dick Holbrooke said that he later volunteered that that was probably the weakest 
part of his agreement--maybe he should not have conceded that point. But he said that Milosevic was adamant that they had to 
go in unarmed, and that they couldn't bear any resemblance to an armed force. He got the best deal he could get, I guess, and 
that resulted in unarmed verifiers.“ Cit. FRONTLINE - Interview with William Walker, Former Director of the KVM 
400 “On a couple of occasions, we saw that that promise was very hollow.“ Cit. FRONTLINE - Interview with William Walker, 
Former Director of the KVM 
401 Loquai, Heinz: Kosovo - A Missed Opportunity for a Peaceful Solution to the Conflict?, pp.84 
402 Eiff, Hansjörg: The OSCE Mission in Kosovo, pp. 285 
403 Eiff, Hansjörg: The OSCE Mission in Kosovo, pp. 286 
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6.2 Recruitment and Establishment 
There had been also serious problems within the personnel generation process, which has been 
criticized by some high national officials already during the start-up period: 404 
  
 There was a huge gap between verbal support of the member states and the actual 
personnel, material and financial contributions. The national governments which later 
sent thousands of soldiers to Kosovo with heavy equipment obviously had problems 
making a few hundred unarmed verifiers rapidly available.405 For instance, appeals by the 
OSCE to participating States for a mobile medical core and medical vehicles went 
unanswered for a long time. A team of German medics was the first to arrive, but not 
until 7 December.406 
 During the recruitment to the KVM, there were insufficient job descriptions provided to 
the member states in order to recruit suitable personnel as well as insufficient quality of 
the nominated candidate´s CVs provided to the OSCE by the member states. The 
selection procedure was made only on the basis of the CVs, without a personal or 
telephone interview. That prevented the possibility to test the candidate´s  language skills, 
social competence, etc.407 
 The selection board was comprised only of members from the Contact Group countries 
and Secretariat, without representation of the smaller states, and worse, of the Mission 
itself. The early caused the imbalance of nationalities within the mission staff, the latter 
possibly decreased the efficiency in order to choose the most suitable candidates. 
 The secondment system was slow and inefficient in establishing large-scale mission with 
multiple and complicated components and functions.408 There has been a series of 
disconnects between the national Foreign Ministries, which are responsible for the 
communication with OSCE, and national Defence ministries, which were in many cases 
provided personnel and support materials for the KVM. The number of the verifiers was 
constantly insufficient to ensure the intended goals - overall coverage and permanent 
presence even at the most critical points.409  
                                                          
404 On 2 December, at the OSCE's Ministerial Council in Oslo, the German Foreign Minister Fischer criticized the OSCE: "We 
are not unaware of the difficulties in setting up the KVM. Nevertheless, we are worried about its slow progress, its lack of 
transparency and the application of unequal standards in the choice of personnel. The planning process has scarcely begun for 
some of the core responsibilities of the KVM. This is particularly true with regard to the police." Cit. Loquai, Heinz: Kosovo - A 
Missed Opportunity for a Peaceful Solution to the Conflict?, pp.85 
405 Loquai, Heinz: Kosovo - A Missed Opportunity for a Peaceful Solution to the Conflict?, pp.85 
406 Loquai, Heinz: Kosovo - A Missed Opportunity for a Peaceful Solution to the Conflict?, pp.84 
407 Recruitment Procedures for the Future´s Mission Staffing 
408 Lessons Learned from the KVMSU Planning Group, pp. 1 
409 Loquai, Heinz: Kosovo - A Missed Opportunity for a Peaceful Solution to the Conflict?, pp. 84 
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 The seconded personnel was sometimes seconded for contracts shorter than 6 months, 
which caused insufficient continuity within the administration.410 
 Another detail which turned out to be very effective was the use of experienced and 
mature verifiers – the average age in the mission was around 45 years. 411 Not only that 
they were able to operate independently, but they enjoyed a great credibility by both 
Serbs and Albanians. On the other hand among the weaknesses was mainly the 
insufficient knowledge of English language among some of the verifiers causing 
problems in communication, inadequate passage of information, difficulties in the action 
coordination, differences in cultural work habits, tendency to hoard information and 
centralise functions and competencies, etc.412 
 There was insufficient capacity of contingency planning in the OSCE prior 16th October 
1998, especially in regard to personnel, equipment and office space. The arrival of an 
additional personnel of 34 people from 7 member countries took time to establish 
offices, structure and the planning process. The fact that KVM was although established 
so quickly, was mainly due to one member state (USA) providing early, a staff planning 
“module” under a senior official.413 
 As the USA, the wealthiest and most populous member of the OSCE and simultaneously 
most capable of seconding the mission members, strongly tended to dominate the KVM. 
However, it did not prove as in the best interest of the mission, nor the OSCE capability 
of the conflict resolution. 414  
 The work of the OSCE KVM Technical reconnaissance team sent to Belgrade on 17th 
October 1998 was considerably limited, as it was given no guidance on the Agreements 
(signed 16th October). It was unable to give consistent or specific recommendations. 
Such guidance was not presented even to the subsequent planning team, what severely 
restrained effective planning in the early stages. 415 
 The observations of the OSCE technical assessment mission (July 1998) concluded, that 
the cease-fire could not be guaranteed without the tough presence of international 
military forces.416  
 
 
                                                          
410 Recruitment Procedures for the Future´s Mission Staffing 
411 Maisonneuve: The Osce Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 54 
412 Maisonneuve: The Osce Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 54 
413 Lessons Learned from the KVMSU Planning Group, pp. 1 
414 Hopmann: Building Security in Post–Cold War Eurasia, pp 46 
415 Lessons Learned from the KVMSU Planning Group, pp. 2 
416 Eiff, Hansjörg: The OSCE Mission in Kosovo, pp. 286 
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6.3 Command 
 The leadership of the HO Walker had also a negative influence on the rapid construction 
of the mission, as he did arrive in Kosovo only after three weeks after his appointment. 
The fact that he had reserved all decisions considering organization and personnel 
exclusively for himself, caused repeated delays. Experienced candidates often had to 
spend weeks waiting before finally being accepted.417  
 The observers stated, that the focus of the HQ was rather on itself instead of on the 
work being done in field.418 
 There was a lack of guidelines from the side of the Mission headquarters, especially the 
lack of clearly established standards against which the performance of the parties could 
be measured, e.g. considering to the number of weapon systems in certain areas, human 
rights standards, court monitoring standards, etc.419 It was than often impossible for the 
verifiers in the field to base their assessments/evaluations on any exact basis. The 
Mission failed to translate the UN resolutions and international agreements into practical 
handbooks for the personnel in the field.  
 
6.4 General Impact of the Mission 
Despite the factors limiting the capacity of the mission to perform its tasks optimally, the impact 
of the mission was significant.  
 The KVM´s essential success was gaining the confidence of the local communities.420 
According to surveys, the Kosovo Albanians expressed their satisfaction over the 
Mission's existence as a link between Kosovo and the outer world and as the world's 
"eye" on Kosovo.421 Also Serb civilians and some officials also developed an increased 
level of trust as a result of the KVM's commitment to impartiality and a genuine concern 
for the plight of the Serb civilians.422 The HoM Walker confirmed this as well “... as we 
went in, we felt that we would be welcomed by all.”423  
 Thanks to this, the mission was successful in brokering numerous small-scale disputes on 
the ground, and thus provided necessary time for the undergoing peace process. 
                                                          
417 Loquai, Heinz: Kosovo - A Missed Opportunity for a Peaceful Solution to the Conflict?, pp.85 
418 Cit. Maisonneuve: The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 54 
419 Maisonneuve: The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 53 
420 Burghardt, Günther: Early Warning and Conflict Prevention, pp. 426 
421 Eiff, Hansjörg: The OSCE Mission in Kosovo, pp. 286 
422 Kosovo/Kosova as Seen as Told, pp. 38 
423 FRONTLINE - Interview with William Walker, Former Director of the KVM 
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However, as it was unarmed, there was little it could do to stop the escalation of violence 
in the beginning of 1999.424 The cease fire was successfully maintained in areas where the 
KVM was able to establish a permanent presence. However, due to the lack of 
manpower, still many areas had to stay beyond control.  
 The presence of the KVM largely contributed to reduction of fear among the civilian 
population, as it was bringing a feeling of security that the area is closely watched by the 
international community. E.g. the village of Malisevo (originally 4000 inhabitants), was 
used by the KLA used as one of its bases and later completely destroyed during the 
operation of Yugoslav security forces. Simultaneously, all inhabitants fled their homes. 
During several days after the a Field Office (FO) was opened there in late January 1999, 
more than a thousand villagers returned to their homes and begun to rebuild them.425 
The same example was the village of Slapuzane, where within several days after opening 
the FO, several hundred villagers returned to their homes. As reported “they had been 
too afraid to live in the village but the mere presence of KVM gave them confidence.“426 
 In some areas, particularly in the RC1, the verifiers were successful in taking over the 
initiative from the parties and making them adherent with the KVM supervision. Rapid 
reactions, effective field presence and control (i.e. changing patrolling patterns, 
settlement initiatives), substantially contributed to reduction of tensions. This was 
analogy to the military principle of “offensive action.” 427 The verifiers were usually first 
at the scene, many times even before the police. 428 
 The unity of action was successfully coordinated, what was apparent during the Racak 
Incident, when the Contact Group and the OSCE had put a pressure on the Yugoslav 
leadership at the highest level, resulting in the summoning of the Rambouillet 
Conference, while the KVM was successfully maintaining the situation in the field to 
allow the peace process to continue.  
 The presence of the KVM verification teams was, within its limits, successfully 
preventing KLA to take advantage of the withdrawal.429 However, many areas were left 
without permanent patrol coverage as the KVM force generation process did not 
                                                          
424 Hopmann: Building Security in Post–Cold War Eurasia, pp. 23; For illustration, the events from 28th December 1998: “The 
outgoing OSCE Chairman-in-Office Geremek announced that if the fighting would go on by withdrawing its by now 600 
verifiers. On 27 December, however, the head of the OSCE KVM succeeded in mediating a cease-fire in the Podujeva region 
which lasted into the new year.” Cit. Troebst, Stefan: The Kosovo Conflict 1998, pp. 18 
425 Maisonneuve: The Osce Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 51 
426 Cit. Kosovo/Kosova as Seen as Told, pp. 38 
427 Maisonneuve: The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 53 
428 Maisonneuve: The Osce Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 51 
429 Crawford: Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War, pp. 512 
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produce the full number of personnel called for in the agreement in time.430 This deficit 
was to some extent balanced by the strategy of rapid reaction, i.e. when there was an 
indication of a problem, the KVM was able to deploy its verification teams immediately 
to the place of the incident to reassure the local population and start with the 
investigation.431  
 The contact of the verifiers with the public was also important for dispelling the 
umbiquituos rumours.432 
 However, the performance of the mission was subsequently severely limited by the 
deteriorating security situation in the province.433 
 
6.5 The impact of the work of the Human Rights Division 
 The presence of the KVM HRD officers on the inter-city buses resulted in fewer cases 
of abuse by the police, who often stopped buses at checkpoints and harassed the Kosovo 
Albanian passengers, beating or arresting them.434 
 Judges, who would otherwise convict a suspected terrorist on very dubious legal grounds, 
would hesitate when the KVM (and other organizations) were present in the 
courtroom.435  
 Families of those detained reported, that since the KVM began monitoring of the trials, 
detention beatings were reduced.436  
 People who were afraid to go as ordered for an "informative talk" to the police stations, 
or were afraid to approach the police in general, often asked KVM to assist them or 
accompany them to the police station.437  
 Through investigation and documentation of the human rights violations, the HR 
officers significantly contributed for later prosecutions of war crimes in Kosovo.    
 
 
                                                          
430 Maisonneuve: The Osce Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 52 
431 Maisonneuve: The Osce Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 54 
432 Maisonneuve: The Osce Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 51 
433 “Its (the KVM´s) ability to report and intervene was hampered first by personnel shortages and later by the escalation in 
military activity ultimately leading to the withdrawal of the Mission on 20 March 1999.” Cit. Mitchell, Sandra: Human Rights in 
Kosovo, pp. 245 
434 Kosovo/Kosova as Seen as Told, pp. 38 
435 Kosovo/Kosova as Seen as Told, pp. 38 
436 Kosovo/Kosova as Seen as Told, pp. 38 
437 Kosovo/Kosova as Seen as Told, pp. 38 
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6.6 Cooperation with other International Organisations and NGOs 
 An example of successful cooperation with other IOs and NGOs in the field was the 
establishment of an All-Agency Coordination centre under the Regional Centre 1. 
Although it was just a large room with map showing the most current information 
including mine tracing and bureau devices (computers, printers, etc.). The idea was to 
support the other IOs and NGOs and to provide them technical support and place for 
meetings and exchange of information. Once per week a meeting was held for all 
interested parties in order to exchange the information. This initiative turned up to be 
successful, as the NGOs, otherwise known for their unsympathies for any coordination 
from above “felt so welcome that they attended regularly.”438 
 
 
6.7 Equipment 
 Armoured vehicles, which because of the danger of mines and of armed attacks provided 
important protection to personnel, represented a further problem. The KDOM 
observers had had such vehicles from the beginning - about one for every three people. 
The OSCE Mission did not receive its first vehicle of this kind until the end of 
November 1998 (See Fig. 3) and by the 17th December it had only 23 of them (1 per 20 
personnel). 439  
 Logistics was a constant challenge as all vehicles had to be acquired or contracted. This 
was alternate service delivery at its best, and for the most part, worked well. There were 
limitations, however. The need to accept tenders, the integration of personnel and 
equipment into a working whole, a lack of flexibility in the timing and speed of contract 
fulfilment were the major challenges.440  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
438 Maisonneuve: The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 54 
439 Loquai, Heinz: Kosovo - A Missed Opportunity for a Peaceful Solution to the Conflict?, pp.84;  
440 Maisonneuve: The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 54 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
any authors label the KVM as a failure.441 However, such conclusions are 
notwithstanding the mission´s mandate. According to the findings of this work, 
the KVM was essentially an observation mission with advisory and consultative 
competences, not a peacekeeping force or prosecution body. As such, it could have only a little 
effect on the general development of the situation.442 As the former HoM Walker later stated: “  
 
ARGUMENTATION:  
 
 The reason why the KVM was established was to verify the ceasefire, not to keep it or 
find a political solution for the crisis. It could, and within its possibilities it successfully 
did, maintain the ceasefire on a local basis, using its appearance credibility and 
negotiating tactics. However, it had no means to influence the political aims of both of 
the parties.  
 The crucial factor was not the efficiency of the monitoring, but the presence or absence 
of the political will to accept the peace process. The progress towards the peace 
depended on broader political development, over which the KVM had little influence 
and no control. It was clearly not in the power and mandate of the KVM to stop the 
violence from escalation. Therefore, it is more appropriate to speak about the failure of 
the peace process itself rather than a failure of the verifying. However, taking in account 
the refusal of Yugoslavia to let foreign armed force to enter its territory and the fact, that 
most of the UN, NATO and OSCE member states were not willing to send their ground 
troops for a possible ground operation against Yugoslavia, there was not many other 
possibilities than to send an unarmed civil mission.  
 The efficiency an observation mission is from the most part determined by the 
environment that is it supposed to work in. Thus, if we examine whether the KVM was a 
success or failure, we should not analyse the results of the peace process, but rather 
measure the KVM performance in the light of the conditions it had to work in.   
 
 
                                                          
441 “The unsuccessful Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) of 1998-1999” Cit. Monitoring the Northern Ireland Ceasefires, pp 1, 
“KVM was an unquestionable failure” Cit. Monitoring the Northern Ireland Ceasefires, pp 5, “the failure of the OSCE Kosovo 
Verification Mission which led to its withdrawal” Cit. Meyer, Berthold: Never ending Stories? pp. 157 
442 „Everybody saw that our unarmed verification mission was making a difference, but not the sort of difference that would 
push this peace process forward.“ Cit. FRONTLINE - Interview with William Walker 
M 
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According to findings of this study, within the limitations given largely by the security 
conditions, the KVM can be designated as effectively performing its tasks. It was providing daily, 
weekly and bi-weekly reports on the security situation, investigating and documenting HR 
violations and keeping close liaison with both of the parties. Over the period of its deployment, 
it even extended the scope of its functions towards mediation and human dimension. Above its 
duties, it had been brokering numerous local-scale ceasefires, thus achieving necessary time for 
the ongoing peace process. Its presence undoubtedly saved lives and increased the feeling of 
security among the civilian population.443 
The essential failure did not lay in the KVM´s performance, but in the wrong application 
of the KVM type of mission to a highly volatile armed conflict environment. Wrong timing, 
insufficient staffing and deteriorating security conditions together with complete absence of 
enforcement measures were to a large extent preventing the verifiers to perform its duties.  
 
ARGUMENTATION:  
 
 The OSCE-FRY Agreement from 16th October 1998, on which the operating framework 
of the KVM was based, implied an existence of permissive environment and cooperation 
of both sides.444  
 The OSCE itself admits, that the Mission was unable to carry out the full scope of tasks 
set out by the FRY-OSCE Agreement from 16th October 1998.445 
 The fact, that the KVM was not designed as a peacekeeping mission can be seen in one 
its provisions, which established, that the Yugoslav military authorities had to report the 
KVM their military movements one week retrospectively, thus leaving no place for the 
KVM to influence the actual situation.446  
 There was never any genuine ceasefire to verify. The violence was already long under way 
prior to the KVM deployment and after the mission arrived to the stage, the KLA 
deliberately took advantage of the withdrawal of the Yugoslav security forces by taking 
control over the vacated areas (by establishing roadblocks, checkpoints) and using them 
for further raids.447  
                                                          
443 “Although only isolated and sporadic because of inadequate mission staffing, international representatives made appearances 
accordingly throughout the whole country and were able to have a pacifying effect in most combat areas. At least the situation in 
these areas did not escalate into armed conflict. Thus the framework for a peaceful resolution and settlement of the conflict was 
improved.” Cit. Meyer, Berthold: Never ending Stories? pp. 153 
444 OSCE KVM: Concept of Operation, Annex E, pp. 3 
445 Survey of OSCE Long-Term Missions and other OSCE Field Activities, pp 77 
446 Agreement on the KVM from 16th October 1998, Chapter III Art.. 2+8 
447 Monitoring the Northern Ireland Ceasefires, pp 4 
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 KVM could do a little to stop the escalation of violence. The only acceptable political 
solution for the KLA was a complete independence of the province. The KLA´s strategy 
was determined by pulling the Yugoslav forces constantly deeper into the conflict, 
hoping for an international military intervention, which would bring them the 
independence in a dues-ex-machina manner.448  
 The KLA had no official obligations in relationship to the Resolution 1199, nor there 
were any attempts made to involve the KLA into the agreement establishing the KVM. 
As it did not mention any prospect for the future independence, the Kosovo Albanians 
saw the agreement between the OSCE and the FRY as preserving the status quo. Thus, 
in order to enforce their mandate the verifiers were not backed by any obligations of the 
Albanian side. As some of the authors mention, the Kosovo Albanian leaders expressed 
reservations about these agreements to the UN personnel and “openly stated that it felt 
itself (the Albanian political leadership) to be outside the agreement.”449  
 The KVM lacked reputation of an independent and important actor in the wider political 
consequences.450  
 
The failure of the peace process seems to be more likely due to the impatience with 
which NATO and the U.S. took the reins of the solution on their own, than due to inability of 
the OSCE. As Terrence Hopman concludes: “However weak the KVM might have been, it had 
been more effective than the subsequent NATO air campaign in preventing the massive violence 
and the forced expulsion of refugees.”451 Have the OSCE early warning in late 1997 and early 
1998 have been heard452 and the KVM established, perhaps the entire crisis could be successfully 
prevented. For all its challenges, the KVM undoubtedly saved lives, it brokered numerous small-
scale disputes,453 assisted in the return of relatively normal conditions in the region, reduced 
tensions where it was present and, most importantly, as the KVM Head of Operations, Canadian 
General Maissoneuve concluded: “it gave the local population of all ethnic backgrounds some 
reason for hope.”454  
                                                          
448 “The KLA certainly wants independence. They want to protect their villagers. They want to get the international community 
to come in there and get independence for them.“ See FRONTLINE - Interview with William Walker, Former Director of the 
KVM 
449 Monitoring the Northern Ireland Ceasefires, pp 4 
450 Monitoring the Northern Ireland Ceasefires, pp 5 
451 Hopmann: Building Security in Post–Cold War Eurasia, pp 24; “...these events reveal patterns of grave abuses by Yugoslav 
and Serbian forces against the civilian population. Such patterns of abuse recurred on a more shocking scale after the withdrawal 
of the OSCE KVM on 20 March 1999.” Cit. Mitchell, Sandra: Human Rights in Kosovo, pp. 248 
452 Hopmann: Building Security in Post–Cold War Eurasia, pp 26 
453 “In some areas it was only the presence of the KVM that prevented outright hostilities. In other areas the KVM seemed to be 
a pawn of the parties, relegated to recording incidents and their perpetrators. In any case, the risk-benefit balance of the KVM 
was tilting towards the former.” See Maisonneuve: The Osce Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 52 
454 Maisonneuve: The Osce Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 54 
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Résumé v českém jazyce 
 
 Přestože KVM plnila zadané úkoly, díky selhání mírového procesu bývá často 
označována za selhání. Toto hodnocení je způsobeno nedostatečnou znalostí mandátu mise a 
rovněž jeho desinterpretací v soudobých médiích.  
 
Úkoly KVM, zakotvené v Dohodě o KVM z 16. Října 1998, byly následující: 
 
1. ověřovat dodržování Rezoluce Rady bezpečnosti OSN č. 1199 a hlásit případy pokroku 
či jejího porušování;  
2. ustavit permanentní přítomnost v maximálním množství míst po celém Kosovu; 
3. Udržovat blízké styky s jugoslávskými a, srbskými úřady, zástupci Kosovských Albánců a 
ostatními organizacemi působícími v Kosovu a asistovat jim v plnění jejich povinností; 
4. dohlížet nad volbami za účelem zajištění jejich demokratického průběhu; 
5. hlásit a poskytovat doporučení Stálému shromáždění OBSE, Radě bezpečnosti OSN a 
dalším organizacím v oblastech působnosti Rezoluce 1199. 
 
V konkrétních termínech KVM „verifikátoři“ měli: 
 
 vyhledávat překážky na komunikacích jako např. Silniční zátarasy, které byly ustaveny za 
jiným účelem než na kontrolu dopravy a stíhání zločinců atp.455 
 pozorovat jednotky a zařízení policie a pohraniční stráže a doprovázet je při vykonávání 
jejich činnosti.456  
 asistovat UNHCR, ICRC a jiným vládním i nevládním organizacím a rovněž místním 
úřadům při dopravování a rozdělování humanitární pomoci  a zajišťovat návrat uprchlíků 
zpět do jejich domovů.457  
 zajišťovat výměnu informací mezi znesvářenými stranami za účelem výměny informací a 
zajišťovat vedení/poradenství za účelem implementace dohody o KVM.458 
 v případě, že by bylo dosaženo uklidnění situace, spolupracovat na plánování 
rekonstrukce, demokratických volbách a asistovat při budování místní samosprávy a 
policie.459  
                                                          
455 Agreement on the KVM from 16th October 1998, Chapter III Art. 3 
456 Agreement on the KVM from 16th October 1998, Chapter III Art. 4-5 
457 Agreement on the KVM from 16th October 1998, Chapter III Art. 6 
458 Agreement on the KVM from 16th October 1998, Chapter III Art. 10 
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Z rozboru zakládajících dokumentů KVM jednoznačně vyplývá, že tyto předpokládaly plnou 
spolupráci obou znesvářených stran na mírovém procesu. Reální bezpečnostní situace v průběhu 
nasazení KVM ale může být charakterizována jako napjatá a výbušná.460 Permanentně se 
vyskytovaly případy partyzánských výpadů, přestřelek z ručních zbraní a útoků na policejní a 
vojenská zařízení, hlídky i jednotlivce. 461  Přes formální (jednostranný) souhlas jugoslávské strany 
s příměřím, jugoslávské ozbrojené síly reagovaly na provokace UCK silnými represemi, které 
způsobovaly mnoho obětí především na civilním (albánském) obyvatelstvu.  
Členové KVM udržovali pravidelné kontakty s civilními zástupci i vojenskými veliteli 
obou stran.462 Bezpečnostní situace se ale permanentně zhoršovala, především o začátku roku 
1999. Vzhledem k častým provokacím se nikdy nepodařilo nastolit vzájemnou důvěru mezi 
oběma stranami, která byla klíčovou podmínkou k jakékoli spolupráci. Mise byla tedy po celou 
dobu vázána především mediací lokálních konfliktů a dokumentováním porušování lidských 
práv, ke kterému v Kosovu docházelo v extrémní míře.463 Případy mučení, bití, únosů znásilnění. 
Bezsoudních poprav byly na denim pořádku, verifikátoři byli ale často omezováni ve své práci 
zamezováním přístupu do některých oblastí a míst.464 Obě strany si často střídaly kontrolu nad 
jednotlivými územími, především pak UCK často využívala stahování jugoslávských jednotek a 
zneužívala tak podmíněk sjednaných v jednostranném příměří. Především od ledna 1999, 
jugoslávská strana začala opět používat těžkou vojenskou techniku a začaly se objevovat případy 
dělostřeleckého bombardování, blízké letecké podpory (Close Air Support), atp. A čím dál vice 
přibývalo oblastí, kam verifikátoři KVM nebyli vpuštěni.  
 V rámci extrémních bezpečnostních podmínek, ve kterých musela KVM operovat, mise 
plnila stanovené úkoly. Úkolem mise nebylo zabránit porušování příměří ani přinést mírové 
řešení konfliktu v Kosovu, ale ověřovat (angl. „verify“) dodržování Rezolucí rady bezpečnosti 
OSN. Existující dokumenty i svědectví dokazují, že se zadané úkoly misi plnit dařilo. Bohužel, 
špatné načasování, pomalé doplňování lidskými zdroji, zhoršující se bezpečnostní podmínky 
a kompletní absence přímých vynucovacích prostředků, příliš vážně bránily úspěšnému 
vykonávání jejich mandátu. Přesto, i když to nebylo jejich legálně zakotvenou povinností, mise 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
459 Agreement on the KVM from 16th October 1998, Chapt. II Art. 4, Chapt. III Art. 7 
460 Kosovo/Kosova as Seen, as Told, pp. 36; Survey of OSCE Long-Term Missions and other OSCE Field Activities, pp 77;  
461 Monitoring the Northern Ireland Ceasefires, pp 4 
462 Maisonneuve: The Osce Kosovo Verification Mission, pp. 51 
463 „The Kosovo Diplomatic Observation Mission (KDOM) notes that the Albanian rebels and the Serb police forces are not 
respecting the United Nations resolutions calling for an end to hostilities and maintenance of a limited number of Serb troops 
and police forces in the province.“ Cit. Council of Europe: Crisis in Kosovo and situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Report, 26.01.1999); “On the one hand was a government that was doing some very bad things, in terms of denying rights to the 
Albanian community, which was 90 percent of the population of Kosovo. When the security services were, quote, "in pursuit of 
a terrorist or a band of terrorists," unquote, they would go in and just destroy a village. On the other side, you had the KLA, 
which also did some bad things, but it was usually of a scale that was totally different. So maintaining that even-handedness was 
difficult.” FRONTLINE - Interview with William Walker, Former Director of the KVM 
464 Monitoring the Northern Ireland Ceasefires, pp 4 
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v průběhu svého nasazení dokázala udržovat celkový klid zbraní skrze úspěšnou mediaci na 
lokální úrovni. Kolaps mírového procesu na nejvyšší úrovni ale bohužel přišel ještě před tím, než 
mise dokázala plně rozvinout svojí operační kapacitu. Eskalace násilí v průběhu ledna a února 
1999 byla primárním strategickým cílem Kosovské osvobozenecké armády (KLA, UCK), která, 
podpořena politikou některých Západních zemí (především USA), získala svoji agresivní 
politikou faktickou moc nad děním v Kosovu, odsunujíc do pozadí umírněnou politiku Ibrahima 
Rugovy. Nebylo v možnostech ani povinnostech KVM tomuto vývoji zabránit. Z tohoto 
důvodu není možné hovořit o selhání KVM, ale o selhání či nechuti mezinárodního společenství 
tomuto konfliktu zabránit.  
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Appendix I – United Nations Security Council Resolution 1160 (1998) 
S/RES/1160 (1998) 
31 March 1998 
 
Source: http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1160.htm (visited 07.04.2008) 
 
 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3868th meeting, on 31 March 1998 
 
 
The Security Council,  
 
Noting with appreciation the statements of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, the 
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United 
States of America (the Contact Group) of 9 and 25 March 1998 (S/1998/223 and S/1998/272), 
including the proposal on a comprehensive arms embargo on the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, including Kosovo,  
 
Welcoming the decision of the Special Session of the Permanent Council of the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) of 11 March 1998 (S/1998/246),  
 
Condemning the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful 
demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army or any 
other group or individual and all external support for terrorist activity in Kosovo, including 
finance, arms and training, 
 
Noting the declaration of 18 March 1998 by the President of the Republic of Serbia on the 
political process in Kosovo and Metohija (S/1998/250),  
 
Noting also the clear commitment of senior representatives of the Kosovar Albanian community 
to non-violence,  
 
Noting that there has been some progress in implementing the actions indicated in the Contact 
Group statement of 9 March 1998, but stressing that further progress is required,  
 
Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,  
 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,  
 
1. Calls upon the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia immediately to take the further necessary steps 
to achieve a political solution to the issue of Kosovo through dialogue and to implement the 
actions indicated in the Contact Group statements of 9 and 25 March 1998;  
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2. Calls also upon the Kosovar Albanian leadership to condemn all terrorist action, and 
emphasizes that all elements in the Kosovar Albanian community should pursue their goals by 
peaceful means only;  
 
3. Underlines that the way to defeat violence and terrorism in Kosovo is for the authorities in 
Belgrade to offer the Kosovar Albanian community a genuine political process;  
 
4. Calls upon the authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community 
urgently to enter without preconditions into a meaningful dialogue on political status issues, and 
notes the readiness of the Contact Group to facilitate such a dialogue;  
 
5. Agrees, without prejudging the outcome of that dialogue, with the proposal in the Contact 
Group statements of 9 and 25 March 1998 that the principles for a solution of the Kosovo 
problem should be based on the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and 
should be in accordance with OSCE standards, including those set out in the Helsinki Final Act 
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of 1975, and the Charter of the 
United Nations, and that such a solution must also take into account the rights of the Kosovar 
Albanians and all who live in Kosovo, and expresses its support for an enhanced status for 
Kosovo which would include a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-
administration;  
 
6. Welcomes the signature on 23 March 1998 of an agreement on measures to implement the 
1996 Education Agreement, calls upon all parties to ensure that its implementation proceeds 
smoothly and without delay according to the agreed timetable and expresses its readiness to 
consider measures if either party blocks implementation;  
 
7. Expresses its support for the efforts of the OSCE for a peaceful resolution of the crisis in 
Kosovo, including through the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office for the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, who is also the Special Representative of the European Union, 
and the return of the OSCE long-term missions;  
 
8. Decides that all States shall, for the purposes of fostering peace and stability in Kosovo, 
prevent the sale or supply to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, by their 
nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels and aircraft, of arms and related 
matériel of all types, such as weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment and 
spare parts for the aforementioned, and shall prevent arming and training for terrorist activities 
there;  
 
9. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a 
committee of the Security Council, consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake 
the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and 
recommendations:  
 
(a) to seek from all States information regarding the action taken by them concerning the 
effective implementation of the prohibitions imposed by this resolution;  
 
(b) to consider any information brought to its attention by any State concerning violations of the 
prohibitions imposed by this resolution and to recommend appropriate measures in response 
thereto;  
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(c) to make periodic reports to the Security Council on information submitted to it regarding 
alleged violations of the prohibitions imposed by this resolution;  
 
(d) to promulgate such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the 
prohibitions imposed by this resolution;  
 
(e) to examine the reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 below;  
 
10. Calls upon all States and all international and regional organizations to act strictly in 
conformity with this resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights granted or 
obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or of any contract entered into 
or any license or permit granted prior to the entry into force of the prohibitions imposed by this 
resolution, and stresses in this context the importance of continuing implementation of the 
Agreement on Subregional Arms Control signed in Florence on 14 June 1996;  
 
11. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the committee 
established by paragraph 9 above and to make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for 
this purpose;  
 
12. Requests States to report to the committee established by paragraph 9 above within 30 days 
of adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken to give effect to the prohibitions 
imposed by this resolution;  
 
13. Invites the OSCE to keep the Secretary-General informed on the situation in Kosovo and on 
measures taken by that organization in this regard;  
 
14. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed and to report on the 
situation in Kosovo and the implementation of this resolution no later than 30 days following 
the adoption of this resolution and every 30 days thereafter;  
 
15. Further requests that the Secretary-General, in consultation with appropriate regional 
organizations, include in his first report recommendations for the establishment of a 
comprehensive regime to monitor the implementation of the prohibitions imposed by this 
resolution, and calls upon all States, in particular neighbouring States, to extend full cooperation 
in this regard;  
 
16. Decides to review the situation on the basis of the reports of the Secretary-General, which 
will take into account the assessments of, inter alia, the Contact Group, the OSCE and the 
European Union, and decides also to reconsider the prohibitions imposed by this resolution, 
including action to terminate them, following receipt of the assessment of the Secretary-General 
that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, cooperating in a constructive 
manner with the Contact Group, have:  
 
(a) begun a substantive dialogue in accordance with paragraph 4 above, including the 
participation of an outside representative or representatives, unless any failure to do so is not 
because of the position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or Serbian authorities;  
 
(b) withdrawn the special police units and ceased action by the security forces affecting the 
civilian population;  
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(c) allowed access to Kosovo by humanitarian organizations as well as representatives of Contact 
Group and other embassies;  
 
(d) accepted a mission by the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office for the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that would include a new and specific mandate for addressing the 
problems in Kosovo, as well as the return of the OSCE long-term missions;  
 
(e) facilitated a mission to Kosovo by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights;  
 
17. Urges the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal established pursuant to 
resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 to begin gathering information related to the violence in 
Kosovo that may fall within its jurisdiction, and notes that the authorities of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia have an obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal and that the Contact 
Group countries will make available to the Tribunal substantiated relevant information in their 
possession;  
 
18. Affirms that concrete progress to resolve the serious political and human rights issues in 
Kosovo will improve the international position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and 
prospects for normalization of its international relationships and full participation in 
international institutions;  
 
19. Emphasizes that failure to make constructive progress towards the peaceful resolution of the 
situation in Kosovo will lead to the consideration of additional measures;  
 
20. Decides to remain seized of the matter.  
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Appendix II – United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199 (1998) 
S/RES/1199 (1998) 
23 September1998 
 
Source: http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1199.htm (visited 07.04.2008) 
 
 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3930th meeting on 23 September 1998 
 
 
The Security Council,  
 
Recalling its resolution 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998,  
 
Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General pursuant to that resolution, and in 
particular his report of 4 September 1998 (S/1998/834 and Add.1),  
 
Noting with appreciation the statement of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, the 
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United 
States of America (the Contact Group) of 12 June 1998 at the conclusion of the Contact Group's 
meeting with the Foreign Ministers of Canada and Japan (S/1998/567, annex), and the further 
statement of the Contact Group made in Bonn on 8 July 1998 (S/1998/657),  
 
Noting also with appreciation the joint statement by the Presidents of the Russian Federation 
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 16 June 1998 (S/1998/526),  
 
Noting further the communication by the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia to the Contact Group on 7 July 1998, expressing the view that the situation 
in Kosovo represents an armed conflict within the terms of the mandate of the Tribunal,  
 
Gravely concerned at the recent intense fighting in Kosovo and in particular the excessive and 
indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army which have 
resulted in numerous civilian casualties and, according to the estimate of the Secretary-General, 
the displacement of over 230,000 persons from their homes,  
 
Deeply concerned by the flow of refugees into northern Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
other European countries as a result of the use of force in Kosovo, as well as by the increasing 
numbers of displaced persons within Kosovo, and other parts of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, up to 50,000 of whom the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has 
estimated are without shelter and other basic necessities,  
 
Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety, and 
underlining the responsibility of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for creating the conditions 
which allow them to do so,  
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Condemning all acts of violence by any party, as well as terrorism in pursuit of political goals by 
any group or individual, and all external support for such activities in Kosovo, including the 
supply of arms and training for terrorist activities in Kosovo and expressing concern at the 
reports of continuing violations of the prohibitions imposed by resolution 1160 (1998),  
 
Deeply concerned by the rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation throughout Kosovo, 
alarmed at the impending humanitarian catastrophe as described in the report of the Secretary-
General, and emphasizing the need to prevent this from happening,  
 
Deeply concerned also by reports of increasing violations of human rights and of international 
humanitarian law, and emphasizing the need to ensure that the rights of all inhabitants of 
Kosovo are respected,  
 
Reaffirming the objectives of resolution 1160 (1998), in which the Council expressed support for 
a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem which would include an enhanced status for 
Kosovo, a substantially greater degree of autonomy, and meaningful self-administration,  
 
Reaffirming also the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,  
 
Affirming that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,  
 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,  
 
1. Demands that all parties, groups and individuals immediately cease hostilities and maintain a 
ceasefire in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which would enhance the prospects for a 
meaningful dialogue between the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Kosovo Albanian leadership and reduce the risks of a humanitarian catastrophe;  
 
2. Demands also that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo 
Albanian leadership take immediate steps to improve the humanitarian situation and to avert the 
impending humanitarian catastrophe;  
 
3. Calls upon the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian 
leadership to enter immediately into a meaningful dialogue without preconditions and with 
international involvement, and to a clear timetable, leading to an end of the crisis and to a 
negotiated political solution to the issue of Kosovo, and welcomes the current efforts aimed at 
facilitating such a dialogue;  
 
4. Demands further that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in addition to the measures called 
for under resolution 1160 (1998), implement immediately the following concrete measures 
towards achieving a political solution to the situation in Kosovo as contained in the Contact 
Group statement of 12 June 1998:  
 
(a) cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian population and order the 
withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression;  
(b) enable effective and continuous international monitoring in Kosovo by the European 
Community Monitoring Mission and diplomatic missions accredited to the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, including access and complete freedom of movement of such monitors to, from and 
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within Kosovo unimpeded by government authorities, and expeditious issuance of appropriate 
travel documents to international personnel contributing to the monitoring;  
 
(c) facilitate, in agreement with the UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes and allow free and 
unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations and supplies to Kosovo;  
 
(d) make rapid progress to a clear timetable, in the dialogue referred to in paragraph 3 with the 
Kosovo Albanian community called for in resolution 1160 (1998), with the aim of agreeing 
confidence-building measures and finding a political solution to the problems of Kosovo;  
 
5. Notes, in this connection, the commitments of the President of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, in his joint statement with the President of the Russian Federation of 16 June 1998:  
 
(a) to resolve existing problems by political means on the basis of equality for all citizens and 
ethnic communities in Kosovo;  
 
(b) not to carry out any repressive actions against the peaceful population;  
 
(c) to provide full freedom of movement for and ensure that there will be no restrictions on 
representatives of foreign States and international institutions accredited to the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia monitoring the situation in Kosovo;  
 
(d) to ensure full and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations, the ICRC and the 
UNHCR, and delivery of humanitarian supplies;  
 
(e) to facilitate the unimpeded return of refugees and displaced persons under programmes 
agreed with the UNHCR and the ICRC, providing State aid for the reconstruction of destroyed 
homes,  
 
and calls for the full implementation of these commitments;  
 
6. Insists that the Kosovo Albanian leadership condemn all terrorist action, and emphasizes that 
all elements in the Kosovo Albanian community should pursue their goals by peaceful means 
only;  
 
7. Recalls the obligations of all States to implement fully the prohibitions imposed by resolution 
1160 (1998);  
 
8. Endorses the steps taken to establish effective international monitoring of the situation in 
Kosovo, and in this connection welcomes the establishment of the Kosovo Diplomatic 
Observer Mission;  
 
9. Urges States and international organizations represented in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
to make available personnel to fulfil the responsibility of carrying out effective and continuous 
international monitoring in Kosovo until the objectives of this resolution and those of resolution 
1160 (1998) are achieved;  
 
10. Reminds the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that it has the primary responsibility for the 
security of all diplomatic personnel accredited to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as 
the safety and security of all international and non-governmental humanitarian personnel in the 
Vladimír Randáček                                                                 The OSCE Kosovo Verification mission 1998-1999 
112 
 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and calls upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and all others concerned in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to take all appropriate 
steps to ensure that monitoring personnel performing functions under this resolution are not 
subject to the threat or use of force or interference of any kind;  
 
11. Requests States to pursue all means consistent with their domestic legislation and relevant 
international law to prevent funds collected on their territory being used to contravene resolution 
1160 (1998);  
 
12. Calls upon Member States and others concerned to provide adequate resources for 
humanitarian assistance in the region and to respond promptly and generously to the United 
Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance Related to the Kosovo 
Crisis;  
 
13. Calls upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the leaders of the Kosovo 
Albanian community and all others concerned to cooperate fully with the Prosecutor of the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the investigation of possible violations 
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal;  
 
14. Underlines also the need for the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to bring to 
justice those members of the security forces who have been involved in the mistreatment of 
civilians and the deliberate destruction of property;  
 
15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide regular reports to the Council as necessary on his 
assessment of compliance with this resolution by the authorities of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and all elements in the Kosovo Albanian community, including through his regular 
reports on compliance with resolution 1160 (1998);  
 
16. Decides, should the concrete measures demanded in this resolution and resolution 1160 
(1998) not be taken, to consider further action and additional measures to maintain or restore 
peace and stability in the region;  
 
17. Decides to remain seized of the matter.  
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Appendix III – United Nations Security Council Resolution 1203 (1998) 
S/RES/1203 (1998) 
234 October 1998 
 
Source: http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1203.htm (visited 07.04.2008) 
 
 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3937th meeting, on 24 October 1998 
 
 
The Security Council, 
 
Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998 and 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 
and the importance of the peaceful resolution of the problem of Kosovo, Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia,  
 
Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General pursuant to those resolutions, in 
particular his report of 5 October 1998 (S/1998/912),  
 
Welcoming the agreement signed in Belgrade on 16 October 1998 by the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Chairman-in-Office of the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) providing for the OSCE to establish a 
verification mission in Kosovo (S/1998/978), including the undertaking of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia to comply with resolutions 1160 (1998) and 1199 (1998),  
 
Welcoming also the agreement signed in Belgrade on 15 October 1998 by the Chief of General 
Staff of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) providing for the establishment of an air 
verification mission over Kosovo (S/1998/991, annex), complementing the OSCE Verification 
Mission,  
 
Welcoming also the decision of the Permanent Council of the OSCE of 15 October 1998 
(S/1998/959, annex),  
 
Welcoming the decision of the Secretary-General to send a mission to the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia to establish a first-hand capacity to assess developments on the ground in Kosovo,  
 
Reaffirming that, under the Charter of the United Nations, primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security is conferred on the Security Council,  
 
Recalling the objectives of resolution 1160 (1998), in which the Council expressed support for a 
peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem which would include an enhanced status for Kosovo, 
a substantially greater degree of autonomy, and meaningful self-administration,  
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Condemning all acts of violence by any party, as well as terrorism in pursuit of political goals by 
any group or individual, and all external support for such activities in Kosovo, including the 
supply of arms and training for terrorist activities in Kosovo, and expressing concern at the 
reports of continuing violations of the prohibitions imposed by resolution 1160 (1998),  
 
Deeply concerned at the recent closure by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
of independent media outlets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and emphasizing the need 
for these to be allowed freely to resume their operations,  
 
Deeply alarmed and concerned at the continuing grave humanitarian situation throughout 
Kosovo and the impending humanitarian catastrophe, and re-emphasizing the need to prevent 
this from happening,  
 
Stressing the importance of proper coordination of humanitarian initiatives undertaken by States, 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and international organizations in Kosovo,  
 
Emphasizing the need to ensure the safety and security of members of the Verification Mission 
in Kosovo and the Air Verification Mission over Kosovo,  
 
Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,  
 
Affirming that the unresolved situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes a 
continuing threat to peace and security in the region,  
 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,  
 
1. Endorses and supports the agreements signed in Belgrade on 16 October 1998 between the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the OSCE, and on 15 October 1998 between the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO, concerning the verification of compliance by the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and all others concerned in Kosovo with the requirements of its 
resolution 1199 (1998), and demands the full and prompt implementation of these agreements 
by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;  
 
2. Notes the endorsement by the Government of Serbia of the accord reached by the President 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the United States Special Envoy (S/1998/953, annex), 
and the public commitment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to complete negotiations on a 
framework for a political settlement by 2 November 1998, and calls for the full implementation 
of these commitments;  
 
3. Demands that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia comply fully and swiftly with resolutions 
1160 (1998) and 1199 (1998) and cooperate fully with the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo 
and the NATO Air Verification Mission over Kosovo according to the terms of the agreements 
referred to in paragraph 1 above;  
 
4. Demands also that the Kosovo Albanian leadership and all other elements of the Kosovo 
Albanian community comply fully and swiftly with resolutions 1160 (1998) and 1199 (1998) and 
cooperate fully with the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo;  
 
5. Stresses the urgent need for the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Kosovo Albanian leadership to enter immediately into a meaningful dialogue without 
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preconditions and with international involvement, and to a clear timetable, leading to an end of 
the crisis and to a negotiated political solution to the issue of Kosovo;  
 
6. Demands that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Kosovo Albanian 
leadership and all others concerned respect the freedom of movement of the OSCE Verification 
Mission and other international personnel;  
 
7. Urges States and international organizations to make available personnel to the OSCE 
Verification Mission in Kosovo;  
 
8. Reminds the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that it has the primary responsibility for the 
safety and security of all diplomatic personnel accredited to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
including members of the OSCE Verification Mission, as well as the safety and security of all 
international and non-governmental humanitarian personnel in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, and calls upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and all others 
concerned throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia including the Kosovo Albanian 
leadership, to take all appropriate steps to ensure that personnel performing functions under this 
resolution and the agreements referred to in paragraph 1 above are not subject to the threat or 
use of force or interference of any kind;  
 
9. Welcomes in this context the commitment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to guarantee 
the safety and security of the Verification Missions as contained in the agreements referred to in 
paragraph 1 above, notes that, to this end, the OSCE is considering arrangements to be 
implemented in cooperation with other organizations, and affirms that, in the event of an 
emergency, action may be needed to ensure their safety and freedom of movement as envisaged 
in the agreements referred to in paragraph 1 above;  
 
10. Insists that the Kosovo Albanian leadership condemn all terrorist actions, demands that such 
actions cease immediately and emphasizes that all elements in the Kosovo Albanian community 
should pursue their goals by peaceful means only;  
 
11. Demands immediate action from the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and 
the Kosovo Albanian leadership to cooperate with international efforts to improve the 
humanitarian situation and to avert the impending humanitarian catastrophe;  
 
12. Reaffirms the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety, 
and underlines the responsibility of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for creating the 
conditions which allow them to do so;  
 
13. Urges Member States and others concerned to provide adequate resources for humanitarian 
assistance in the region and to respond promptly and generously to the United Nations 
Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance Related to the Kosovo crisis;  
 
14. Calls for prompt and complete investigation, including international supervision and 
participation, of all atrocities committed against civilians and full cooperation with the 
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, including compliance with its orders, requests 
for information and investigations;  
 
15. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall not 
apply to relevant equipment for the sole use of the Verification Missions in accordance with the 
agreements referred to in paragraph 1 above;  
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16. Requests the Secretary-General, acting in consultation with the parties concerned with the 
agreements referred to in paragraph 1 above, to report regularly to the Council regarding 
implementation of this resolution;  
 
17. Decides to remain seized of the matter.  
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Appendix IV – Agreement on the Kosovo Verification Mission 
 
Source: http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/Kosovo/Kosovo-Documents3.htm (visited 07.04.2008) 
 
Devoted to the respect of the principles of the UN Charter and to the Principles of the Helsinki 
Final Act on peace, stability and cooperation in Europe, as well as to the Paris Charter,  
 Considering in particular the importance of reaching a peaceful, democratic and lasting 
solution of all existing problems in the Province of Kosovo and Metohija, based on the 
equality of all citizens and national and ethnic communities,  
 Devoted to the respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in the 
region,  
 Agreeing to comply with and willing to contribute to the FRY implementation of 
Resolutions 1160 and 1199 of the UN Security Council,  
 The Federal Government of the FR of Yugoslavia, on one side,  
o and, The OSCE, on the other,  
o have reached the following  
AGREEMENT  
I. Establishment and Termination  
1. The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission will be established by the OSCE 
Permanent Council pursuant to a resolution of the United Nations Security 
Council calling upon the OSCE to establish the Mission.  
2. The FRY government has informed the OSCE Chairman-in-Office of its 
endorsement of the establishment of the Mission.  
3. OSCE will request member states to contribute personnel and funding for the 
Verification Mission in accordance with established procedures.  
4. OSCE will establish coordination with other organizations it may deem 
appropriate to allow the Verification Mission to accomplish all its objectives most 
effectively.  
5. KDOM will act in place of the OSCE Verification Mission pending its 
establishment. Once OSCE is operational, KDOM will be absorbed by the 
Verification Mission.  
6. The FRY government hereby guarantees the safety and security of the 
Verification Mission and all its members.  
7. In the event of an emergency situation in Kosovo which in the judgement of the 
Mission Director threatens the safety of members of the Verification Mission, the 
FRY shall permit and cooperate in the evacuation of Verification Mission 
members.  
8. The FRY government will accept the OSCE Verification Mission as a diplomatic 
entity in terms of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The Mission 
will enjoy the privileges and immunities conferred by such status, as will its 
members, in accordance with the Vienna Convention.  
9. The FRY government and its entities will designate formal liaison officers to 
work with the Verification Mission in Belgrade, Pristina and field locations. The 
FRY, Serbian and Kosovo authorities will undertake to provide full cooperation 
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and support to the Verification Mission. This will include, but not be limited to, 
billets, frequency or frequencies, visas and documentation, customs facilities, 
vehicle registration, fuel, medical support, airspace access for support aircraft and 
access to Belgrade, Pristina and other airports in accordance with normal 
procedures.  
10. The OSCE and the FRY agree on a Verification Mission for one year, with 
extensions upon request of either the OSCE Chairman-in-Office or the FRY 
government.  
II. General Responsibilities, Roles and Missions  
1. To verify compliance by all parties in Kosovo with UN Security Council 
Resolution 1199, and report instances of progress and/or non-compliance to the 
OSCE Permanent Council, the United Nations Security Council and other 
organizations. These reports will also be provided to the authorities of the FRY.  
2. To establish permanent presences at as many locations throughout Kosovo as it 
deems necessary to fulfil its responsibilities;  
3. To maintain close liaison with FRY, Serbian and, as appropriate, other Kosovo 
authorities, political parties and other organizations in Kosovo and accredited 
international and non-government organizations to assist in fulfilling its 
responsibilities;  
4. To supervise elections in Kosovo to ensure their openness and fairness in 
accordance with regulations and procedures to be agreed. For the elections, the 
Mission may be augmented with election support personnel;  
5. To report and make recommendations to the OSCE Permanent Council, the UN 
Security Council and other organizations on areas covered by UN Security 
Council Resolution 1199.  
III. Specific Terms of Reference  
1. The Verification Mission will travel throughout Kosovo to verify the 
maintenance of the cease-fire by all elements. It will investigate reports of cease-
fire violations. Mission personnel will have full freedom of movement and access 
throughout Kosovo at all times.  
2. The Verification Mission will receive weekly information from relevant 
FRY/Serbian military/police headquarters in Kosovo regarding movements of 
forces during the preceding week into, out of or within Kosovo. Upon request of 
the Verification Mission Director, Mission personnel may be invited to 
accompany police within Kosovo.  
3. The Verification Mission will look for and report on roadblocks and other 
emplacements which influence lines of communication erected for purposes 
other than traffic or crime control. The Mission Director will contact the relevant 
authorities upon receipt of such reports. These authorities will explain the 
reasons for the emplacements or else direct that the emplacements be removed 
immediately. The Verification Mission will also receive notification should 
emergent circumstances lead to the establishment of a roadblock for other than 
traffic or crime control-related reasons. The Mission Director may request the 
removal of any roadblocks.  
4. The Verification Mission will maintain liaison with FRY authorities about border 
control activities and movements by units with border control responsibilities 
through areas of Kosovo away from the border. The Verification Mission, when 
invited by the FRY authorities or upon its request, will visit border control units 
and accompany them as they perform their normal border control roles.  
5. When invited or upon request, the Verification mission will accompany police 
units in Kosovo as they perform their normal policing roles.  
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6. The Verification Mission will, to the extent possible, assist UNHCR, ICRC and 
other international organizations in facilitating the return of displaced persons to 
their homes, the provision of facilitative and humanitarian assistance to them by 
the FRY, Serbian and Kosovo authorities as well as the humanitarian 
organizations and NGOs. The Mission will verify the level of cooperation and 
support provided by the FRY and its entities to the humanitarian organizations 
and accredited NGOs in facilitating procedural requirements such as issuance of 
travel documentation, expedited customs clearance for humanitarian shipments 
and radio frequencies. The Mission will make such representations as it deems 
necessary to resolve problems it observes.  
7. As the political settlement defining Kosovo´s self-government is achieved and 
implementation begins, the Mission Director will assist, both with his own 
resources and with augmented OSCE implementation support, in areas such as 
election supervision, assistance in the establishment of Kosovo institutions and 
police force development in Kosovo.  
8. The Mission Director will receive periodic updates from the relevant authorities 
concerning eventual allegations of abusive actions by military or police personnel 
and status of disciplinary or legal actions against individuals implicated in such 
abuses.  
9. The Verification Mission will maintain liaison with FRY, Serbian and, as 
appropriate, Kosovo authorities and with ICRC regarding ICRC access to 
detained persons.  
10. The Mission Director will, as required, convene representatives of national 
communities and authorities to exchange information and provide guidance on 
implementation of the agreement establishing the Verification Mission.  
11. The Mission Director will report instances of progress and/or non-compliance 
or lack of full cooperation from any side to the OSCE and other organizations.  
12.  
   
IV. Composition and Facilities  
1. A Director, together with headquarters staff to be determined by Verification 
Mission requirements.  
2. 2000 unarmed verifiers from OSCE member states will be permitted. 
Headquarters and support staff included in this total. The Mission may be 
augmented with technical experts provided by OSCE.  
3. A headquarters in Pristina.  
4. Field presence in locations around Kosovo to be determined by the Mission 
Director.  
5. A small liaison office in Belgrade.  
6. Vehicles, communications and other equipment along with locally-hired 
interpreters and support staff which the Director deems to be required for the 
performance of the responsibilities of the Mission.  
V. Field Presence  
1. Coordination centers will be established in the capital of each opstina in Kosovo 
with specific areas of responsibility, under the Mission Director in Pristina.  
2. Many opstina coordination centers will have one or more sub-stations in smaller 
towns/villages in the opstina. The number and location of sub-stations will vary 
from opstina to opstina, depending on the verification environment and past 
conflict situation.  
3. The chief of each coordination center will maintain a liaison relationship with the 
opstina authorities and the local leadership of the ethnic Albanian and other 
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communities. Each sub-station will be responsible for coordination with the local 
authorities, including the local leadership of main ethnic groups.  
4. The number of verification personnel assigned to each coordination center and 
sub-station would depend on the complexity of verification issues in the 
particular area.  
5. Each coordination center and sub-station would have appropriately configured 
vehicles with which to patrol its assigned area of responsibility. 
   
Done at Belgrade on 16 October 1998 in two original copies in the English and Serbian 
languages.  
   
FOR THE ORGANIZATION FOR 
COOPERATION AND SECURITY IN EUROPE 
FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 
OF YUGOSLAVIA 
H.E. Bronislaw Geremek  
Chairman-in-Office 
H.E. Zivadin Jovanovic  
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
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Appendix V – The Rambouillet Agreement 
 
Appendix B: Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force 
 
Source: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html (visited 11.04.2008) 
 
1. For the purposes of this Appendix, the following expressions shall have the meanings 
hereunder assigned to them:  
 
a. "NATO" means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), its subsidiary bodies, its 
military Headquarters, the NATO-led KFOR, and any elements/units forming any part of 
KFOR or supporting KFOR, whether or not they are from a NATO member country and 
whether or not they are under NATO or national command and control, when acting in 
furtherance of this Agreement.  
 
b. "Authorities in the FRY" means appropriate authorities, whether Federal, Republic, Kosovo 
or other.  
 
c. "NATO personnel" means the military, civilian, and contractor personnel assigned or attached 
to or employed by NATO, including the military, civilian, and contractor personnel from non-
NATO states participating in the Operation, with the exception of personnel locally hired.  
 
d. "the Operation" means the support, implementation, preparation, and participation by NATO 
and NATO personnel in furtherance of this Chapter.  
 
e. "Military Headquarters" means any entity, whatever its denomination, consisting of or 
constituted in part by NATO military personnel established in order to fulfill the Operation.  
 
f. "Authorities" means the appropriate responsible individual, agency, or organization of the 
Parties.  
 
g. "Contractor personnel" means the technical experts or functional specialists whose services 
are required by NATO and who are in the territory of the FRY exclusively to serve NATO 
either in an advisory capacity in technical matters, or for the setting up, operation, or 
maintenance of equipment, unless they are:  
 
(1) nationals of the FRY; or  
(2) persons ordinarily resident in the FRY.  
 
h. "Official use" means any use of goods purchased, or of the services received and intended for 
the performance of any function as required by the operation of the Headquarters.  
 
i. "Facilities" means all buildings, structures, premises, and land required for conducting the 
operational, training, and administrative activities by NATO for the Operation as well as for 
accommodation of NATO personnel.  
 
2. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities under this Appendix, all NATO 
personnel shall respect the laws applicable in the FRY, whether Federal, Republic, Kosovo, or 
other, insofar as compliance with those laws is compatible with the entrusted tasks/mandate and 
shall refrain from activities not compatible with the nature of the Operation.  
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3. The Parties recognize the need for expeditious departure and entry procedures for NATO 
personnel. Such personnel shall be exempt from passport and visa regulations and the 
registration requirements applicable to aliens. At all entry and exit points to/from the FRY, 
NATO personnel shall be permitted to enter/exit the FRY on production of a national 
identification (ID) card. NATO personnel shall carry identification which they may be requested 
to produce for the authorities in the FRY, but operations, training, and movement shall not be 
allowed to be impeded or delayed by such requests.  
 
4. NATO military personnel shall normally wear uniforms, and NATO personnel may possess 
and carry arms if authorized to do so by their orders. The Parties shall accept as valid, without 
tax or fee, drivers' licenses and permits issued to NATO personnel by their respective national 
authorities.  
 
5. NATO shall be permitted to display the NATO flag and/or national flags of its constituent 
national elements/units on any NATO uniform, means of transport, or facility.  
 
6. a. NATO shall be immune from all legal process, whether civil, administrative, or criminal.  
 
b. NATO personnel, under all circumstances and at all times, shall be immune from the Parties' 
jurisdiction in respect of any civil, administrative, criminal, or disciplinary offenses which may be 
committed by them in the FRY. The Parties shall assist States participating in the Operation in 
the exercise of their jurisdiction over their own nationals.  
 
c. Notwithstanding the above, and with the NATO Commander's express agreement in each 
case, the authorities in the FRY may exceptionally exercise jurisdiction in such matters, but only 
in respect of Contractor personnel who are not subject to the jurisdiction of their nation of 
citizenship.  
 
7. NATO personnel shall be immune from any form of arrest, investigation, or detention by the 
authorities in the FRY. NATO personnel erroneously arrested or detained shall immediately be 
turned over to NATO authorities.  
 
8. NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, 
free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associated 
airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the right of bivouac, 
maneuver, billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities as required for support, training, and 
operations.  
 
9. NATO shall be exempt from duties, taxes, and other charges and inspections and custom 
regulations including providing inventories or other routine customs documentation, for 
personnel, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, equipment, supplies, and provisions entering, exiting, or 
transiting the territory of the FRY in support of the Operation.  
 
10. The authorities in the FRY shall facilitate, on a priority basis and with all appropriate means, 
all movement of personnel, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, equipment, or supplies, through or in the 
airspace, ports, airports, or roads used. No charges may be assessed against NATO for air 
navigation, landing, or takeoff of aircraft, whether government-owned or chartered. Similarly, no 
duties, dues, tolls or charges may be assessed against NATO ships, whether government-owned 
or chartered, for the mere entry and exit of ports. Vehicles, vessels, and aircraft used in support 
of the Operation shall not be subject to licensing or registration requirements, nor commercial 
insurance.  
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11. NATO is granted the use of airports, roads, rails, and ports without payment of fees, duties, 
dues, tolls, or charges occasioned by mere use. NATO shall not, however, claim exemption from 
reasonable charges for specific services requested and received, but operations/movement and 
access shall not be allowed to be impeded pending payment for such services.  
 
12. NATO personnel shall be exempt from taxation by the Parties on the salaries and 
emoluments received from NATO and on any income received from outside the FRY.  
 
13. NATO personnel and their tangible moveable property imported into, acquired in, or 
exported from the FRY shall be exempt from all duties, taxes, and other charges and inspections 
and custom regulations.  
 
14. NATO shall be allowed to import and to export, free of duty, taxes and other charges, such 
equipment, provisions, and supplies as NATO shall require for the Operation, provided such 
goods are for the official use of NATO or for sale to NATO personnel. Goods sold shall be 
solely for the use of NATO personnel and not transferable to unauthorized persons.  
 
15. The Parties recognize that the use of communications channels is necessary for the 
Operation. NATO shall be allowed to operate its own internal mail services. The Parties shall, 
upon simple request, grant all telecommunications services, including broadcast services, needed 
for the Operation, as determined by NATO. This shall include the right to utilize such means 
and services as required to assure full ability to communicate, and the right to use all of the 
electro-magnetic spectrum for this purpose, free of cost. In implementing this right, NATO shall 
make every reasonable effort to coordinate with and take into account the needs and 
requirements of appropriate authorities in the FRY.  
 
16. The Parties shall provide, free of cost, such public facilities as NATO shall require to prepare 
for and execute the Operation. The Parties shall assist NATO in obtaining, at the lowest rate, the 
necessary utilities, such as electricity, water, gas and other resources, as NATO shall require for 
the Operation.  
 
17. NATO and NATO personnel shall be immune from claims of any sort which arise out of 
activities in pursuance of the Operation; however, NATO will entertain claims on an ex gratia 
basis.  
 
18. NATO shall be allowed to contract directly for the acquisition of goods, services, and 
construction from any source within and outside the FRY. Such contracts, goods, services, and 
construction shall not be subject to the payment of duties, taxes, or other charges. NATO may 
also carry out construction works with their own personnel.  
 
19. Commercial undertakings operating in the FRY only in the service of NATO shall be exempt 
from local laws and regulations with respect to the terms and conditions of their employment 
and licensing and registration of employees, businesses, and corporations.  
 
20. NATO may hire local personnel who on an individual basis shall remain subject to local laws 
and regulations with the exception of labor/employment laws. However, local personnel hired 
by NATO shall:  
a.  be immune from legal process in respect of words  
spoken or written and all acts performed by them in  
their official capacity; 
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b. be immune from national services and/or national  
military service obligations; 
  
c. be subject only to employment terms and  
conditions established by NATO; and 
 
 d. be exempt from taxation on the salaries and  
emoluments paid to them by NATO. 
 
21. In carrying out its authorities under this Chapter, NATO is authorized to detain individuals 
and, as quickly as possible, turn them over to appropriate officials.  
 
22. NATO may, in the conduct of the Operation, have need to make improvements or 
modifications to certain infrastructure in the FRY, such as roads, bridges, tunnels, buildings, and 
utility systems. Any such improvements or modifications of a non-temporary nature shall 
become part of and in the same ownership as that infrastructure. Temporary improvements or 
modifications may be removed at the discretion of the NATO Commander, and the 
infrastructure returned to as near its original condition as possible, fair wear and tear excepted.  
 
23. Failing any prior settlement, disputes with the regard to the interpretation or application of 
this Appendix shall be settled between NATO and the appropriate authorities in the FRY.  
 
24. Supplementary arrangements with any of the Parties may be concluded to facilitate any 
details connected with the Operation.  
 
25. The provisions of this Appendix shall remain in force until completion of the Operation or 
as the Parties and NATO otherwise agree.  
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Appendix VI – Code of Conduct of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission 
 
6th May 1998 
Souce: KVM Archive, OSCE Prague Office 
 
PRINCIPLE:  members of OSCE Missions shall conduct themselves at the highest personal and 
professional level at all times, while on duty or off duty. Mission members shall respect the 
authority of the Head of Mission or his/her designate, and be responsible to him/her for the 
proper performance of their duties and observance of this Code of conduct. 
 
COMPLIANCE WITH OSCE STANDARDS: Mission members shall comply at all times with 
the principles, norms and commitments of the OSCE as well as with the relevant provision of 
International Law. 
 
IMPARTIALITY: Mission members shall adhere to the mandate of the Mission in performing 
their duties. They shall refrain from any action that might cast doubt on their ability to act 
impartially.  
Mission members shall not use or attempt to use their position for private advantage, and shall 
not accept any gratuity of gift which goes beyond simple courtesy. 
 
LOYALTY: The work and conduct of mission members shall be in conformity with the interests 
of the OSCE. The responsibilities of serving an international community require discretion and 
tact. Mission members are expected to avoid all actions, statements and public activities which 
might be deterimental to the fulfilment of their functions. In particular, a Mission member shall 
not act in a manner which is likely to bring discredit to the Mission, its members and/or to the 
OSCE in general.  
 
SECURITY: Mission Members shall make every effort to ensure the security of the Mission as a 
whole and of its individual members, and shall follow closely all instructions regarding safety 
matters. 
 
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES: During their assignment, Mission members shall enjoy the 
privileges and immunities set forth in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the 
Vienna Convention on Special missions, and in the Provisions concerning the Legal Capacity of 
the CSCE Institutions and Privileges and Immunities, adopted by the CSCE Ministerial Council 
of 1 December 1993, as agreed between the OSCE and the host country/authorities concerned.  
 
It is emphasized that the privileges and immunities are granted to the Mission members in the 
interest of the OSCE and not for personal benefit. Whenever questions concerning privileges 
and immunities arise, the mission member concerned shall immediately report the matter 
through his/her supervisor to the Head of mission. 
 
Notwithstanding such privileges and immunities, mission members shall respect the laws and 
regulations of the host country, and local customs and traditions.  
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RELATIONS WITH NATIONAL AUTHORITIES: The duties of Mission members are 
international in character. Mission members shall not seek or accept instructions in the 
performance or their duties from their national authorities or any authority external to the 
OSCE. The must not allow national interests to interfere in any way with their ability to 
effectively carry out their OSCE tasks. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCERTION: Mission members shall exercise maximum 
discretion with regard to all matters relating to the activities of the Mission. After completion of 
their assignment, former Mission members wishing to go public (such as through interviews or 
research work) may describe the work of the Mission in general terms. They shall, however, 
refrain from disclosing at any time operational details or any information that might have a 
bearing or sensitive issues, or may negatively affect the activities and/or standing of the OSCE. 
In case of doubt, the OSCE Secretary general shall be consulted and, if required, his permission 
obtained. 
 
During their assignment (including duty or private travel outside the Mission area) Mission 
members shall not make public statements, grant interviews, or write articles, without prior 
authorisation by the Head of Mission or his/her designate. Mission members shall refrain from 
actions, statements or publications which are incompatible with their duties or obligations 
towards the OSCE.  
 
Mission reports are for the internal use of the OSCE and, through established channels, for the 
use of national authorities of participating states. 
 
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY: Mission members shall protect, manage and use OSCE resources 
and OSCE property efficiently and with necessary care, and must not wilfully, or through 
negligence, cause any waste, loss and/or damage to OSCE equipment (including automobiles), 
documents and resources. 
 
Mission members may be required to reimburse the OSCE, either partially or in full, for any 
financial loss suffered by the OSCE as a result of their gross negligence, including violation of 
OSCE regulations and instructions issued by the Head of Mission or on his/her behalf. 
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Appendix VII – OSCE KVM Alert Status Action 
Source: OSCE KVM Manual 
Alert Status Action Taken 
Alert Status ZERO 
Normal Working Environment 
Basic Personal Security Measures 
Arrival Security Documentation updated 
EAP Updated 
Communications and Emergency equipment inspected 
Alert Status ONE 
Potentially Deteriorating 
Environment 
EAG Convenes  
Lower Profile, travel in pairs 
Travel after dark must be approved 
Reporting of movements strictly enforced 
Maintain radio communications 
Vehicles 3/4 tanked 
Vehicle Security Inspections conducted as directed 
Alert Status TWO 
Deteriorating Environment 
(no direct threat to the OSCE 
members) 
Movement restricted to Emergencies only  
OSCE personnel remain in accomodations 
15 kilo bags packed 
Prepare Concentration point 
Establish OPS Room in Vienna 
Alert Status THREE 
Deteriorating Environment 
(direct threat to the OSCE 
members) 
OSCE PErsonnel proceed to Concentration Point 
Account for all personnel 
Bring 15 kilo bag 
Store additional luggage 
Stock food and beverages for minimum three days 
vehicles fully fueled 
Sitrep to EAG every three hours 
Armed security requested 
Alert Status FOUR 
Armed Conflict and/or  
Total Civil Disorder  
(within specific region) 
Evacuate to OSCE Contingency Location 
Secure sensitive items 
Bring 15 kilo bag and valuable OSCE property 
Bring up to 85 Kilos of luggage and additional OSCE 
Property 
Alert Status FIVE 
All out War 
Total Civil Disorder 
(throughout entire country) 
Option A – Evacuate out of country from OSCE 
Contingency Location without NATO assistance 
Option B – Evacuate out of country from OSCE 
Contingency Location with NATO assistance  
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Appendix VIII – The four Albanian vilayets as of 1898 
 
 
 
Source: www.answers.com (visited 20.05.2008) 
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Appendix IX – Kosovo: Situation As of July 1998 
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Appendix X – Kosovo Road Map 
 
 
Source: www.unmikonline.com (visited 20.05.2008) 
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Appendix XI – Pictures from the Field 
 
 
 
 
An OSCE KVM vehicle passes an Yugoslav T-55 tank. 
Source: www.wikipedia.com (visited 20.05.2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
The OSCE KVM vehicles during the withdrawal on 19th March 1999                                           
– the armoured Jeep Cherokee (center) and soft-skin Mitsubishi Pajero (left). 
Source: www.answers.com (visited 20.05.2008) 
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Appendix XII – OSCE KVM Command Structure As on 5th March 1999 
According to OSCE KVM Manual 
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Appendix XIII – OSCE KVM Locations As of  5 th March 1999  
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Appendix XIV – KVM Personnel and Selected Equipment List 
November 1998 – March 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
